David G. Kaufman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 18 2019, 9:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE1 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David G. Kaufman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
David G. Kaufman, February 18, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
46A05-1707-CR-1596
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Alevizos, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46C01-1307-FC-242
1
Appellate counsel, Mary P. Lake, wrote and submitted Kaufman’s Appellant Brief but withdrew her
appearance prior to the handdown of this memorandum decision.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 1 of 27
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] David G. Kaufman (“Kaufman”) appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions
for Class C felony attempted misconduct with a minor2 and Class D felony
attempted possession of child pornography.3 Kaufman argues that the trial
court abused its discretion and violated Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) when it
admitted prior conduct evidence. The trial court admitted the evidence under
the intent exception under Evidence Rule 404(b), finding it relevant to respond
to Kaufman’s contrary intent and tempering any prejudicial effect by
specifically instructing the jury as to the limited purpose for the evidence.
Under the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence, and we affirm
Kaufman’s convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its admission of
evidence.
2
IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-9; 35-41-5-1.
3
I.C. §§ 35-42-4-4; 35-41-5-1. The jury also found Kaufman guilty of Class D felony child solicitation, but
the record before us indicates that this charge was ultimately dismissed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 2 of 27
Facts
[3] Kaufman served as Fire Chief of the Lincoln Township Volunteer Fire
Department (“Fire Department”) from the 1990’s until 2012. In 2006, B.D.,
who was thirteen years old and who wanted to be a fireman, met Kaufman and
talked to him about the cadet program at the Fire Department. Although
participants in the cadet program had to be sixteen years old, Kaufman invited
B.D. to go the Fire Department to “hang out and basically see how everything
worked.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 60). Thereafter, B.D. went to the Fire Department one
day per week to watch activities at the Fire Department and learn from
Kaufman.
[4] The following year, when B.D. was fourteen years old, he was in Kaufman’s
office at the Fire Department, and Kaufman asked him if he wanted to make
some money by participating in a “college study” during which Kaufman
would “measure [B.D.’s] penis hard and soft.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 66). Kaufman
told B.D. that the study would first involve measurements, then questions about
his sex life, and an “opportunity for more things down the road[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3
at 66). Kaufman offered B.D. $150 to participate in the measurement part of
the study and told him that the study would provide “more money for younger
people.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 67). B.D. refused and told Kaufman that it was
“weird.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 66). Kaufman told B.D. that he “would never hurt”
him. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 67).
[5] Kaufman continually asked B.D. to participate in the study whenever he was
with B.D. Before Kaufman talked to B.D. about the study, he always “look[ed]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 3 of 27
side to side, mak[ing] sure there wa[s] nobody standing close enough to hear
him.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 68). When asking B.D. to participate in the study,
Kaufman would put his arm around B.D. or grab him by the waist or his pants
pockets.
[6] During the summer when B.D. was fourteen years old, Kaufman asked B.D. to
mow his lawn. After finishing the job, B.D. went inside Kaufman’s house to
get paid. After Kaufman paid B.D. for the lawn, he then put his arm around
B.D., “tried to coax” B.D. into doing the study, and told B.D. that he would
“never hurt” him. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 71). B.D. refused and left Kaufman’s house.
[7] B.D. mowed Kaufman’s lawn once per week that summer, and each time B.D.
was at Kaufman’s house, Kaufman asked B.D. to participate in the study. On
one specific occasion, B.D. went inside Kaufman’s house after he had mowed
the lawn. Kaufman went to his bedroom to get the cash, and B.D. followed
him. Kaufman then sat on his bed, put his fingers in B.D.’s pocket, and pulled
B.D. towards him. Kaufman then told B.D. that “if he wanted [B.D.] he could
have [him]” and said that he would never hurt B.D. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 72). B.D.
left Kaufman’s house and never mowed his lawn again.
[8] B.D. did, however, continue with his weekly observation day at the Fire
Department. And Kaufman continued his requests for B.D. to participate in
the study. On B.D.’s fifteenth birthday, he was at the Fire Department, and
Kaufman was “persistent” about wanting B.D. to do the study where Kaufman
would “measure [B.D.’s] penis hard and soft” and “ask questions about [B.D.’s]
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 4 of 27
sex life.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 75, 76). Kaufman told B.D., “let’s get this done.” (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 75). B.D. again refused.
