Paul M. Camp v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 05 2015, 8:36 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Paul M. Camp November 5, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
01A02-1503-CR-143
v. Appeal from the Adams Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Patrick R. Miller,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
01D01-1310-FD-148
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] In 2010, Appellant-Defendant Paul Camp was convicted of dealing in
methamphetamine. On July 1, 2013, the Indiana legislature enacted a law
making it a Class D felony for a person to possess pseudoephedrine, a precursor
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, within seven years of being
convicted of dealing in methamphetamine. On multiple occasions between
August and September of 2013, Camp purchased products containing
pseudoephedrine and was charged with two counts of possession of a precursor
by a methamphetamine offender. Camp argued that he did not know that he
was prohibited from purchasing pseudoephedrine and tendered jury instructions
that it was a defense that he was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact
which prevented him from knowingly committing the acts charged. The trial
court refused to give Camp’s proposed instructions and the jury found Camp
guilty as charged. On appeal, Camp argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to give his proposed mistake-of-fact instructions to the
jury. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 14, 2010, Camp was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine. On
August 15, 2013, Camp purchased a box of “Wal-Phed, twelve hour, twenty-
count”, a product containing pseudoephedrine, from a Walgreens in Decatur,
Indiana. Tr. p. 219. On August 26, 2013, Camp again purchased a box of Wal-
Phed from the same Walgreens. Both transactions were recorded by store
cameras and logged by the pharmacist in the electronic database of
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pseudoephedrine purchases along with Camp’s driver’s license information.
Camp purchased products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine a total of
six times between July 13, and September 5, 2013.
[3] On October 1, 2013, Camp was charged with two counts of Class D felony
possession of a precursor by a methamphetamine offender.1 On January 26,
2015, the case was tried to a jury. At trial, Camp admitted that he went to the
Walgreens with the intent to purchase pseudoephedrine, and did so, but that he
did not know it was a crime for him to possess it. At the close of evidence,
Camp tendered two proposed mistake-of-fact instructions for submission to the
jury.
Mistake of Fact – Alternative 1
It is an issue whether the accused mistakenly committed the acts
charged.
It is a defense that the accused was reasonably mistaken about a
matter of fact if the mistake prevented the accused from:
[intentionally] [knowingly] committing the acts charged [or]
[committing the acts charged with specific intent to [knowingly]
[intentionally]].
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused was not reasonably mistaken.
Appellant’s App. p. 80.
Mistake of Fact – Reasonableness from Accused’s Perspective
1
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-4-14.5(h)(1)(A) (2013), a person who has been convicted of dealing
in methamphetamine is prohibited from knowingly or intentionally possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine
for seven years from the date the individual was sentenced.
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In determining whether the accused’s belief was reasonable, you
must determine whether a reasonable person in the accused’s
position would have had such a belief. This means that you must
consider all the circumstances, including Defendant’s belief it was
okay to purchased Sudafed for his mother and himself, in
deciding whether his belief was reasonable.
If you have a reasonable doubt whether a reasonable person in
the accused’s situation would have had such a belief, you must
give the accused the benefit of that doubt and find that the belief
was reasonably held.
Appellant’s App. p. 81.
[4] The trial court refused to give Camp’s proposed instructions, finding that his
argument was actually that he had made a “mistake of law, not [a] mistake of
fact” and that he had not claimed to be mistaken about any of the factual
elements of the crime “as to whether it was pseudoephedrine, whether he was a
convicted methamphetamine offender, and whether or not seven years had
passed from that conviction and whether or not he intentionally possessed it.”
Tr. p. 295. The jury found Camp guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced
Camp to an aggregate 880-day executed term of incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Camp claims that the trial court erred in refusing to submit his proposed
mistake-of-fact instructions to the jury. “The manner of instructing a jury is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Albores v. State, 987 N.E.2d 98, 99
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) trans. denied. “We review a trial court’s instructions to the
jury for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises when the
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instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or
otherwise mislead the jury.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484-85 (Ind. 2015)
(citations omitted). “On review of a trial court’s decision to refuse a proposed
jury instruction, we consider whether the instruction (1) correctly states the law,
(2) is supported by the evidence, and (3) is covered in substance by other
instructions that are given.” Albores, 987 N.E.2d at 99.
[6] The trial court refused to give the two mistake-of-fact instructions offered by
Camp because Camp did not present evidence to support a mistake-of-fact
defense. Camp claims that he was ignorant of the law and would not have
purchased pseudoephedrine had he known of the law. “It is a defense that the
person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a
matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of
the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-7. We have previously held that a mistake of
fact defense is available where three elements are satisfied, “(1) the mistake
must be honest and reasonable; (2) the mistake must be about a matter of fact;
and (3) the mistake must negate the culpability required to commit the crime.”
Nolan v. State, 863 N.E.2d 398, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Camp’s mistake, even
assuming it was honest and reasonable, fails to satisfy the second and third
elements.
[7] “A fact is ‘A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; an
event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in time or
space or an event mental or physical; that which has taken place.’” Giles v. State,
699 N.E.2d 294, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
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591 (6th ed.1990)). It would be a mistake of fact, for example, if Camp had
purchased medication which was mislabeled and purported not to contain any
pseudoephedrine when in fact it did contain pseudoephedrine. In such as case,
Camp could claim that he was mistaken as to the fact that he had knowingly
purchased and possessed pseudoephedrine.
[8] Here, Camp’s argument is not that he mistakenly purchased or possessed
pseudoephedrine but that he did not know it was illegal for him to do so. Camp’s
mistake was not one of fact; rather, he claims he was simply ignorant of the law.
It is well-settled in Indiana that ignorance of the law is no defense. Dewald v.
State, 898 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21, 31
(1874) (“every man is presumed to know the laws of the country in which he
dwells;….[I]gnorance of the law excuses no man.”) Therefore, Camp’s alleged
mistake does not negate the culpability required to commit the crime. Because
Camp’s proposed jury instructions were not supported by the evidence (i.e. he
was not mistaken as to any fact) and incorrectly stated the law (i.e. that reasonable
ignorance of the law is a defense), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to give those instructions to the jury.
[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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