Sean R. Schaffer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 10 2015, 9:52 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sean R. Schaffer, November 10, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
15A01-1504-CR-136
v. Appeal from the Dearborn
Superior Court 2
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Steven Cox,
Appellee-Plaintiff Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
15D02-1409-F6-408
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Sean R. Schaffer appeals his conviction following a plea of guilty to Official
Misconduct,1 a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Schaffer argues that his conviction is
void because no written plea agreement was made part of the record.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Throughout most of 2014, Schaffer worked as a probation officer in Dearborn
County. While performing his duties, Schaffer stole hydrocodone tablets from
a probationer under his supervision. As a result, Schaffer was charged with
official misconduct and two counts of theft. Schaffer subsequently entered into
a written plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which Schaffer would
plead guilty to official misconduct in exchange for the dismissal of the theft
charges and sentencing would be left to the discretion of the trial court. A
guilty plea hearing was held on October 1, 2014, at which the trial court was
apparently presented with a copy of the written plea agreement. The trial court
expressed uncertainty as to the need for a plea agreement, noting that the
agreement did not bind the court to anything. Defense counsel explained that
the agreement was a product of “charge bargaining as opposed to plea
bargaining[.]” Transcript at 9. The court read the plea agreement into the
record and confirmed that Schaffer understood its terms. After the State
established a factual basis, Schaffer withdrew his preliminary plea of not guilty
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-1.
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to official misconduct and pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial
court accepted Schaffer’s guilty plea, granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
theft charges, and set the matter for a separate sentencing hearing.
[4] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that Schaffer had pled
guilty to official misconduct, but stated that it did not understand the negotiated
plea agreement and did not recall accepting it. Defense counsel again explained
that the parties’ intention was to “charge bargain”, i.e., that Schaffer would
plead guilty to official misconduct in exchange for the dismissal of the theft
charges, and that sentencing would be left to the trial court’s discretion. Id. at
29. Defense counsel stated that he was uncertain as to whether the plea
agreement had been formally rejected or accepted. The State again moved to
dismiss the theft charges, which the trial court granted. The State and defense
then presented evidence and argument on sentencing. The trial court ultimately
sentenced Schaffer to two and one-half years in the Department of Correction,
with six months suspended to probation. Schaffer now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
[5] On appeal, Schaffer argues that his conviction is void because no written plea
agreement was properly filed with the court, as required by Ind. Code § 35-35-3-
3. It is well settled, however, that a person who pleads guilty cannot challenge
his conviction on direct appeal. Robey v. State, 7 N.E.3d 371, 383 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (citing Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2005), and Tumulty v.
State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 394-95 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied. This is the case even
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when the record would otherwise be adequate to resolve the issue presented.
Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 395-96. Instead, claims of error in the acceptance of a
guilty plea must be presented through a petition for post-conviction relief under
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1. Id. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that
the requirements of I.C. § 35-35-3-3 were not satisfied, we must affirm
Schaffer’s conviction.
[6] Schaffer also argues in passing that the trial court erred in sentencing him.
“Although a person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the
propriety of a conviction on direct appeal, he or she is generally entitled to
contest the merits of the trial court’s sentencing decision when the trial court
exercises its discretion.” Holsclaw v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1086, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). In this case, Schaffer does not argue that his sentence is inappropriate
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) or in excess of the statutory maximum.
Instead, he argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him beyond the
advisory sentence recommended by the State at the sentencing hearing. In
support of this argument, Schaffer cites St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 493-94
(Ind. 2009), in which our Supreme Court held that, under the facts of that case,
a written plea agreement providing that the State would “recommend” a
particular sentence was intended to be a fixed plea agreement, under which the
trial court was bound to impose the specified sentence. St. Clair is inapposite.
It is clear from the record that the plea agreement in this case, regardless of
whether it was oral or written, contained no sentencing recommendation and
left sentencing to the trial court’s discretion. The State’s verbal
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recommendation at the sentencing hearing did nothing to change the terms of
the plea agreement.
[7] Judgment affirmed.
[8] Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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