[9] Another day when B.D. was at the Fire Department in the fall of 2008,
Kaufman approached B.D. and told him that if he was not comfortable having
his penis measured in person, then B.D. could take photos of his penis with his
cell phone, load the photos on an SD card, and put the SD card in Kaufman’s
mailbox. Kaufman told B.D. that “it wouldn’t pay as good but it was a way to
get started.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 76-77). B.D. walked away from Kaufman and went
to sit by Zac Richie (“Richie”), who was a fire cadet. Richie, who had
overheard Kaufman ask B.D. if he “want[ed] to take penis pictures,” talked to
B.D. about Kaufman’s request. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 96).
[10] B.D. joined the cadet program at the Fire Department when he turned sixteen
and remained in the cadet program until he was seventeen years old. Kaufman
did not relent in his requests for B.D. to participate in the study. B.D.,
however, never participated in Kaufman’s study and never took any photos of
himself. When B.D. was eighteen years old, he told his mother about
Kaufman’s repeated requests for B.D. to participate in a penis study.
Thereafter, Kaufman was fired as fire chief, and the police department started
an investigation into the allegations against Kaufman.
[11] In April 2013, Detective Jennifer Rhine-Walker (“Detective Rhine-Walker”)
interviewed Kaufman and discussed the university study with him. This
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 5 of 27
interview was recorded and a redacted version of it was played at trial. 4 During
the interview, Kaufman told the detective that he had done the study in
conjunction with the University of Michigan but stated that he did not
remember the name of his contact person. Nor did Kaufman keep any
documentation of his involvement with the study. Kaufman stated that the
study was done “years and years ago” and was “very, very short lived.”
(State’s Ex. 1B). He could not remember an exact date or the duration of the
study. Kaufman stated that he was not paid to conduct the study and that the
subjects did not receive any payment to do the study. Kaufman described the
study as a “lifestyle survey” with “really benign” questions relating to sex,
including questions about how often the subject had sex, the subject’s favorite
positions, and the length of the subject’s penis. (State’s Ex. 1B). As for the
question regarding length, Kaufman initially told the detective that the subject
would merely self-report the measurement and that he did not remember ever
obtaining actual measurements of anyone’s penis. Later, in the interview,
Kaufman admitted that he had asked the male subjects to measure their penises,
both flaccid and erect, and stated that he usually gave the subjects a disposable
paper measuring tape to measure themselves. He stated that, at times, he
would hold the tape and measure a subject’s penis, but he clarified that he did
not come in contact in a “sexual manner.” (State’s Ex. 1B). Kaufman insisted
that he had never done anything of a “sexual nature” and that everything he
4
The information about the interview recounted hereinafter includes only what was contained on the
redacted version shown to the jury.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 6 of 27
had done was for “information and research.” (State’s Ex. 1B). He also denied
that he had ever taken any photographs of anyone as part of the study.
[12] In July 2013, the State initially charged Kaufman with three counts of Class C
felony attempted sexual misconduct with a minor, Class D felony attempted
possession of child pornography, and Class A misdemeanor false informing.
The following month, the State amended the charging information and added
three counts of Class D felony child solicitation.
[13] After Kaufman had been charged and the case was pending, William Duttlinger
(“Duttlinger”), who had been named as the new fire chief after Kaufman, found
a thumb drive in a filing cabinet in Kaufman’s old office. Duttlinger inserted
the thumb drive into his computer and saw photographs of fire scenes and a
photograph of a naked man lying on a table. Duttlinger forwarded the thumb
drive to the township trustee, who then forwarded it to Detective Rhine-
Walker. Thereafter, the State sought and obtained a search warrant to search
the contents of the thumb drive.
