Darnell Hatton a/k/a Darnal Hatton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 15 2017, 9:31 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darnell Hatton Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darnell Hatton, June 15, 2017
a/k/a Darnal Hatton, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 49A05-1612-CR-2826
Appeal from the Marion Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Marc T.
State of Indiana, Rothenberg, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
CR-79-324B
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Darnell Hatton appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct
erroneous sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
[2] In 1979, Hatton was convicted of Class B felony robbery, Class B felony
confinement, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony receiving stolen property.
He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty years each on the two
Class B felonies and four years each on the two Class D felonies, and his
sentence was enhanced by thirty years because he was found to be an habitual
offender.1 The sentencing order bears a stamp stating, “Commitments being
held in abeyance.” Appellant’s App. p. 15-16.
[3] On October 28, 2016, Hatton filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence,
arguing that the portion of the sentencing order directing that the sentence be
“held in abeyance” was erroneous. Id. The trial court denied the motion,
finding as follows: “Denied. Sentence herein was not postponed; Ct. simply
noted it would be run consecutively to other cases.”2 Id. at 9. Hatton now
appeals.
[4] A motion to correct erroneous sentence is appropriate only when the sentence is
erroneous on its face. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004)
1
In 1998, the trial court vacated Hatton’s conviction for receiving stolen property and the habitual offender
finding. Appellant’s App. p. 16.
2
On April 10, 1979, a trial court had imposed a sixty-year term on Hatton in another unrelated cause.
Appellant’s Br. p. 13-14. In the sentencing transcript for the instant offenses, the trial court did, in fact, state
that the sentences for these offenses “shall run consecutively to all other sentences to be imposed or
heretofore imposed by the Courts.” Appellant’s App. p. 17-19.
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(cautioning that “[c]laims that require consideration of the proceedings before,
during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct
erroneous sentence” and emphasizing that the narrow confines of this
procedure are to be strictly applied). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to correct erroneous sentence, we will reverse only if the ruling is
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court.
E.g., Hobbs v. State, 71 N.E.3d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
[5] At the time Hatton committed these offenses, the statute authorizing
consecutive sentences was generally found to apply only to those occasions
where the trial court was meting out two or more terms of imprisonment at one
time. E.g., Kendrick v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (Ind. 1988), superseded by
statute. At that time, however, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(b) stated as
follows:
If a person commits a crime:
(1) After having been arrested for another crime; and
(2) Before the date he is discharged from probation,
parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that
other crime;
The terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served
consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are
tried and the sentences are imposed.
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I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b) (1979). Our Supreme Court found that this statute does not
require consecutive sentences where the subsequent crime was committed
between arrest and sentencing for a prior crime, but does require consecutive
sentences where the subsequent offense occurred after sentencing for a prior
crime. Groff v. State, 488 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ind. 1986).
[6] In this case, it is impossible to tell from the face of the sentencing judgment
whether Hatton committed the instant crimes after having been sentenced for
another crime but not yet discharged from probation, parole, or incarceration.
To make that determination, the trial court would have been required to go
beyond the face of the judgment and examine the record, which is improper
when evaluating a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As a result, the trial
court did not err by denying Hatton’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. 3
[7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
3
We note that in Hatton’s direct appeal, our Supreme Court described Hatton’s criminal history in the year
leading up to his 1979 convictions in this case: in 1978, he was convicted of burglary, arrested for attempted
robbery, escaped from custody, convicted of robbery, kidnapping, rape, and criminal deviate conduct, and
convicted of burglary and murder; in 1979, he was convicted of escape. Hatton v. State, 439 N.E.2d 565, 569
(Ind. 1982). It seems nearly certain, therefore, that on July 25, 1979, when Hatton committed the instant
offenses, he had already been sentenced for another crime(s) but not yet discharged from probation, parole,
or incarceration.
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