David John Arndt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 27 2017, 10:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark S. Lenyo Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
David John Arndt, July 27, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1611-CR-2708
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, [1] The Honorable Jane Woodward
Appellee-Plaintiff. Miller, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
71D01-1301-FC-11
71D03-1504-F5-60
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[2] Following a jury trial, David Arndt was convicted of burglary as a Level 5
felony and the trial court revoked his probation from a previous sentence after
finding he committed the offense of burglary. Arndt appeals his conviction and
the revocation of his probation, raising three issues for review, which we restate
as: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error in allowing a witness
to testify as to his recollection of a license plate number, (2) whether the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing a lay witness to identify Arndt as one of
the individuals depicted in a surveillance video, and (3) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in revoking Arndt’s probation.1 Concluding any error in
the admission of testimony regarding the license plate was harmless, and the
trial court neither abused its discretion in allowing the witness to identify Arndt
nor in revoking Arndt’s probation, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Michiana Auto Pros (“Michiana”) is an automobile repair business providing a
full range of services, including specialty work on off-road vehicles, in Osceola,
Indiana. Michiana’s specialty work required it to carry non-standard inventory,
including four 40-inch Nitto Grappler tires (“Nitto tires”). The Nitto tires were
mounted onto rims and were stored in a garage on Michiana’s property.
1
Arndt’s appeal from his criminal conviction for burglary and his appeal from the revocation of his probation
in a separate case have been consolidated on appeal.
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Michiana’s shop manager, Shaun Rajski, later testified the Nitto tires had their
own unique design and were mounted on seventeen-inch rims, thereby giving
the wheel “its own unique mold.” Transcript, Volume I at 56.
[4] In the early morning hours of March 26, 2016, a surveillance camera captured
two individuals burglarizing Michiana and stealing property, including the four
Nitto tires. The value of the items stolen was approximately $22,000.00. Over
the course of the next week, Brad Vincent, an employee at Discount Tire in
South Bend, learned of the burglary at Michiana and that the special tires had
been stolen.
[5] On April 6, 2015, Hewey Hudson went to the Discount Tire and discussed with
Vincent how to remove a tire from a rim and then mount the tire on a separate
rim. Hudson then left Discount Tire. Ninety minutes later, Hudson returned to
Discount Tire accompanied by Arndt. The pair brought with them two tires
mounted on seventeen-inch rims and requested Vincent remove the tires and
mount them on another set of rims. Vincent immediately recognized the tires
and sent a picture of the tires to Rajski, who confirmed the tires were the ones
stolen from Michiana. Vincent then performed the work requested. After
strapping the tires to their truck, Hudson and Arndt left Discount Tire. Vincent
then contacted law enforcement and reported the truck’s license plate number.
An investigation ensued and revealed Arndt and his associate, Dangiz Weed,
burglarized Michiana. At the time of the burglary, Arndt was serving a two-
year sentence fully suspended to probation.
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[6] On April 20, 2015, the State charged Arndt with burglary as a Level 5 felony.
In addition, the State filed a petition to revoke Arndt’s probation, alleging he
committed the crime of burglary while on probation. At trial, Weed admitted
he and Arndt burglarized Michiana and stole numerous items, including the
Nitto tires.2 Arndt’s aunt, Belinda Holcomb, also testified and was shown
Michiana’s surveillance video from the night of the burglary. Over Arndt’s
objection, Holcomb identified Arndt as one of the two individuals captured on
video, explaining, “I’ve known him his whole life. That’s his walk. . . . He’s
bow legged. Just like his dad.” Tr., Vol. II at 63-64.
[7] Vincent testified as to his encounter with Hudson and Arndt at Discount Tire.
The State then handed Vincent a photograph of the truck, which had not yet
been entered into evidence. Vincent recognized it as the truck in which Hudson
and Arndt arrived at Discount Tire because he specifically remembered the
truck had a temporary license plate just as the photograph depicted. However,
he stated he could not remember the license plate number he had provided to
law enforcement. The State then provided Vincent with a police report to
refresh his recollection. After allowing Vincent to review the police report, the
State retrieved the report from Vincent and asked whether he now remembered
the license plate number on the truck, and if so, what the number was. Vincent
2
The State charged Weed and Arndt under separate causes and opted not to join the two causes for trial.
Weed’s testimony came as he remained in custody awaiting his trial. During Arndt’s trial, Weed also
testified he did not receive any promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony. Weed ultimately pleaded
guilty to charges stemming from his role in the burglary.
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then stated the license plate number. However, the State had left the
photograph of the truck on the witness stand with the license plate number
visible. The trial court overruled Arndt’s objection. On cross-examination,
Vincent admitted he had read the numbers off the photograph of the truck when
testifying. At this point, the trial court acknowledged it had erred in previously
overruling Arndt’s objection and admonished the jury: “I’m admonishing you
to disregard anything that you may have heard regarding a license plate, and I
am admonishing you not to take anything about that into consideration in
arriving at a decision about the outcome of this case.” Tr., Vol. I at 118.
[8] The jury found Arndt guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of
conviction for the burglary charge and revoked Arndt’s probation in his earlier
case after finding he violated a condition of his probation by committing the
burglary. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[9] The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Cherry v. State, 971 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A
trial court may abuse its discretion in admitting evidence if its decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if
the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. We will reverse a trial court’s
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erroneous decision to admit evidence only when the decision affects a party’s
substantial rights. McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. Improperly admitted evidence “is harmless error when the
conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to
satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the
questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Wickizer v. State, 626
N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ind. 1993).