[14] A forensic analysis of the thumb drive revealed that it was registered to
Kaufman and his wife. The thumb drive contained Power Point documents
(relating to fire/EMS), a few Word documents, and photographs. These files
were placed on the thumb drive between 2002-2013. The metadata on the
thumb drive revealed that all the photographs were taken by the same model of
Olympus camera, which was known to be used only by Kaufman. The
photographs included images of fire scenes that were contained in a non-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 7 of 27
concealed folder on the thumb drive and twenty-nine images of naked men that
were contained in a secure, encrypted folder on the drive. All the hidden
photographs were close-up images of penises in both flaccid and erect states.
Some of the photographs showed various naked male subjects, who were
individually photographed lying on a bed, holding a tape measure, and
measuring their penises in flaccid and erect states. Some other photographs
depicted these naked male subjects, again individually photographed, while
they were lying on a bed or kneeling back on the bed and thrusting their penises
in a forward manner. Additionally, there were images of the penises of two
naked males, photographed together, as they stood next to a bed, sat on the bed
thrusting their penises in a forward manner, and knelt on all fours on the bed
with their penises exposed from behind. A witness testified at trial that the
bedroom depicted in the photographs was Kaufman’s bedroom.
[15] In March 2014, the State filed its notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence.
Specifically, the State’s notice indicated that it intended to introduce evidence
from various witnesses, including eighteen males whom Kaufman had asked to
participate in a sexually-based study and eleven males, from the eighteen listed,
who had participated in the study. The State alleged that it sought to introduce
the evidence, in accordance with Evidence Rule 404(b), to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident. The trial court initially denied the State’s 404(b) motion.
[16] During the pendency of this case, Kaufman entered into a written plea
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two amended charges of Class
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 8 of 27
D felony official misconduct and Class A misdemeanor false informing in
exchange for the State’s dismissal of the remaining charges. The trial court
ultimately rejected Kaufman’s plea, finding that Kaufman had failed to
establish an adequate factual basis because Kaufman had stated that his request
for photographs of B.D.’s penis and request to take measurements of B.D.’s
penis, which would have included Kaufman physically touching his penis, were
made for the study and were not made to arouse or satisfy Kaufman’s sexual
desires.
[17] In preparation for trial, the State filed its witness and exhibit list, which
included, among its list of intended witnesses, the names of nine people who
had been listed in the State’s 404(b) notice. Two of these nine witnesses were
C.R. (“C.R.”) and K.R. (“K.R.”). Among its list of intended exhibits, the State
indicated that it planned to introduce into evidence the thumb drive and the
nude male photographs contained thereon; the video of Kaufman’s April 2013
interview with Detective Rhine-Walker; and the video of a 1995 interview that
Kaufman did with an attorney. Thereafter, Kaufman filed two motions in
limine, seeking to prohibit the State from offering evidence of: (1) the thumb
drive containing photographs of naked adult men; and (2) witnesses contained
in the State’s 404(b) notice.
[18] In March 2017, the trial court held a three-day jury trial. At the time of trial,
the State had amended the charging information and proceeded against
Kaufman on the following three charges: (1) Class C felony attempted sexual
misconduct with a minor; (2) Class D felony attempted possession of child
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 9 of 27
pornography; and (3) Class D felony child solicitation. All three of these
charges involved an underlying specific intent to satisfy or arouse the sexual
desires of Kaufman. See IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-9 (sexual misconduct with a
minor); 35-42-4-4 (possession of child pornography); 35-42-4-6 (child
solicitation) (2008).5
[19] Before the trial commenced, the trial court and the parties discussed the State’s
proposed 404(b) evidence, which included: (1) C.R.’s testimony; (2) K.R.’s
testimony; (3) the video of Kaufman’s interview with Detective Rhine-Walker;
and (4) the photographs of naked men contained on the thumb drive. They also
discussed whether the evidence might be allowed under the intent and plan
exceptions of Rule 404(b).
