Arnell Lyles v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 12 2016, 9:13 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Arnell Lyles, October 12, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1603-CR-667
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G21-1312-FA-80037
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Arnell Lyles (“Lyles”) was convicted after a jury trial of Dealing in Cocaine, as
a Class A felony.1 He now appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
[3] Lyles raises a single issue for our review: whether the trial court’s admission of
a search warrant, together with related testimony, was fundamental error.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] On the evening of December 18, 2013, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department (“IMPD”) detectives, led by Detective Beniam Kumbi (“Detective
Kumbi”) and assisted by an IMPD SWAT team, executed a no-knock search
warrant of a residence in Indianapolis. Lyles was the only person in the home,
which contained little furniture except for a futon, a television, and a small
refrigerator in the kitchen.
[5] Police found Lyles in the kitchen. A search of Lyles’s person uncovered $195
in cash, a wallet, keys, a pair of dice, and two cellular phones. In the kitchen,
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b). Lyle’s offense was committed in 2013, prior to the effective date of substantial
changes to Indiana’s criminal statutes. We refer throughout to the statutes applicable at the time of Lyle’s
offense.
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police found $295 in cash tucked under the television, nineteen bindles of crack
cocaine on the counter, and two more cellular phones. There were no items of
paraphernalia typically used to consume cocaine, and Lyles exhibited no
outward signs of having used cocaine himself.
[6] Further into their search, the detectives opened the kitchen’s small refrigerator.
Within it they found some food and a loaded .38 revolver. Opening a kitchen
drawer, detectives located a box of bullets of the type that had been loaded into
the revolver. Subsequent analysis disclosed that Lyles’s fingerprints were on
this box.
[7] On December 19, 2013, the State charged Lyles with Dealing in Cocaine and
Possession of Cocaine, enhanced to a Class C felony because the alleged offense
was committed while Lyles possessed a firearm.2
[8] A jury trial was conducted on January 28 and 29, 2016. Shortly before the trial
commenced, the State moved to dismiss the enhancement for possession of a
firearm, and the trial court granted the State’s motion. At the trial’s conclusion,
the jury found Lyles guilty as charged of Dealing in Cocaine and Possession of
Cocaine.
[9] A sentencing hearing was conducted on March 8, 2016. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the trial court entered judgment of conviction against Lyles for
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-6(b).
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Dealing in Cocaine, and ordered the count of Possession of Cocaine merged.
The trial court then sentenced Lyles to twenty-eight years imprisonment, with
eight years suspended to probation, twelve years executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction, and eight years executed in Community
Corrections.
[10] This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] In his appeal, Lyles contends that the trial court’s admission into evidence of
the following were fundamental error: the search warrant and Detective
Kumbi’s testimony that, in issuing the warrant, the judge had credited police
statements. Lyles acknowledges that he did not object to admission of these
materials at trial.
[12] When a defendant has not objected to the admission of evidence at trial,
appellate review is waived unless there has been fundamental error. Halliburton
v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). The fundamental error doctrine is an
exception to the general rule of waiver. Id. “Hence, the ‘fundamental error’
exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a
blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is
substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due
process.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). For fundamental error to
exist, a fair trial must have been impossible or the complained-of error must
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constitute a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process.
Id. Relief on these grounds is available “only in egregious circumstances.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
[13] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, under most circumstances, a search
warrant and its supporting affidavit are inadmissible evidence. In Guajardo v.
State, the court noted that a probable cause affidavit and search warrant “have
no bearing on any issue before the jury” and thus should not have been
admitted into evidence. 496 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (Ind. 1986). The court
observed, “There is no reason for the trier of fact to view the probable cause
affidavit or search warrant, particularly since these documents often contain
statements highly prejudicial to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 177
Ind. App. 376, 378-79, 379 N.E.2d 987, 988-89 (1978)). However, the Guajardo
Court nevertheless affirmed the conviction based upon “strong identification
testimony” that rendered the error harmless. Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63, 67
(Ind. 2001) (citing Guajardo, supra).
[14] Both this Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have held that even when a
search warrant is erroneously admitted into evidence, reversible error arises
only when the defendant has been prejudiced. In Brown, the Indiana Supreme
Court concluded that a claim of prejudice that “consist[ed] entirely of
speculation that [Brown] was a victim of guilt by association,” was insufficient
to establish prejudice when other evidence indicated Brown’s motive and
presence at the scene of the crime. Id. at 68. And in Jacobs v. State, this Court
observed that prejudicial information is “often”—but not always—included in a
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search warrant. Id. at 999 (quoting Guajardo, 496 N.E.2d at 1303). Thus, we
affirmed as harmless error the admission of a search warrant into evidence
when 1) the warrant did not mention the defendant or contain allegations or
information the jury did not learn by other means, and 2) the defendant did not
articulate how the search warrant included information that could have
contributed to the verdict. Id. at 998-9 (quoting Guajardo, 496 N.E.2d at 1303).
[15] Here, Lyles argues that admission into evidence of the search warrant and
Detective Kumbi’s testimony was highly prejudicial. Lyles observes the search
warrant and Detective Kumbi’s testimony informed the jury that “a judge had
been presented with information about the house … and that the judge had
credited police officers’ statements about what they expected to find.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 13.) The warrant itself, Lyles notes, indicated that there
were individuals trafficking controlled substances at the home, and that the
warrant’s mention of “pre-recorded buy money” indicated that police had
already made a controlled buy at the residence. (Ex. 1.) Finally, Lyles draws
our attention to Detective Kumbi’s testimony that the warrant was a “no-
knock” warrant that was executed with the assistance of a SWAT team because
officers suspected there were weapons in the house based upon “prior
knowledge” of the home. (Tr. at 56.) Lyles argues that, in a possession case
like this one, because the jury would not have had this information without the
impermissible admission of the warrant and related testimony, and because this
information was not cumulative of other evidence presented at trial, “[t]he deck
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was unfairly stacked against [Lyles],” destroying his presumption of innocence.
(Appellant’s Br. at 15.)
[16] However, there was substantial independent evidence of Lyle’s guilt presented
at trial. Lyles was the sole occupant of the home when police searched it, and
he was in the kitchen where the nineteen pre-tied bindles of cocaine were
located, along with two cellular phones and nearly $300 in cash tucked under
the microwave. In addition, Lyles had nearly $200 and two other cellular
phones on his person. Photographs of Lyles were recovered from two of the
phones, as were photographs of a gun that strongly resembled the pistol found
in the kitchen refrigerator. The gun in the refrigerator was loaded with .38
caliber ammunition that was of the same type as the ammunition found in a
box in a kitchen drawer, and Lyle’s fingerprint was recovered from that box.
Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that any error in the admission of the
search warrant prejudiced Lyles—let alone that such prejudice might arise to
the level of a deprivation of Lyles’s right to a fair trial necessary to establish
fundamental error. We accordingly affirm Lyles’s conviction.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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