Tyrell J. Beavers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Jun 21 2017, 9:01 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyrell J. Beavers, June 21, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1612-CR-2867
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Terry C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Shewmaker, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1607-MR-4
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Tyrell J. Beavers appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro-se request to
withdraw his guilty plea. He contends the trial court abused its discretion
because he presented sound reasons in support of withdrawing his plea and the
State did not oppose the request.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On July 6, 2016, the State charged Beavers with murder. Counsel appeared on
his behalf the following week. On October 7, 2016, the parties entered into a
written plea agreement pursuant to which Beavers agreed to plead guilty as
charged and the State agreed to a sentence of forty-five years in prison – the
minimum sentence for murder. At a plea hearing on October 10, 2016, the trial
court accepted Beavers’ guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction for
murder. The court then scheduled sentencing for November 17, 2016.
[4] While awaiting sentencing, Beavers sent letters to the trial court on or about
October 22 and November 7, 2016, requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. At
the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court addressed with Beavers
this request, which was unverified and not filed by counsel. Beavers
complained that counsel failed to advise that he could have a bench trial rather
than a jury trial. Upon further questioning by the court, Beavers stated that he
did not agree with the plea agreement and felt as though he was signing his life
away. The court then sought comments from defense counsel, who
thoughtfully noted his client’s young age of nineteen and the minimum
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sentence obtained by the plea agreement. Similarly, the prosecutor observed
that “defense counsel ha[d] negotiated with the state for the least possible
sentence that he could get under the circumstances.” Transcript at 24. The
prosecutor noted that this was “one of the strangest situations” and that
withdrawal was not in the young defendant’s best interest. Id. Further, the
prosecutor observed that Beavers had “acknowledged his guilt on multiple
occasions” and had been “very detailed about that guilt.” Id. at 25.
[5] The trial court denied the request to withdraw the guilty plea. Specifically, the
court concluded that it was not required to act on a pro-se filing by a defendant
represented by counsel and that withdrawal was clearly not in Beavers’ best
interest. The court then proceeded to sentence Beavers to forty-five years in
prison as required by the plea agreement. Beavers appeals the denial of his pro-
se request to withdraw his guilty plea.
Discussion & Decision
[6] A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this court
with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41,
44 (Ind. 2001). We will reverse such a ruling only for an abuse of discretion.
Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[7] After a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a defendant
may file a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). The
motion “shall be in writing and verified.” Id. The trial court may grant the
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motion to withdraw “for any fair and just reason unless the state has been
substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”1 Id.[8] In the instant case, Beavers did not file a verified, written motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Accordingly, his argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his pro-se requests to withdraw – made via letter and
orally at sentencing – has been waived. See Peel v. State, 951 N.E.2d 269, 272
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“A defendant’s failure to submit a verified, written
motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally results in waiver of the issue of
wrongful denial of the request.”) (quoting Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128 n.
3 (Ind. 2000)). Further, the trial court properly observed that it was not
required to consider the pro-se request because Beavers was represented by
counsel. See Black v. State, 7 N.E.3d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[9] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that Beavers has failed to present any
grounds compelling the grant of his request to withdraw his guilty plea. The
record establishes that his plea was freely and voluntarily made and that the
plea resulted in an extremely beneficial sentence – the minimum sentence.
Beavers argues that his reasons for wanting to withdraw the plea were “well
articulated and sound”. Appellants’ Brief at 7. Defense counsel, the prosecutor,
and the trial court all felt otherwise (that is, withdrawal was not in Beavers’ best
1
The statute also provides that the court shall grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “whenever the
defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. Beavers,
however, does not claim that a manifest injustice resulted from the plea agreement.
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interest). On review, we discern an exercise of discretion by the trial court, not
an abuse of it.
[10] Judgment affirmed.
[11] Kirsch, J. and Mathias, J., concur.
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