[20] The trial court, which was well-versed in the analysis and considerations of the
Evidence Rule 404(b) exceptions, discussed some relevant caselaw, including
Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. 1997) and Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795
(Ind. 1993) and explained to the parties that the evidence would be admissible if
the State met the two required considerations, as set out in Hicks, of relevancy
5
Specifically, the attempted sexual misconduct with a minor charge alleged, in relevant part, that Kaufman,
while acting with the intent to commit the crime of sexual misconduct with a minor, asked B.D. to submit to
a fictional study wherein Kaufman would touch or fondle B.D.’s penis with intent to arouse or satisfy the
sexual desires of Kaufman. The attempted possession of child pornography charged alleged, in relevant part,
that Kaufman, with the intent to commit the crime of possession of child pornography, requested B.D. to
provide photographs that depicted sexual conduct. The possession of child pornography statute defines
“sexual conduct” in part, as the exhibition of uncovered genitals intended to satisfy or arouse the sexual
desires of any person. See I.C. § 35-42-4-4. Lastly, the child solicitation charged alleged, in relevant part, that
Kaufman knowingly or intentionally solicited B.D. to engage in fondling or touching to arouse or satisfy the
sexual desires of Kaufman.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 10 of 27
and then balancing the probative value against any prejudicial effect. The trial
court also discussed how the facts of the case—specifically that Kaufman had
asserted that he was seeking B.D.’s penis measurements and photographs on
behalf of a university study—had established a contrary intent to the intent to
arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires as was part of the charges against him.
The trial court noted that this case was “kind of a strange case” and seemed to
be an issue of “first impression.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 55). The trial court summarized
the unique nature of the case and the intent and plan exception as follows:
Here’s the problem in this case. The facts as alleged are that
[Kaufman] specifically used this lure. If he just said, ‘Hey, let me
take pictures of your penises,’ and the guy said, ‘no,’ it’s a close
call. But he said, ‘I’m taking a university study. You’ll get paid.
You can get even more if you do this.’ And in the same period,
he’s saying the same thing to other individuals, and those
individuals go through with it, and it’s shown that the end result
is fondling et cetera, it’s plan, it’s intent. I think it comes in.
*****
I’m trying to limit this to stuff that happened in the same time
period. They have a whole slew of stuff they can ask me that I
told them in advance, I’m probably not going to let them use.
But once again, I’m just saying that I—because I don’t have a
foundation, I don’t have these witnesses in front of me yet, but if
[the State] can lay [its] foundation and do those things,
[Kaufman] will be able to make [his] objection to preserve the
record, but it is my thinking that I will probably allow in the
photographs,[6] and I will probably allow in [C.R.]’s testimony,
6
The trial court, however, indicated that certain photographs, including the “two-man series” of photos,
would not be admissible under the exception. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 47).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 11 of 27
and perhaps, [K.R.]’s testimony. I doubt that I’m going to let in
anything older than that.
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 54-55).
[21] During the trial, B.D. testified regarding the facts surrounding Kaufman’s
offenses against him. B.D. also testified that he kept returning to the Fire
Department because he wanted to be a fireman. He testified that he did not
initially tell anyone about Kaufman’s repeated requests to participate in the
study because “it was weird” and “embarrassing.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 80). B.D. also
testified that he was afraid that if the story got out, then Kaufman would kick
him out of the cadet program and reduce the chance that B.D. would become a
fireman.
[22] Prior to the State calling C.R. as a witness, the trial court held a hearing outside
the presence of the jury to discuss C.R.’s potential testimony and Kaufman’s
404(b) objection thereto. The State indicated that C.R.’s proposed testimony
would be that Kaufman had: (1) asked C.R. to participate in a University of
Michigan sex study; (2) asked C.R. sex-related questions; (3) told C.R. that the
university researchers liked his questionnaire responses and wanted C.R. to be
part of the study by providing penis measurements and a semen sample; (4)
measured and touched C.R.’s flaccid and erect penis; (5) offered to perform
fellatio to assist C.R. in making his penis erect; and (6) offered to help C.R.
ejaculate to get a semen sample; and (7) obtained a semen sample from C.R.,
who did not use Kaufman’s assistance. The State asserted that C.R.’s
testimony would be admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was necessary for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 12 of 27
the State to “show what the study actually consisted of and what actually
happened as part of [the] plan, but also to show, in conjunction with other
evidence, that the intent was for more than a professional or scientific study.”
