Edgar Santiago v. State of Indiana

FILED
Jul 03 2019, 7:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Zachary J. Stock Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney at Law, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Edgar Santiago, July 3, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-495
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark A. Smith,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D04-1806-CM-826
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-495 | July 3, 2019 Page 1 of 9
[1] Edgar Santiago appeals his conviction for Class A Misdemeanor Driving While
Suspended,1 arguing that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his
suspended driver’s license because the prolonged stop violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On June 19, 2018, Avon Police Department Officer Mercedes Spicer was
patrolling in her fully marked police car when she stopped behind a Toyota
truck at a red light. Officer Spicer ran a license plate check of the truck and
discovered that it belonged to a man named Valentine Hernandez and that
Hernandez’s license had been suspended. Officer Spicer spotted the driver of
the truck and saw that he, too, was a man. With this information, she turned on
her patrol lights and conducted a traffic stop under the suspicion that the driver,
who Officer Spicer believed was Hernandez, was operating a motor vehicle
with a suspended license.
[3] Officer Spicer then approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and told the
driver, who was later identified as Santiago, that she had stopped the vehicle
because the owner’s driver’s license had been suspended. Santiago, the sole
occupant of the vehicle, told Officer Spicer that his cousin owned the truck and
that he was not Valentine Hernandez. To confirm this information, Officer
1
Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2.
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Spicer asked Santiago for his driver’s license, but Santiago handed her a
Mexican identification (ID) card identifying him as Edgar Santiago. Officer
Spicer clarified that she wanted to see his driver’s license and not just an ID
card; Santiago replied that he did not have a driver’s license.
[4] Officer Spicer returned to her police car and ran a search of Santiago using his
Mexican ID. She discovered that Santiago’s driver’s license had been suspended
and that he had a prior conviction for driving while suspended. Consequently,
Officer Spicer arrested Santiago and had the vehicle towed.
[5] On June 20, 2018, the State charged Santiago with Class A misdemeanor
driving while suspended. Soon after, Santiago filed a motion to suppress
evidence that his driver’s license was suspended, arguing that the prolonged
investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. At Santiago’s
February 25, 2019, bench trial, Santiago renewed his objection to the admission
of the evidence, which the trial court overruled. The trial court found Santiago
guilty as charged. During sentencing later that same day, the trial court imposed
fines without any period of probation or incarceration. Santiago now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Santiago raises one argument on appeal—namely, that the trial court erred
when it admitted evidence of his suspended driver’s license because the
prolonged investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution. Specifically, Santiago contends that this evidence was
obtained during an unconstitutional extension of an initially valid traffic stop.
[7] As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. “[T]he Fourth
Amendment’s ‘protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.’” Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316,
319 (Ind. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). And
evidence that is the product of an unlawful seizure is inadmissible under the
Fourth Amendment. Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures is “fruit of the
poisonous tree” and is inadmissible in a court of law).
[8] Reversal of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is appropriate only where
the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997). “Moreover, we will sustain the
trial court[’s] [decision on the admission of evidence] if it can be done on any
legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind.
2000). However, we will review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo,
giving no weight to the legal analysis below. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332,
334 (Ind. 2013). In reviewing determinations of reasonable suspicion
specifically, we look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting legal wrongdoing. State v. Burlington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind.
2004).
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[9] Here, Santiago does not contest the validity of the initial Terry2 stop of the
vehicle. Santiago concedes that Officer Spicer had a reasonable suspicion that
the owner was driving the vehicle with a suspended license, thereby allowing
her to conduct a routine traffic stop. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850
(Ind. 2017). Rather, Santiago argues that Officer Spicer’s initial reasonable
suspicion leading to the traffic stop dissipated as soon as she determined that
Santiago was not Valentine Hernandez, the owner of the vehicle. Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015)
(finding that a traffic stop becomes unlawful “if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of the stop itself). According to
Santiago, Officer Spicer had already determined from both Santiago’s replies
and his Mexican ID card that Santiago was not Hernandez before she asked for
his driver’s license a second time. Therefore, because the mission of the stop
was to investigate the owner of the car (Hernandez), any further questioning by
Officer Spicer unlawfully prolonged the stop and violated the Fourth
Amendment.
[10] Santiago cites Holly v. State, in which our Supreme Court encountered a very
similar situation also challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. 918 N.E.2d
323 (Ind. 2009). In Holly, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Jason Ross ran a license plate check of the vehicle travelling in front of him and
2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that officers may conduct brief investigatory stops “where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him [or her] reasonably to conclude in light of his [or
her] experience that criminal activity may be afoot”).
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discovered that the vehicle’s owner was a Black woman named Terry Sumler
and that she had a suspended driver’s license. Officer Ross conducted a traffic
stop and immediately noticed that the driver was a Black man, later identified
as Damen Holly. There were two other passengers in the vehicle: Sumler and
Holly’s brother. Confused, Officer Ross asked Holly for his driver’s license.
