Kory Tremaine Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Apr 18 2018, 8:56 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Scott L. Barnhart Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Brooke Smith Attorney General of Indiana
Keffer Barnhart LLP
Caroline G. Templeton
Indianapolis, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kory Tremaine Johnson, April 18, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A05-1710-CR-2263
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kelli E. Fink,
Magistrate
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
82C01-1704-F5-1977
82C01-1610-F5-6049
Bradford, Judge
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Case Summary 1
[1] In March of 2017, Appellant-Defendant Kory Johnson was at the Evansville
home of Jermekca Outlaw. After a heated discussion on the telephone with
another person, Johnson fired several shots out the back door. Outlaw left,
taking her three children and a young niece. When Outlaw returned some time
later, Johnson was on her front porch. Outlaw managed to get inside with the
children, at which point Johnson repeatedly asked to be let in. When Outlaw
refused, Johnson unsuccessfully attempted to enter through several windows,
eventually trying a kitchen window in the back of the house. When Outlaw
again refused Johnson entry, he shot three times at the doorknob of the back
door.
[2] Johnson was charged with two counts of Level 6 felony carrying a handgun
without a license, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6 felony
attempted residential entry and requested a speedy trial. The day before trial
(which was set for the last day of the speedy-trial period), the State notified the
trial court that it could not secure the presence of a key witness for trial and
requested a continuance. The State had first attempted to contact the witness
eight days before trial and had never received any response. The trial court
granted the State’s request for a continuance of approximately one month, and
1
Oral argument was held in this case on March 8, 2018, at Ivy Tech Community College in Lafayette,
Indiana. We would like to thank the faculty, staff, and students of Ivy Tech for their hospitality and counsel
for the high quality of their arguments.
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Johnson was eventually convicted of Level 6 felony carrying a handgun without
a license, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6 felony attempted
residential entry. The trial court sentenced Johnson to seven years of
incarceration and revoked the probation imposed in an earlier case. Johnson
contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s request for a
continuance and that his convictions violate Indiana constitutional prohibitions
against double jeopardy, specifically, the actual evidence test. Because we
disagree with both contentions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 19, 2017, in cause number 82C01-1610-F5-6049 (“Cause No.
6049”),2 Johnson pled guilty to Level 6 felony battery against a public safety
official and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. On March 23,
2017, the trial court sentenced Johnson to two years of incarceration, all
suspended to probation.
[4] Meanwhile, on or about March 20, 2017, Jermekca Outlaw had met Johnson,
and the two began a sexual relationship. On March 31, 2017, Johnson
collected Outlaw from her home on Washington Avenue in Evansville at
around 8:00 p.m. and drove her around for a while. Johnson seemed
2
Unless noted, all material in this document refers to Cause No. 1977. In fact, Johnson makes no specific
argument regarding the probation revocation in Cause No. 6049. Perhaps Johnson assumes that a reversal of
his convictions in Cause No. 1977 would automatically lead to a reversal of his probation revocation in
Cause No. 6049, as they were the basis of the revocation. Be that as it may, we decline to entertain granting
this relief when no challenge has been made.
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intoxicated and argumentative and repeatedly called Outlaw a “b****[.]” Tr.
Vol. III p. 21. Outlaw walked home.
[5] Later, at around 11:00 p.m., Outlaw was at home with her three children and a
niece when Johnson returned, arguing with somebody on the telephone.
Johnson pulled out a handgun and began to load it. Johnson’s telephone kept
ringing, and he kept telling those on the other end that he was at Outlaw’s
house and to “pull up on him.” Tr. Vol. III p. 23. Outlaw became concerned
with Johnson’s actions and told him that he had to leave. Johnson’s telephone
rang again, and he told the caller, “‘Do I have to send shots to let you know
that I’m on Washington?’” Tr. Vol. III p. 24. Johnson opened the back door
and “shot off like four shots[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 24. Outlaw took the children
and left.
