Nicholas Cooper v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 09 2015, 6:33 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald E.C. Leicht Gregory F. Zoeller
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nicholas Cooper, December 9, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
34A05-1506-CR-567
v.
Appeal from the Howard Superior
Court
State of Indiana,
The Honorable William C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Menges, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34D01-1112-FB-1106
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Nicholas Cooper appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court for the
revocation of his probation. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Cooper raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
revoked Cooper’s entire suspended sentence for his probation violations.
Facts
[3] In December 2011, the State charged Cooper with Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine and Class B felony possession of methamphetamine. He
pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine, and the trial court
sentenced him to fifteen years in the Department of Correction with three years
suspended to probation. In 2013, Cooper filed a petition for sentence
modification, which the trial court granted. The trial court modified his
sentence by suspending the balance of the executed sentence and ordering
Cooper to participate in the Community Transition Program. Cooper was
released from incarceration and began participation in the Re-Entry Court
Program.
[4] In November 2013 and August 2014, the trial court found that Cooper was in
indirect contempt of court for violating the terms and conditions of the Re-
Entry Court Program. In December 2014, the Re-Entry Court Program
indicated that it intended to terminate Cooper’s participation in the program
because he had absconded. The trial court terminated Cooper from the Re-
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Entry Court Program and found probable cause that Cooper had violated the
terms and conditions of his probation. The State then filed a petition to revoke
Cooper’s suspended sentence, and Cooper admitted to violating his probation.
At a sentencing hearing, Cooper testified that he became “overwhelmed” with
the Re-Entry Court Program’s rules and “panicked and ran.” Tr. p. 4. He
admitted that he was gone for “[a] couple months.” Id. Cooper also admitted
to using “[m]orphine and spice” and said that he “[m]ight have” used heroin.
Id. at 7. The trial court ordered that the balance of Cooper’s suspended
sentence be executed. Cooper now appeals.
Analysis
[5] Cooper argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the balance
of his suspended sentence. According to Cooper, the trial court should have
reimposed the original sentence of fifteen years with three years suspended to
probation less his credit time. A trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation
violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v. State,
878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
[6] Under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h), if the trial court “finds that the
person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period,
and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period,” the trial
court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:
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(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without
modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not
more than one (1) year beyond the original
probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that
was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
[7] Cooper argues that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion because it
automatically imposed the entire suspended sentence. However, the trial court
had previously granted Cooper significant leniency when it modified his
sentence. Cooper then admitted that he absconded from the Re-Entry Court
Program for a couple of months, used morphine and spice, and might have
used heroin. Given Cooper’s multiple serious violations and prior leniency
granted to him, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it ordered
him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence in the
Department of Correction.
Conclusion
[8] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Cooper’s previously
suspended sentence as a result of his probation violations. We affirm.
[9] Affirmed.
[10] Kirsch, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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