Rodger L. Blackburn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 14 2015, 9:03 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Gregory F. Zoeller
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Plainfield, Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Rodger L. Blackburn, December 14, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
11A01-1505-CR-398
v. Appeal from the Clay Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Joseph Trout,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
11C01-1411-F5-837
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A01-1505-CR-398 | December 14, 2015 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] In this belated appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2, Rodger L.
Blackburn (“Blackburn”) appeals his conviction for Criminal Trespass, as a Class
A misdemeanor.1 He presents the sole issue of whether the evidence is sufficient
to support the conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2001, Edward Blackburn (“Edward”), who is Blackburn’s brother, purchased
land and a residence in Clay County (“the Property”). Blackburn twice assisted
Edward with roofing work at the Property.
[3] In 2014, Edward rented the Property to his sister, Angie Hastings (“Hastings”),
and brother-in-law, Billy Matherly (“Matherly”). Edward prohibited Hastings
and Matherly from allowing Blackburn on the Property. Nonetheless,
Blackburn twice came to the Property during Hastings’s tenancy. Although
Blackburn was advised that he was not allowed on the Property, he remained
long enough to engage in some conversation with his mother, Debbie
Blackburn (“Debbie”) without incident.
[4] On November 2, 2014, Blackburn again came to the Property for the purpose of
speaking with his mother. They engaged in some conversation on the porch
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2. Blackburn does not challenge his conviction for Battery, as a Level 5 felony. I.C. §
35-42-2-1.
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and Debbie went back into the house. She refused to come back outside and
this angered Blackburn. He began to curse and threaten both Hastings and
Matherly. Blackburn charged through the door and a fight ensued between him
and Matherly. During the struggle, Blackburn drew a knife from his pocket and
stabbed Matherly in the shoulder. Hastings called 9-1-1 and Blackburn fled.
[5] On November 17, 2014, Blackburn was arrested. He was charged with two
counts of Battery (one as to Matherly and one as to Hastings)2 and one count
each of Criminal Recklessness3 and Criminal Trespass. Blackburn was tried
before a jury and acquitted of the alleged battery upon Hastings. He was
convicted of the remaining charges. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial
court did not enter judgment upon the Criminal Recklessness conviction.
Blackburn was sentenced to six years imprisonment for the Level 5 battery
upon Matherly. He was given a one-year concurrent sentence for Criminal
Trespass. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Blackburn was charged with violating Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(1),
which provides:
A person who:
2
Hastings had reported to police that Blackburn had kicked her in the stomach.
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-2.
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(1) not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or
intentionally enters the real property of another person after having
been denied entry by the other person or that person’s agent[.]
[7] Subsection (c) provides in relevant part:
A person has been denied entry under subsection (b)(1) when the
person has been denied entry by means of:
(1) personal communication, oral or written;
(2) posting or exhibiting a notice at the main entrance in a manner
that is either prescribed by law or likely to come to the attention
of the public; or
(3) a hearing authority or court order [.]
[8] The criminal trespass statute’s purpose is to punish those who willfully or
without a bona fide claim of right commit acts of trespass on the land of
another. Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
Blackburn acknowledges that sufficient evidence exists to prove that he did not
have a contractual interest in the Property, and that he knowingly or
intentionally entered onto it. He asserts only that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that his entry occurred after he had been denied
entry by his sister or her agent.
[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we will
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A01-1505-CR-398 | December 14, 2015 Page 4 of 6
[10] The State introduced evidence that the owner and the tenants of the property
had denied Blackburn entry. Edward testified: “I told [Rodger] I didn’t want
[him] anywhere on my property.” (Tr. at 10.) Matherly testified that he had
“told Rodger Blackburn not to come to [the Property]” and that “one of the
stipulations of us renting the house was [Blackburn is] not to be on the
property.” (Tr. at 23.) Matherly testified further:
He’s came [sic] there a couple different times before this incident
and we’ve told him he’s not to be there, but instead of get in an
argument and make him leave, he just wanted to talk to his mom
so we figured all right, let him talk to his mom, get him out of
here with as much or as less trauma.
(Tr. at 23.) Hastings corroborated her husband’s testimony:
The last time he was at my house I told him he wasn’t supposed
to be there because we would have to leave. We would have to
move. He wasn’t allowed on the property from my other
brother[.] . . . In fact we asked him not to come to our house.
(Tr. at 63, 70.)
[11] There is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Blackburn had
entered the Property after being denied entry in accordance with Indiana Code
section 35-43-2-2(1)(c).
Conclusion
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[12] Blackburn’s conviction for Criminal Trespass is supported by sufficient
evidence.
[13] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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