[6] Outlaw returned a while later to find Johnson on her front porch. Outlaw took
the children inside and locked the door. Outlaw refused to let Johnson in
despite several requests, and he made several attempts to enter through
windows, eventually trying a kitchen window on the back of the house. When
Outlaw closed the window, Johnson asked, “‘So you really not gonna let me in
here?’” Tr. Vol. III p. 32. Outlaw replied “‘No[,]’” and Johnson said, “‘If you
don’t open this door I’m about to send shots through it.’” Tr. Vol. III p. 32.
Outlaw retreated to the hall closet (where she had told the children to hide), and
Johnson fired three shots in an attempt to shoot the knob off of the back door.
Around this time, police arrived.
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[7] On April 4, 2017, the State charged Johnson with Level 5 felony carrying a
handgun without a license with a felony conviction within the past five years,
Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license with a prior conviction,
Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6 felony attempted residential
entry. On April 5, 2017, Johnson requested a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal
Rule 4(B). On June 13, 2017, the day before trial was scheduled, the State
moved to continue the trial, which motion was granted. The basis of the State’s
request for continuance was that it had been unable to secure the presence of
Evansville Police Detective John Pieszchalski, a crime scene technician who
processed the scene on Washington Avenue and collected a firearm and several
shell casings. On June 15, 2017, Johnson moved for discharge, which motion
was denied the same day.
[8] On July 18, 2017, a jury found Johnson guilty of Class A misdemeanor carrying
a handgun without a license, Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6
felony attempted residential entry. On August 11, 2017, the trial court found
that Johnson’s carrying a handgun without a license conviction was a Level 6
felony by virtue of a prior conviction for the same offense and/or a felony
conviction within the past fifteen years.
[9] On September 11, 2017, the trial court found that Johnson had violated the
terms of probation imposed in Cause No. 6049 by committing the crimes
charged in Cause No. 1977, granted the State’s petition to revoke, and ordered
that he serve his two-year sentence. On September 12, 2017, the trial court
sentenced Johnson to an aggregate sentence of seven years of incarceration in
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Cause No. 1977. On November 17, 2017, this court granted Johnson’s motion
to consolidate his appeals in Cause Nos. 6049 and 1977.
Discussion and Decision
I. Speedy Trial
[10] The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana
Constitution. Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind. 1995). This
“fundamental principle of constitutional law” has long been zealously guarded
by our courts. Id. (quoting Castle v. State, 237 Ind. 83, 85, 143 N.E.2d 570, 572
(1957)). Criminal Rule 4 implements a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides, in part, as follows:
If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall
move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such
motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on
his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where
there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70)
calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
Provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the
prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as
set forth in subdivision (A) of this rule.
[11] While Criminal Rule 4 implements the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, Otte v.
State, 967 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), it does not contemplate a mere
technical means to escape prosecution. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1041
(Ind. 2013). After according the trial court’s findings reasonable deference,
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appellate review is for clear error. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040. This Court will
neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses and will
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inference supporting the
judgment. Id. A clear error is one that leaves the Court with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
[12] “The absence of a key witness through no fault of the State is good cause for
extending the time period requirements for early trial under Rule 4.” Woodson
v. State, 466 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Ind. 1984). If at the time the defendant requests
discharge the court is “satisfied that there is evidence for the state, which cannot
then be had, that reasonable effort has been made to procure the same and there
is just ground to believe that such evidence can be had within ninety (90) days,
the cause may be continued[.]” Crim. R. 4(D).
[13] The record indicates that Detective Pieszchalski was emailed on June 6, 2017,
notifying him that Johnson’s trial was to begin on June 14, 2017. On June 12,
2017, somebody from the Vanderburgh County Prosecutor’s Office emailed
Detective Pieszchalski, asking when he could participate in a witness
conference. There is no indication that Detective Pieszchalski responded to
either of these emails.