Holly stated that he did not have his driver’s license, so Officer Ross went back
to his vehicle to run Holly’s information. Officer Ross then discovered that
Holly’s driver’s license was also suspended, so Officer Ross ordered everyone
out of the vehicle. He and a back-up officer conducted a search of the vehicle
and found a small baggie of marijuana. Officer Ross arrested Holly.
[11] Holly later challenged the admission of any evidence obtained from the officer’s
inquiry about his driver’s license or the subsequent search on the same grounds
as Santiago. Specifically, Holly conceded that Officer Ross had the reasonable
suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle under the belief that the owner,
Sumler, was driving it with a suspended driver’s license. However, Holly
argued that once it was apparent that he was not Sumler and not the owner of
the vehicle, Officer Ross’s reasonable suspicion dissipated, and any further
inquiry unlawfully prolonged the Terry stop in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Our Supreme Court ruled in Holly’s favor, holding, in pertinent
part, as follows:
To be sure, if a license plate check reveals that the driver’s license
of the vehicle’s registered owner has been suspended, then there is
reason to believe (a) the registered owner is driving the vehicle,
and thus (b) is doing so illegally. Under those circumstances, in
Terry terms, an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that
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criminal activity is afoot. But once it becomes apparent that the driver of
the vehicle is not the owner then an officer simply has no reason to conduct
additional inquiry. An officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a
Terry stop when among other things, “the officer is unaware of any
evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the
driver of the vehicle.”
Id. at 325 (quoting Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. 2009)) (emphasis
added).
[12] According to our Supreme Court, the “stubbornly clear” evidence that Holly
was a man and Sumler was a woman proved that Holly was not the vehicle’s
owner, thereby making Officer Ross’s request for Holly’s driver’s license
violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 326. In other words, the additional
request for Holly’s driver’s license, which led to a search of the vehicle,
unlawfully prolonged the stop because Officer Ross’s reasonable suspicion that
Sumler had been driving the vehicle had already evaporated. Simply put,
“[r]easonable suspicion to pull a car over does not confer unconditional
authority to request the driver’s license and registration.” Id.
[13] Despite Santiago’s claim that his scenario is identical to that of Holly’s, his
argument is unavailing. Key facts distinguish Santiago’s case from Holly’s—
namely, those related to identification. Unlike Officer Ross in Holly, whose
reasonable suspicion vanished as soon as he saw that the driver was a man and
not a woman, Officer Spicer could not immediately determine that Santiago
was not Hernandez, the owner of the car. Officer Spicer’s license plate search of
the vehicle in front of her showed that the vehicle was owned by a Latino man
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-495 | July 3, 2019 Page 7 of 9
named Valentine Hernandez. Officer Spicer then stopped the vehicle,
approached the driver’s side, and found a Latino man driving the vehicle.
Therefore, we hold that it was within the officer’s authority to ask for a driver’s
license to confirm Santiago’s identity because it was not immediately apparent
that he was not the owner of the vehicle.3
[14] Furthermore, Indiana law supports the notion that an officer may ask for a
driver’s license in the course of a Terry stop to confirm that someone can validly
drive on Indiana roads. “A Terry stop is a lesser intrusion on the person than an
arrest and may include a request to see identification and inquiry necessary to
confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions.” Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563,
570 (Ind. 2006). Indiana Code section 9-24-1-1 requires any individual driving
on Indiana roads to have a valid driver’s license or permit issued by a motor
vehicle bureau. Furthermore, a “‘driver’s license’ means any type of license or
privilege to operate a motor vehicle under the laws of a jurisdiction.” Ind. Code
§ 9-28-2-4. Accordingly, this definition encompasses international driver’s
licenses, including those from Mexico.
[15] Officer Spicer had the authority to check for a driver’s license, like in any other
routine traffic stop, to ensure that the driver was properly licensed to operate a
3
Both Holly and Armfield rely on numerous state supreme and intermediate court decisions from other
jurisdictions where there was “evidence or circumstances which indicate that the owner is not the driver of
the vehicle.” Holly, 918 N.E.2d at 326. These cases all point to evidence of clear differences in age, gender,
and race as examples of demonstrable proof that the driver was not, in fact, the owner of the vehicle—the
person about whom the officer formed the initial reasonable suspicion of engaging in potential criminal
activity. See, e.g., Armfield, 918 N.E.2d at 321 n.7.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-495 | July 3, 2019 Page 8 of 9
motor vehicle on Indiana roads. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.
2006) (holding that “[w]here an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, a
request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration . . . are within the scope
of a reasonable detention[]”); see also State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an individual’s “failure to produce his license was
a circumstance independent of the [] violation, which provided [the officer]
with reasonable suspicion that [defendant] might not have a valid driver’s
license”). Here, because Officer Spicer did not have conclusive evidence to
determine that Santiago was not Hernandez and because she had an obligation
to ensure that Santiago could legally drive on Indiana roads, it was not
impermissible of her to ask for Santiago’s driver’s license during the Terry stop.
[16] Therefore, we hold that Officer Spicer’s request to see Santiago’s driver’s license
did not unlawfully prolong the initial purpose of the investigatory traffic stop,
and consequently, did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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