Michael Hunt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Nov 30 2015, 8:06 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael Hunt Gregory F. Zoeller
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Hunt, November 30, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
35A04-1412-PC-555
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
35C01-1210-PC-12
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] In March of 2012, Appellant-Petitioner Michael Hunt pled guilty to one count
of Class B felony robbery and to being a habitual offender. The trial court
accepted Hunt’s guilty pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate thirty-year
sentence. On October 16, 2012, Hunt filed a petition for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”), in which he alleged that he suffered ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The post-conviction court subsequently denied Hunt’s petition. Hunt
appealed this determination.
[2] On appeal, Hunt again contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. He also contends that the post-conviction court erred in ruling on his
PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we
conclude that Hunt has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. Also, because the record demonstrates that the post-conviction
court ordered the parties to submit their evidence via affidavit pursuant to
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) (“Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b)”) and
based its ruling on said evidence, we conclude that the post-conviction court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Hunt’s PCR petition without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The factual basis supporting Hunt’s guilty pleas instructs us to the underlying
facts leading to this post-conviction appeal:
On or about December 27, 2011, I drove to Pilgrims Rest
Cemetery, located in Huntington County, Indiana. When I
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arrived I removed my bike out of the back of the vehicle I was
driving and rode to the First Farmers Bank and Trust, also
located in Huntington County, Indiana. Once I arrived, I
entered the bank wearing latex gloves, a ski mask, a black wig
with a baseball cap, a blue jacket with the hood up and a bullet
proof vest. I was also carrying a loaded Para .45 caliber semi
automatic gun, a device that I made to look like a bomb and a
black bag.
I walked up to the counter, placed the “bomb” and the black bag
on the counter, and while pointing the gun at the tellers I
instructed them to place $30,000 in $100.00 and $50.00 bills into
the bag. I told the tellers that if they didn’t give me the money, I
would blow up the bank. The tellers emptied all the drawers into
the black bag and handed it back to me and I left the bank on my
bike. I rode back to the Cemetery and as I was getting into my
vehicle I could see the police cars with their lights and sirens
activated, but I continued getting into the vehicle anyway and
attempted to get away. After driving a short distance I wrecked
my vehicle and tried to flee on foot but I was apprehended by
police and taken into custody.
Appellant’s App. pp. 75-76.
[4] As a result of Hunt’s actions, Appellee-Respondent the State of Indiana (the
“State”) charged Hunt with Class B felony robbery, Class D felony unlawful
use of body armor, and Class D felony resisting law enforcement. The State
also alleged that Hunt was a habitual offender. Hunt subsequently pled guilty
to Class B felony robbery. He also admitted that he is a habitual offender. In
admitting to his status as a habitual offender, Hunt stated the following:
Prior to December 27, 2011, I had accumulated two prior
unrelated felony convictions. I was convicted of Robbery, a class
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B felony, in Marion County, Indiana, under cause number 81-
285A, and I was convicted of Robbery, a class C felony, in
Tippecanoe County, Indiana, under cause number 79D02-9602-
CF-00012.
Appellant’s App. p. 76. In exchange for Hunt’s guilty plea, the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges and to cap the executed portion of Hunt’s
sentence at thirty years. During the guilty plea hearing, Hunt affirmed that the
factual bases for both the Class B felony robbery charge and the habitual
offender allegation were true and correct.
[5] Prior to sentencing, Hunt moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the
plea agreement failed to specify whether his sentences were to run concurrently
or consecutively. The State maintained that Hunt’s counsel understood and it
was a “feign on misunderstanding” by Hunt for him to assert that he did not
understand that the habitual offender constituted a sentence enhancement, not
a separate sentence. Tr. p. 33. After taking the motion under advisement, the
trial court denied Hunt’s motion.