[14] On June 13, 2017, the State requested a continuance on the basis that Detective
Pieszchalski’s presence at trial, despite attempts to contact him, could not be
ensured. In its verified motion to continue trial, the State claimed that it had
become aware of Detective Pieszchalski’s unavailability on June 12, 2017; had
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been unable to contact him via email, cellular telephone, social media, or his
chain of command; and believed him to be out of the state. (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II 115). The State also indicated that it had confirmed with Detective
Pieszchalski’s Captain that he would return to work in July and requested a
continuance to July 10, 2017.
[15] Johnson argues that the State’s efforts to secure Detective Pieszchalski for trial
were not reasonable and that the trial court therefore committed clear error in
granting the State’s motion to continue trial. Keeping in mind that the trial
court was in the best position to evaluate the reasonableness of the State’s
efforts to secure Detective Pieszchalski for trial, we conclude that Johnson has
failed to establish clear error.
[16] The record indicates that securing the presence of law enforcement officers via
email (without formally issuing a subpoena) is the standard operating procedure
for the Vanderburgh Prosecutor’s office. It is reasonable to infer from this that
the procedure has worked well for the office in the past and that if securing the
presence of law enforcement witnesses ever became an issue, subpoenas would
be issued. As for the timing of the prosecutor’s attempt to secure Detective
Pieszchalski’s testimony, we cannot say that Johnson has established that it was
unreasonably late. Even eight days before trial would have been more than
enough time to secure Detective Pieszchalski’s testimony in some other form,
had the prosecutor’s office known that it was necessary to do so. The problem
here was that Detective Pieszchalski was seemingly completely incommunicado
by the time the deputy prosecutor attempted to contact him.
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[17] It is also worth noting that the continuance asked for was relatively short, at less
than a month, because the State asked for just enough time to ensure Detective
Pieszchalski’s availability for trial and no more. Even though Criminal Rule
4(C) contemplates continuances of up to ninety days, the State requested a
continuance of only twenty-six days. Under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that Johnson has failed to establish that the trial court committed clear
error in granting the State’s request for a continuance.
II. Double Jeopardy
[18] Johnson contends that his three convictions in Cause No. 1977 violate
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. As mentioned, the jury
found Johnson guilty of Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a
license,3 Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and Level 6 felony attempted
residential entry. In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana
Supreme Court held “that two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in
violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to
… the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged
offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id.at 49–50.
To show that two challenged offenses constitute the “same
offense” in a claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts
3
The trial court later found the offense to be a Level 6 felony by virtue of a prior conviction for the same
offense and/or a felony conviction within the past fifteen years.
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used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one
offense may also have been used to establish the essential
elements of a second challenged offense.
Id. at 53. “In determining the facts used by the fact-finder to establish the
elements of each offense, it is appropriate to consider the charging information,
jury instructions, and arguments of counsel.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231,
1234 (Ind. 2008) (citing Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d at 832 (Ind. 2002);
Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54 n.48).
[19] If each conviction requires at least one unique evidentiary fact, no violation of
the actual evidence test occurs. Weddle v. State, 997 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied; see also Berg v. State, 45 N.E.3d 506, 509 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015) (concluding that the double jeopardy clause is not violated when the
evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also establish
only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second
offense). Allegations that multiple convictions violate double jeopardy
prohibitions are reviewed de novo. Weddle, 997 N.E.2d at 47.
[20] Johnson has failed to establish that his conviction for carrying a handgun
without a license violates the actual evidence test. The charging information
alleged that “on or about March 31, 2017, Kory Tremaine Johnson … did carry
a handgun in any vehicle or on or about his body without being licensed[.]”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96. Outlaw testified that Johnson had a gun at her
kitchen table on the night of March 30, 2017, which is sufficient, by itself, to
sustain Johnson’s conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. The
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prosecutor pointed to that fact during her closing argument before detailing
Johnson’s continuing criminal conduct. Moreover, the jury instruction
specified what conduct was required to convict Johnson of carrying a handgun
without a license: “Johnson … carried a handgun in a vehicle or on or about
his person … away from [his] dwelling, property or fixed place of business.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 159. Nowhere in any of this is any suggestion that
use of the handgun was necessary to complete, or was used to prove, the crime
of carrying a handgun without a license.
