Jorge Navarro v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 31 2015, 8:57 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald J. Berger Gregory F. Zoeller
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jorge Navarro, December 31, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1506-CR-587
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Elizabeth C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Hurley
Trial Court Cause No.
71D08-1409-F6-184
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Jorge Navarro refused to exit his car and fled from three police officers who
pursued him with activated lights and sirens at speeds of ninety miles per hour.
At his trial for resisting law enforcement, Navarro testified that he knew police
officers were pursuing him. He now argues that there is insufficient evidence
that he knew he was fleeing from a police officer. However, the evidence
presented at trial, including Navarro’s testimony, is sufficient to support his
conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 20, 2014, South Bend Police
Department Officer (SBPD) Joseph Carey, who was wearing his police uniform
and driving a marked police car, was dispatched to investigate the report of a
loud noise. Officer Carey noticed a silver car speeding through a residential
neighborhood. The officer then noticed that the car had stopped in the middle
of the street and was backing up toward the officer’s car. When the silver car
stopped, Officer Carey noticed that its front end was damaged and smoke was
coming out of the engine or the front tire. Officer Carey asked the driver,
Navarro, if he was okay. Navarro asked the officer if he wanted to race.
[3] Officer Carey turned on his car’s overhead lights and dashboard camera and
approached Navarro’s car. As he and Navarro were talking, Navarro reached
around the center console area. Concerned for his safety, Officer Carey radioed
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for back-up assistance. The officer also asked Navarro, who appeared
intoxicated, to exit his car. Navarro began revving his engine and refused to
comply with the Officer Carey’s request. SBPD Officer Devon Johnson arrived
at the scene, activated the lights on his police car, and also ordered Navarro to
exit his car. SBPD Officer Anuar Velazquez arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter, and the three officers attempted to remove Navarro from the car.
When they were unsuccessful, Officer Carey deployed his Taser. Navarro put
his car in gear and fled with the three officers in pursuit with activated lights
and sirens. SBPD Officer Greg Howard eventually joined in the pursuit, which
reached speeds of ninety miles per hour.
[4] As his tires began to smoke, Navarro struck a curb, exited his vehicle, and
threw himself on the ground. He was arrested and charged with resisting law
enforcement with a vehicle. At trial, Navarro testified that he knew the officers
were pursuing him because of the lights and sirens behind him. He also
admitted that “driving away from the police was a really bad choice.” Tr. p.
94. A jury convicted Navarro as charged, and he appeals his conviction.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Navarro’s sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Bell v. State, 31
N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is probative evidence from which
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a reasonable fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, we will affirm. Id.
[6] In order to convict Navarro of resisting law enforcement with a car, the State
had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally fled from a law enforcement
officer after the officer identified himself by visible or audible means, including
operation of the officer’s siren or emergency lights, and ordered Navarro to
stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a). The offense is a Level 6 felony if the
person, while committing the offense, operates a vehicle in a manner that
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person. I.C. § 34-44.1-3-
1(b). To be convicted for resisting law enforcement, the evidence must show
that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person he resisted was
a police officer. Mason v. State, 944 N.E.2d 68, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans.
denied.
[7] Here, Navarro’s sole contention is that there is insufficient evidence that
Navarro “kn[e]w that it was a police officer who ordered him to stop.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 5. However, our review of the evidence reveals that Officer
Carey, the first officer to approach Navarro’s car, was wearing a uniform and
driving a marked police car. During his initial conversation with Navarro, the
officer activated his emergency lights. Two other officers arrived at the scene in
marked cars with activated emergency lights before Navarro fled. In addition,
Navarro admitted at trial that he knew police officers were pursuing him
because of the lights and sirens behind him as well as the conflict he had with
the officers before he fled. This is sufficient evidence to prove that Navarro
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knew that it was a police officer who ordered him to stop and to support his
conviction of resisting law enforcement.
[8] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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