[6] At sentencing, the trial court again informed Hunt that his habitual offender
enhancement did not constitute a separate sentence, but rather was an
enhancement to the sentence imposed by virtue of Hunt’s Class B felony
robbery conviction. Finding Hunt’s criminal history, which included numerous
prior felony convictions, to be an aggravating factor, the trial court sentenced
Hunt to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment. The trial court then enhanced this
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sentence by fifteen years by virtue of Hunt’s status as a habitual offender, for an
aggregate thirty-year sentence.
[7] On October 16, 2012, Hunt filed a pro-se PCR petition. Hunt filed an amended
pro-se PCR petition on May 22, 2014. The State subsequently filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, which was granted by the post-conviction court on
July 11, 2014. With respect to the remaining portions of Hunt’s PCR petition,
the post-conviction court ordered the parties to submit evidence by affidavit.
Following the submission of evidence, the post-conviction court issued an order
denying Hunt’s PCR petition on October 31, 2014. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision 1
[8] Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal.
Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 1999). Instead, they create a
narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges
which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id.
A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative
judgment and as a result, faces a rigorous standard of review on appeal. Dewitt
v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Colliar v. State, 715 N.E.2d 940, 942
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
1
We note that Hunt has filed a motion for oral argument and a motion to strike the State’s brief. Having
reviewed Hunt’s motions, we deny both motions in an order issued simultaneously with this memorandum
decision.
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[9] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739,
745 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, in order to prevail, a petitioner must establish his
claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5);
Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. When appealing from the denial of a PCR petition,
a petitioner must convince this court that the evidence, taken as a whole, “leads
unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction
court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. “It is only where the evidence is without
conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has
reached the opposite conclusion, that its decision will be disturbed as contrary
to law.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).
We therefore accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous but give no deference to its conclusions of law. Id.
[10] Hunt contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his PCR petition,
claiming that the record demonstrates that he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Hunt also claims that the post-conviction court erred in ruling on
his PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. We will
discuss each claim in turn.
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I. Whether Hunt Suffered Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel
[11] The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “‘The
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 685 (1984)). “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper function of the
adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a
just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
[12] A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two
components. Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 2007). Under the first
prong, the petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient by
demonstrating that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. We recognize that
even the finest, most experienced criminal defense attorneys may not agree on
the ideal strategy or most effective way to represent a client, and therefore,
under this prong, we will assume that counsel performed adequately and defer
to counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions. Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585
(Ind. 2002). Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of
bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Id.
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[13] Under the second prong, the petitioner must show that the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. Again, a petitioner
may show prejudice by demonstrating that there is “a reasonable probability
(i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but
for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
A petitioner’s failure to satisfy either prong will cause the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim to fail. See Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154. Stated differently,
“[a]lthough the two parts of the Strickland test are separate inquires, a claim
may be disposed of on either prong.” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031
(Ind. 2006) (citing Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154).
[14] Hunt claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
adequately investigate and challenge the charging information for the habitual
offender enhancement. He also claims that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sentence imposed by the trial
court.
1. Failing to Adequately Investigate and Challenge the
Charging Information for the Habitual Offender Enhancement
[15] On appeal, Hunt claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
(1) failing to adequately investigate the proper sequence of the commission,
conviction, and sentencing dates relating to the predicate prior convictions
listed in the charging information for the habitual offender enhancement and (2)
failing to file a motion to dismiss the charging information for the habitual
offender enhancement.
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[16] In the instant matter, Hunt does not present any evidence or testimony from
trial counsel in support of his allegation that his trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate the proper sequence of the commission, conviction, and
sentencing dates relating to the predicate prior convictions. When counsel is
not called as a witness to testify or present an affidavit in support of a
petitioner’s arguments, the post-conviction court may infer that counsel would
not have corroborated the petitioner’s allegations. Dickson v. State, 533 N.E.2d
586, 589 (Ind. 1989); see also Oberst v. State, 935 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (citing Culvahouse v. State, 819 N.E.2d 857, 863 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. With regard to this claim, Hunt presents only
the self-serving statements contained in his affidavit. It was within the post-
conviction court’s discretion to reject Hunt’s self-serving testimony as not
credible. See Popplewell v. State, 428 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ind. 1981) (providing that a
court is not obligated to believe a petitioner’s self-serving testimony).
