Hoker Trucking, LLC and Linda L. Phillips v. Pamela K. Robbins, as Adminstratrix of the Estate of Mike Douglas Robbins

OPINION ON REHEARING Dec 31 2015, 9:13 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael T. Terwilliger Frederick W. Crow
Whitten Law Office Young & Young
Valparaiso, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Hoker Trucking, LLC and Linda December 31, 2015
L. Phillips, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Defendants, 89A01-1411-CT-468
Appeal from the Wayne Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Charles K. Todd,
Pamela K. Robbins, as Jr., Judge
Administratrix of the Estate of Trial Court Cause No.
Mike Douglas Robbins, 89D01-1212-CT-56
Deceased,
Appellee-Plaintiff
Riley, Judge.
[1] In our original opinion, we concluded that based on SCI Propane v. Frederick, 39
N.E.3d 675 (Ind. 2015), “Robbins, as the surviving spouse, was not entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest as compensable damages under
the GWDS.” See Hoker Trucking, LLC v. Robbins, --- N.E.3d --- (Ind. Ct. App.
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Sept. 15, 2015). Robbins has now filed a petition for rehearing in which she
contends that the prejudgment interest was not awarded on the attorneys’ fees,
as we alluded to in our opinion, but on the $6,000,000.00 jury verdict. As such,
she asserts SCI Propane is not applicable, and instead we should have followed
the directives of the prejudgment interest statute, I.C. Ch. 34-51-4, which notes
in section 1 that prejudgment interest “applies to any civil action arising out of
tortious conduct.” We agree. Thus, we grant rehearing for the limited purpose
of addressing the prejudgment interest award; in all other respects, we affirm
our original opinion.
[2] Our review of the record indicates that the trial court ordered prejudgment
interest on the jury verdict only and not on the award of attorneys’ fees.
Applying the prejudgment interest statute, the trial court noted that although
Hoker Trucking’s offer met the requirements of I.C. § 34-51-4-6, it did not meet
the requirements of I.C. § 34-51-4-5 [the amount of the offer was less than 2/3
of the amount of the judgment award] and thus Hoker Trucking was
responsible for the payment of prejudgment interest on the jury verdict.
Accordingly, the trial court awarded prejudgment interest at a rate of 8% on the
jury award from June 21, 2013 through October 5, 2014, for a total amount of
$622,028.11.
[3] The prejudgment interest statute permits the trial court to grant prejudgment
interest, but does not require an award of prejudgment interest. See I.C. 34-51-
4-7; Alsheik v. Guerrero, 979 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ind. 2012) (in which Guerrero
sought prejudgment interest in a medical malpractice suit). We review a trial
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court’s ruling on a motion for prejudgment interest under the prejudgment
interest statute for an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, the prejudgment interest
statute grants the trial court broad discretion to determine when an award of
prejudgment interest is warranted. Id. Accordingly, the trial court abuses its
discretion if it misinterprets the law, or if it does not “support its determination
with findings consistent with the statute.” Id. (citing Kosarko v. Padula, 979
N.E.2d 144, 150 (Ind. 2012)).
[4] Here, the trial court awarded prejudgment interest in accordance with the
prejudgment interest statute and supported its decision as follows:
In this cause, [Robbins] provided settlement demand letters on
March 22, 2013 and December 19, 2013, which demanded
payment of Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000.00), which was the
amount of the ultimate jury verdict. Further, said demand letters
met other relevant portions related to I.C. § 34-51-4-6.
Additionally, [Hoker Trucking] made no offer that met the
requirements related to I.C. § 34-51-4-5. Additionally, [Hoker
Trucking] ultimately conceded full liability in this cause, and the
trial held in this cause was only on the issue of damages. The
[c]ourt, having considered the evidence submitted in this cause
and properly before the [c]ourt, which includes [Robbins’]
settlement demand letters, copies of which were admitted as
Plaintiff’s exhibits 4 and 5 [] and having reviewed applicable
statutory sections and cases, and considering the objectives of the
statute as herein above set forth, the [c]ourt finds that
prejudgment interest is appropriate[.]
(Appellant’s App. p. 78).
[5] We affirm the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest.
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[6] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur
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