[21] We further conclude that the jury was presented with more than one unique
fact to support Johnson’s conviction for criminal recklessness. The State
alleged that “on or about March 31, 2017, Kory Tremaine Johnson did
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally perform an act that created a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another person by shooting a firearm into an inhabited
dwelling[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96. The jury instructions for criminal
recklessness indicated that State was required to prove that “Johnson …
recklessly, knowingly or intentionally … performed an act that created a
substantial risk of bodily … injury to another person, and … by shooting a
firearm into an inhabited dwelling of Jermekca Outlaw[.]” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 160. Outlaw’s testimony about being home with three of her children
and a niece when she heard gunshots, and evidence of a bullet hole and bullet
found in Outlaw’s son’s room, tend to establish the above. More importantly,
performing an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury and shooting a
firearm into an inhabited dwelling do not tend to prove any element of
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Johnson’s other charges. Johnson has failed to establish that his criminal
recklessness conviction violates prohibitions against double jeopardy.
[22] Finally, we conclude that Johnson’s attempted residential entry conviction is
supported by unique evidentiary facts. The charging information for his count
alleged that
on or about March 31, 2017, Kory Tremaine Johnson did
attempt to commit the crime of Residential Entry: knowingly or
intentionally breaking and entering the dwelling of Jermekca
Outlaw … by performing conduct that constituted a substantial
step toward the commission of said crime, to wit: opening
windows, and/or lifting screens, and/or damaging a door knob,
and/or reaching through a hole[.]
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96.
[23] The record contains evidence that Johnson lifted all of the screens on Outlaw’s
windows in an attempt to get into the home after she locked him out and
refused entrance, and Outlaw saw him attempt to put his hand through the hole
he caused by shooting the doorknob off. These are evidentiary facts that had no
relevance to Johnson’s criminal recklessness or carrying a handgun without a
license charges. The jury instructions also focused on specific, unique conduct
that related only to the attempted residential entry conviction: “Johnson … did
knowingly or intentionally attempt to break and enter the dwelling of Jermekca
Outlaw … by opening windows, and/or lifting screens, and/or damaging a
door knob, and/or reaching through a hole[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp.
161–62.
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[24] Johnson argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument created a reasonable
probability that the jury used the same facts to convict Johnson on both the
residential entry and criminal recklessness charges. We disagree that the
argument had this effect. For one thing, the prosecutor made the argument to
rebut Johnson’s previous assertion that there was “no attempt to get into that
house[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 148. Countering the assertion, the prosecutor argued
that
I do not know how you can reach that conclusion that there was
no evidence the defendant tried to gain entry into the home.
Between screaming at the home’s occupant. Between having to
be kicked off the front porch, between shooting out the
doorknob, checking the windows, lifting the screens, sticking a
hand through a hole that was created when he shot off the
doorknob, that seems to be evidence to me of attempting to get
into the home.
Tr. Vol. II p. 157.
[25] Although one fact (the shooting at the doorknob) could have been used to
support, in part, the convictions for both attempted residential entry and
criminal recklessness, this is not enough to violate the actual evidence test. See
Borum v. State, 951 N.E.2d 619, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (a single fact
supporting a first charge and also included among additional facts supporting a
second charge does not indicate a reasonable probability that the jury based its
findings of guilt on the same evidence, which is especially true in cases
involving protracted criminal episodes). In summary, we conclude that
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Johnson has failed to establish that any of his three convictions violate
constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
Conclusion
[26] Johnson’s speedy-trial rights were not violated in Cause No. 1977, as we
conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the State’s efforts to secure
Detective Pieszchalski’s presence for trial were reasonable, entitling it to the
continuance it received. Also, we conclude that none of Johnson’s three
convictions in Cause No. 1977 were based on the same actual evidence.
[27] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Robb, J., and Altice, J, concur.
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