[17] In addition, Hunt has failed to present any evidence or argument demonstrating
that an investigation into the sequence of his prior unrelated felonies would
have uncovered or yielded a factual or legal basis upon which to move to
dismiss the charging information.
Like most failures to investigate, establishing this ground for
ineffective assistance would require going beyond the trial record
to show what the investigation, if undertaken, would have
produced. This is necessary because success on the prejudice
prong of an ineffectiveness claim requires a showing of a
reasonable probability of affecting the result.
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Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1214 (Ind. 1998) (citing State v. Moore, 678
N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied). Further, in order to prevail on his
claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion
to dismiss the charging information relating to the habitual offender
enhancement, Hunt bore the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability
that the motion to dismiss would have been granted if made. See Garrett v. State,
992 N.E.2d 710, 723 (Ind. 2013) (providing that in order to prevail on a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to the failure to file a motion to
dismiss, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the motion to
dismiss would have been granted if made). Review of the record indicates that
Hunt failed to carry this burden.
[18] Although Hunt alleges that the charging information relating to the habitual
offender enhancement should have been dismissed because it failed to show the
sequence of the commission, conviction, and sentence dates of the predicate
unrelated felony convictions, Hunt has failed to prove that such information
was required to be in the charging information.
[19] “A charging information must be ‘sufficiently specific to apprise the defendant
of the crime for which he is charged and to enable him to prepare a defense.’”
Jones v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Bonner v.
State, 789 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). In the instant matter, the
charging information relating to the habitual offender enhancement read as
follows:
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[The Prosecuting Attorney], being duly sworn upon her oath,
says that she is informed and verily believes that Michael Hunt
has accumulated at least two (2) prior unrelated felony
convictions, namely:
1. Robbery, a Class B felony, in Marion County, Indiana
under cause number 81-285A.
2. Robbery, a Class C felony, in Tippecanoe County,
Indiana, under cause number 79D02-9602-CF-00012.
Appellant’s App. p. 70. The above-quoted allegations provide no ambiguity as
to which predicate unrelated prior convictions upon which the State is relying
on to prove Hunt’s status as a habitual offender. The charging information
clearly informs Hunt that the predicate prior offenses are his 1981 Class B
felony robbery conviction from Marion County under cause number 81-285A
and his 1996 Class C felony robbery conviction out of Tippecanoe County
under cause number 79D02-9602-CF-12.
[20] Further, even if more specificity was needed, Hunt has failed to prove that a
motion to dismiss would be granted as Hunt has provided no reason why the
State would not simply have been permitted to amend the charging information
to include the necessary information. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that
“[w]hile the habitual offender charge is not a separate offense under Indiana
law, it is subject to the rules governing charging of criminal offenses, including
[Indiana Code section] 35-34-1-5(c) … which provides: ‘Upon motion of the
prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the
trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any
defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the
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substantial rights of the accused.’” Murphy v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1077, 1083
(Ind. 1986).
[21] Furthermore still, in order to successfully challenge a habitual offender
determination in post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner must prove that he
is not a habitual offender under the laws of the State. See Weatherford v. State,
619 N.E.2d 915, 917-18 (Ind. 1993). Hunt’s evidence, however, proves the
opposite, i.e., that he is a habitual offender under the laws of Indiana. Hunt
submitted court documents relating to both of the predicate prior convictions to
the post-conviction court. These exhibits support the post-conviction court’s
determination that Hunt “actually provides documentation from the predicate
offenses of the habitual offender enhancement demonstrating that this was a
proper enhancement.” Appellant’s App. p. 13. Hunt has failed to show that he
suffered any prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s alleged failure to file a
motion to dismiss the charging information relating to the habitual offender
enhancement.