B. License Plate Number
[10] Arndt contends the trial court erred in allowing Vincent to testify as to the
license plate number. Assuming the trial court did err, we must determine
whether the error was harmless. See id.; McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 440.
[11] At the outset, the State points out that Ardnt has presented no argument
addressing any alleged prejudice suffered as a result of the trial court’s error.
The State is correct and Arndt’s claim is therefore waived for failure to present a
cogent argument. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Notwithstanding waiver, the
record does not demonstrate Arndt suffered any prejudice. Upon recognizing
its error, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard all evidence pertaining
to the license plate, and there is no indication any additional evidence regarding
the license plate was admitted. See Street v. State, 30 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (noting there is a presumption the jury follows a trial court’s
admonishment and that the excluded testimony played no part in the jury’s
deliberation), trans. denied. In addition, Arndt’s conviction is supported by
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substantial independent evidence, including Weed’s testimony affirming he and
Arndt were the ones who burglarized Michiana, and Vincent’s testimony
regarding his encounter with Arndt and Hudson regarding the Nitto tires. We
conclude any error in allowing Vincent to testify as to the license plate number
was harmless.
C. Holcomb’s Identification of Arndt
[12] Arndt contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Holcomb to
identify him as one of the two individuals depicted on the surveillance video.
Specifically, he claims Holcomb’s testimony was inadmissible under Indiana
Evidence Rules 701 and 403. We disagree.
[13] Rule 701 provides, “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the
form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s
perception; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony
or to a determination of a fact in issue.” Although not entirely clear from his
brief, Arndt seems to argue Holcomb’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule
701 because “[Holcomb’s] son was a suspect in the case, the son’s truck was
used in the burglary, and bad blood existed between [Holcomb] and Arndt.”
Brief of Appellant at 11. Arndt cites to no case, however, showing such
evidence is relevant to a Rule 701 analysis, and at most, his argument is an
invitation for this court to reassess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do. Tongate v. State, 954 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), trans. denied. In any event, Holcomb testified she was Arndt’s aunt, had
known Arndt his entire life, and knew he walked in a unique fashion.
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Therefore, her opinion identifying Arndt was rationally related to her
perception and was helpful to the jury in determining the identity of one of the
persons depicted on the video. See Goodson v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1181, 1184
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding a trial court did not abuse its discretion under
Rule 701 in admitting police officer testimony identifying the defendant in
photographs and videotapes because the police officers had known the
defendant for several years and their testimony was helpful to the jury in
determining the identity of the person depicted in the photographs and
videotapes), trans. denied.
[14] Rule 403 provides, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evaluation of whether the
probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice is a task left to the trial court’s discretion. Bell v.
State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. In determining
any unfair prejudicial impact, “courts should look for the dangers that the jury
will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence
will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Id.[15] Arndt argues the trial court erred in not considering certain factors and not
conducting “the balancing test required under Evidence Rule 403.” Br. of
Appellant at 17. However, Arndt cites to no case demonstrating what factors
the trial court was required to consider, nor does he set forth a cogent argument
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addressing how the jury in his case may have substantially overestimated the
value of Holcomb’s testimony, or how Holcomb’s testimony might have
aroused or inflamed the passions of the jury. His argument is therefore waived
for failure to present a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). In
any event, Holcomb’s testimony was certainly prejudicial towards Arndt
precisely because its probative value implicated him as one of the assailants.
However, there is nothing in the record demonstrating the jury could have
substantially overestimated the value of Holcomb’s testimony, nor is there any
indication such testimony aroused or inflamed the passions of the jury. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Holcomb to identify Arndt as
one of the individuals who burglarized Michiana.
II. Revocation of Probation
[16] Finally, Arndt contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his
probation. Specifically, he claims the State did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence he violated a condition of probation. We disagree.
[17] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind.
2013). It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if the
conditions of probation are violated and appeals from a revocation of probation
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Probation revocation is a two-step
process: first, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation
of a condition of probation occurred, and second, the trial court must determine
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the appropriate sanction if a violation is found. Id. The State must prove the
defendant violated a condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 617.
[18] Arndt challenges only the first step, arguing Weed’s testimony “was hardly
compelling” and “often conflicting[,]” and Holcomb’s testimony was “similarly
tainted.” Brief of Appellant at 18-19. Therefore, he claims the State did not
present evidence proving he committed a criminal offense in violation of his
probation. We interpret Arndt’s argument as an invitation for this this court to
reassess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
Thornton v. State, 792 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). At trial, the State
presented evidence through the testimony of Weed showing Weed and Arndt
were the two individuals who burglarized Michiana. In addition, Vincent
testified as to his encounter with Hudson and Arndt when the pair were in
possession of the Nitto tires, and Holcomb identified Arndt as one of the two
burglars depicted in Michiana’s surveillance video. And after the jury found
Arndt guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court entered
judgment of conviction accordingly. This evidence is sufficient to prove by a
preponderance evidence that Arndt violated a condition of his probation by
committing a new offense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Arndt’s probation.
Conclusion
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[19] We conclude any error in the admission of Vincent’s testimony regarding the
license plate was harmless in light of the trial court’s admonishment to the jury
and the substantial independent evidence of Arndt’s guilt. In addition, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Holcomb to identify Arndt as one
of the individuals depicted on Michiana’s surveillance camera, nor did the trial
court abuse its discretion in revoking Arndt’s probation. Accordingly, we
affirm Arndt’s conviction and the revocation of his probation.
[20] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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