Tamarius T. Jennings v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 29 2015, 8:04 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tamarius T. Jennings, December 29, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
48A04-1503-CR-122
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas Newman,
Appellee-Plaintiff Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C03-1410-FB-1766
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Tamarius T. Jennings appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for two
counts of class B felony aiding, inducing, or causing armed robbery. The sole
issue presented for our review is whether the State presented sufficient evidence
to support the convictions. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on February 19, 2014,
Jennings, his neighbor Samantha Cooper, and her boyfriend Jason Shaw
planned to rob Leroy Smith. Cooper knew Smith and believed that he had a
large amount of money. The group planned that Cooper would call Smith and
ask him to hang out, and then Jennings and Shaw would come later to commit
the robbery. Cooper called Smith and left to go to his house. Jennings told
Shaw that he could obtain a gun and then he and Shaw went to Jennings’s
house to make plans on how they would commit the robbery.
[3] When Cooper arrived at Smith’s house, Smith, Kaleb Kemper, and Smith’s son
Joseph were present; however, Joseph had gone to bed before Cooper arrived.
Kemper thought that Cooper was acting “very sketchy.” Tr. at 263. Cooper
partied with Smith and Kemper a little and then began going into the bathroom
to text Jennings. Cooper advised Jennings about how many people were
present at Smith’s and whether the people knew Jennings or Shaw. Cooper told
Jennings to come to Smith’s and to wear a mask. Jennings and Shaw left
Jennings’s house and went to a nearby home. Jennings entered the home while
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Shaw waited outside. Jennings came out a few minutes later carrying a sawed-
off rifle and a black plastic bag. Jennings texted Cooper to tell her that they
were on their way to Smith’s house. Cooper told Smith that she needed to step
outside the house to take a call. She did not lock the door when she returned
inside. Jennings and Shaw walked to Smith’s house carrying the rifle in the
plastic bag. They decided that Shaw would enter Smith’s residence and commit
the robbery while Jennings stayed out front to act as a lookout.
[4] When the pair reached Smith’s house, Shaw entered the front door with the
rifle and the bag, leaving the door open. Jennings stood on the sidewalk in
front of the house. Shaw ordered Smith and Kemper to get on the ground and
to put their money, cell phones, and property in the bag. He told them that he
would blow their heads off if they failed to comply. As they were kneeling on
the floor, Shaw and Kemper could see Jennings standing on the sidewalk.
[5] Shaw became distracted at some point as he spoke to Jennings through the
open door. Kemper seized the opportunity to jump up and hit Shaw, knocking
him through the front door. Kemper and Shaw tussled, and Kemper took the
rifle from Shaw. Smith then began hitting Shaw before Shaw took off running,
leaving the black plastic bag and the rifle behind. Jennings acted like he was
trying to help and began to walk inside Smith’s house. Kemper, who believed
that both Jennings and Cooper were involved in the robbery, shoved both of
them out the front door. Jennings and Cooper walked away together.
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[6] Anderson police officers responded to the scene and began investigating the
robbery. They encountered several witnesses who had information connecting
Shaw and Jennings to the robbery. One of those witnesses, Autumn Jones,
informed officers that, shortly after the robberies, she was stopped at a stoplight
when Jennings and Shaw, whose face was beaten and bleeding, jumped into the
backseat of her car. Jennings explained to Jones that Shaw had been involved
in a bar fight. Jones told officers that she drove Jennings and Shaw to a house
and dropped them off. Because Jones had Jennings’s cell phone number, Jones
texted Jennings at the direction of the officers to meet her at a McDonald’s.
When Jennings arrived at the McDonald’s, officers arrested him. After his
arrest, Jennings’s text messages with Cooper regarding the planning and
commission of the robbery were extracted from his cell phone. In addition,
Jennings’s fingerprint was recovered from the black plastic bag used in the
robbery.
[7] The State charged Jennings with two counts of class B felony aiding, inducing,
or causing armed robbery. 1 A trial was held and the jury found Jennings guilty
as charged. The trial court imposed concurrent six-year sentences on each
count. This appeal followed.
1
Count I charged Jennings with aiding, inducing, or causing the armed robbery of Leroy Smith. Count II
charged Jennings with aiding, inducing, or causing the armed robbery of Kaleb Kemper.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] Jennings challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess witness credibility. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 499 (Ind.
2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that
support the verdict and will affirm if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. In short, if the testimony believed by the trier of fact is
enough to support the verdict, then the reviewing court will not disturb the
conviction. Id. at 500.
[9] To prove that Jennings committed class B felony aiding, inducing, or causing
armed robbery, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or
intentionally aided, induced, or caused Shaw to commit armed robbery. Ind.
Code § 35-41-2-4. The version of Indiana Code Section 35-42-5-1 in effect at
the time of the offenses provided that “[a] person who knowingly or
intentionally takes property from another person: (1) by using or threatening the
use of force on any person; or (2) by putting any person in fear; commits
robbery as a Class C felony.” The offense is a class B felony if it is committed
while armed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.
[10] “It is well established that a person who aids another in committing a crime is
just as guilty as the actual perpetrator.” Green v. State, 937 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011). To be convicted as an accomplice, it is not
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necessary that the defendant participated in every element of the crime. Id.
While mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to make one an
accomplice, presence may be considered along with the defendant’s relation to
the person engaged in the crime and the defendant’s actions before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. Id.
[11] Here, Shaw and Cooper both testified that Jennings actively participated in the
planning of the robberies. He obtained the deadly weapon and black plastic bag
used to commit the crimes, and he stood as a lookout during the crimes. Text
messages between Cooper and Jennings, fingerprint evidence, and Jennings’s
behavior and companionship with Cooper and Shaw before and after the crimes
further establishes his planning and participation in the crimes.
[12] Jennings’s sole assertion is that the testimony of Shaw and Cooper was
incredibly dubious and should be disregarded. The incredible dubiosity rule is
applied only in limited circumstances and “allows the Court to impinge upon a
jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when
confronted with inherently improbable testimony.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d
749, 754 (Ind. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Application of the
rule requires that there be: (1) a sole testifying witness; (2) testimony that is
inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and (3) complete
absence of circumstantial evidence. Id. Here, the testimony of multiple
witnesses as well as the presence of circumstantial evidence precludes
application of the incredible dubiosity rule, and our analysis of Jennings’s
assertion ends. Accordingly, we decline Jennings’s improper invitation for us
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to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility in his favor. The State
presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.
[13] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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