[22] In light of Hunt’s failure to provide any evidence other than his own self-serving
testimony demonstrating that trial counsel did not adequately investigate the
prior unrelated felony convictions listed in the habitual offender allegation or
that a motion to dismiss the charging information relating to the habitual
offender enhancement would have been successful, we conclude that the post-
conviction court properly determined that Hunt did not receive ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in this regard.
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2. Failing to Challenge the Sentence Imposed
by the Trial Court
[23] Hunt also claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because
his trial counsel failed to challenge the fifteen-year sentence imposed by the trial
court for his Class B felony robbery conviction. Specifically, Hunt argues that
because the trial court found his criminal history to be an aggravating factor in
sentencing Hunt to an aggravated fifteen-year sentence, said sentence, when
considered together with the fifteen-year sentence enhancement that he received
by virtue of his status as a habitual offender, amounts to a double sentence
enhancement.
[24] Initially, we observe that Hunt did not raise this claim in his PCR petition, but
rather framed the issue below as whether the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences. Generally, issues not raised in the petition for
post-conviction relief may not be raised for the first time on an appeal from the
denial of a petitioner’s PCR petition. See Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1171
(Ind. 2001) (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8)). However, because Hunt’s
arguments on appeal are similar in nature to those raised below in his original
and amended PCR petitions, we will consider Hunt’s arguments.
[25] First, the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly informed Hunt that the
fifteen years imposed in relation to his status as a habitual offender did not
constitute a separate sentence that was to be run consecutive to the fifteen-year
sentence relating to the Class B felony robbery conviction, but rather was an
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enhancement of the sentence. In so informing Hunt, the trial court quoted our
opinion in Harris v. State, 964 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[26] The record also demonstrates that the instant offense, Class B felony robbery, is
Hunt’s fifth felony robbery conviction and his seventh overall felony conviction.
In addition to his prior felony robbery convictions, Hunt’s record also includes
prior felony convictions for possession of cocaine and receiving stolen property.
The Indiana General Assembly has explicitly provided that a defendant’s
history of criminal activity is a proper aggravating factor to be considered by the
trial court at sentencing. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2). A single
aggravating factor is adequate to sustain an enhanced sentence. See Hawkins v.
State, 748 N.E.2d 362, 363 (Ind. 2001). Thus, even if the trial court were to
have refrained from considering the predicate prior convictions which the State
relied upon to prove Hunt’s status as a habitual offender as part of Hunt’s
criminal history, Hunt’s criminal history is such that we are convinced that the
trial court acted within its discretion in considering Hunt’s criminal history to
be an aggravating factor at sentencing. As such, Hunt’s claim that
consideration of his criminal history as an aggravating factor at sentencing
amounted to a double enhancement is without merit. Hunt has failed to prove
that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the fifteen-year
sentence imposed by the trial court. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769.
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3. Additional Challenges
[27] Hunt raises two additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on
appeal. These claims include that his trial counsel failed to object to an
allegedly insufficient factual basis and failed to advise him that by pleading
guilty, he was waiving his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender
enhancement. Hunt, however did not raise either of these claims in either his
original or amended PCR petitions. These claims, therefore, may not be raised
on appeal. See Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1171 (providing that issues not raised in the
PCR petition may not be raised for the first time on post-conviction appeal).
II. Whether the Post-Conviction Court Erred By
Denying Hunt’s PCR Petition Without Conducting
an Evidentiary Hearing
[28] Hunt also contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his PCR
petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant’s App. 48)
On June 2, 2014, the post-conviction court ordered the parties to submit their
evidence by affidavit pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b). Post-
Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) provides as follows:
In the event petitioner elects to proceed pro se, the court at its
discretion may order the cause submitted upon affidavit. It need
not order the personal presence of the petitioner unless his
presence is required for a full and fair determination of the issues
raised at an evidentiary hearing.
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(Emphasis added). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.”
Fuquay v. State, 689 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Freeman v.
State, 541 N.E.2d 533, 538 (Ind. 1989)), trans. denied. Further,
[a]ffidavits are sworn testimony and constitute “competent
evidence” in post-conviction proceedings. Gould v. State, 578
N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. Factual
statements in affidavits often raise issues of fact, and to require a
full evidentiary hearing any time affidavits submitted under
[Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b) create issues of fact would defeat
the purpose of [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b), which is to allow
for more flexibility in both the presentation of evidence and the
review of post-conviction claims where the petitioner proceeds
pro se. Accordingly, where the PCR court orders the parties to
proceed by affidavit under [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b), the
court may also determine that the petitioner’s personal presence
at an evidentiary hearing is required. But we hold that the
decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for a “full and
fair determination of [t]he issues raised,” like the decision to
proceed by affidavit, is best left to the PCR court’s discretion.
Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[29] Hunt submitted the affidavits of himself and Yolanda Bush-Johnson in support
of his amended PCR petition. The mere fact that the post-conviction court
determined that these affidavits did not carry Hunt’s evidentiary burden of
proving that he suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel does not
automatically establish that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Hunt
could have obtained an affidavit from trial counsel which would support Hunt’s
claims, but failed to do so. Hunt has failed to demonstrate on appeal how an
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evidentiary hearing would have aided him or to identify any evidence which he
wished to present that could not have been presented via affidavit or in
documentary form. Because Hunt has failed to demonstrate how he would
have benefitted from an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that the trial court
acted within its discretion in ordering the parties to proceed by affidavit. See
Fuquay, 689 N.E.2d at 486 (providing that the post-conviction court acted
within its discretion in order the parties to proceed by affidavit where petitioner
failed to demonstrate how an evidentiary hearing would have aided him).
[30] Further, we note that Hunt relies on our prior decision in Hamner v. State, 739
N.E.2d 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) in arguing that the post-conviction court erred
in ruling on his PCR petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The issue presented in Hamner was whether a trial court erred by denying the
petitioner’s PCR petition without first conducting a hearing pursuant to Indiana
Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f) (“Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f)”), which states that
the post-conviction court may deny the petitioner’s petition without further
proceedings if “the pleadings conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to
no relief.” In Hamner, we concluded that
[Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f)] dispenses with the necessity for an
evidentiary hearing when the issues are of law only. Armstead v.
State, 596 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). It does not,
however, dispense with the need for an evidentiary hearing when
the determination hinges, in whole or in part, upon facts not
resolved, even though it may appear unlikely that the petitioner
will be able to produce evidence sufficient to establish his claim.
Id. This is true even though the petitioner has only a remote
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chance of establishing his claim. Gann v. State, 550 N.E.2d 803,
804-805 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
Hamner, 739 N.E.2d at 160.
[31] Hunt’s reliance on Hamner is misplaced. In the instant matter, the post-
conviction court did not deny Hunt’s petition based on the pleadings
themselves as is provided for by Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(f), but rather after
reviewing the evidence which was presented by the parties via affidavit as
proscribed by Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b). We have previously held that:
although the opinion falls short of holding as much, Hamner
suggests that after a PCR court orders that the cause be submitted
upon affidavit under [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b), the “issue of
fact” standard applicable to determining whether summary
disposition is appropriate under [Post-Conviction] Rules 1(4)(f)
and (g) applies equally to [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b). We
disagree with Hamner to the extent that it conflated summary
disposition and [Post-Conviction] Rule 1(9)(b).
Smith, 822 N.E.2d at 200-01. We reaffirm our opinion in Smith regarding the
applicability of the holding of Hamner to rulings made following a Post-
Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) order to submit evidence via affidavit.
[32] Hunt has failed to establish that the post-conviction court abused its discretion
in ruling on the paper record that was created after the parties submitted their
evidence by affidavit pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b).
Conclusion
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[33] Having concluded that Hunt failed to establish either that he received
ineffective assistance from his trial counsel or that the post-conviction court
abused its discretion in denying his PCR petition without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
[34] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J, concur.
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