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 128).
[23] In response, Kaufman’s counsel argued as follows:
[T]his is a child solicitation, attempted sexual misconduct with a
minor. [C.R.] was of a consenting age and an adult. The
evidence thus far, in terms of our alleged victim, was -- the study
consisted -- that he knew of -- consisted of the survey and
photographing of [the] penis. There has been no evidence from
the victim. In fact, he said he -- there might be other things down
the road but he didn’t know what they were.
So this evidence, this 404(b) evidence, while similar in the first
two steps in terms of the study and the measurements, is not
similar at all in terms of the semen sample, the assistance in
obtaining the semen sample. Measuring the -- or weighing the
probative value versus the prejudicial effect to the defendant,
allows t[he] jury to speculate. And, again, the risk of them
convicting on what happened to [C.R.] versus what actually
occurred in these charged acts is great. That’s our objection.
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 129).
[24] The trial court then ruled as follows:
In doing the Hicks analysis, first we determine[] whether it’s
relevant to a manner other than the defendant’s propensity to
commit the crime. I think it’s -- we talked about this yesterday. I
think it’s part of a plan. It’s within the same time period. It’s
also, in this case, intent and intensively [sic] been placed into the
equation because of the nature of the ruse itself is of what the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 13 of 27
alleged ruse is. Because this is a specific intent -- these are
specific intent crimes -- they must show that the attempt was to
do something beyond scientific, beyond clinical. And the fact
that these first two steps may be seen as part of a grooming plan
that leads to -- that was meant to lead towards something else, I
think is relevant. The question is is it overly prejudicial? I think
it’s limited to one or two within the same timeframe, fine. As
I’ve indicated there’s a slew of other witnesses listed on the State
that I’m not going to allow because they are not similar and/or
it’s a combination of not being similar or not within the same
timeframe. But I will allow [C.R.].
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 128-29). Kaufman then asked for a limiting instruction as to the
limited use for the evidence for intent and plan, and the trial court agreed.
When the jury returned, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
This next witness is problematic for us in the rules of evidence so
to speak. I’m going to explain that generally prior bad acts
cannot be used to so that the defendant has a propensity to
commit the acts charged. Therefore, you’re going to here [sic]
from this next witness who is going to talk about a few things.
You can only use this witness’s testimony to aid you in
determining the -- whether the intent of the defendant or whether
there was a plan that the defendant had. You can only use it for
those purposes if you need to determine those in your minds.
You may not use it to say this man has a propensity to do these
things. It’s a fine line. It’s obviously an intellectual line that
you’re going to have to make. Does anybody have a problem
with understanding that?
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 132-33). The trial court then asked Kaufman whether he had any
problems with the explanation, and his counsel indicated that he did not.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 14 of 27
[25] Thereafter, C.R. testified that in the Fall of 2008, when he was twenty years
old, he took an EMT class in which Kaufman was the instructor. C.R.
described how Kaufman had approached him, invited him to his house, told
C.R. that he was helping to conduct a University of Michigan study, and asked
C.R. if he wanted to be a part of the compensated study. After C.R. agreed,
Kaufman told C.R. that the study would first involve answering a survey of
questions to see if C.R. would qualify for the study. Kaufman then asked C.R.
detailed questions about his sexual involvement with women, wrote C.R.’s
answers on a legal pad, and told C.R. that he would submit his responses to the
university. Thereafter, Kaufman told C.R. that the university considered him
to be a “top candidate” for the program. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 145). He then had C.R.
return to his house on two different occasions. During the first return visit,
Kaufman told C.R. that he needed to get a semen sample and gave C.R. a
“Tupperware cup.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 148). C.R. then went into Kaufman’s
bathroom, masturbated, and returned the cup to Kaufman. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 148).
During the second visit to Kaufman’s house, Kaufman told C.R. that the study
would be finished after he obtained a measurement of the size of C.R.’s penis,
both flaccid and erect. C.R. pulled down his pants, and Kaufman, bare-
handed, touched C.R.’s flaccid penis and measured it with a cloth measuring
tape. Kaufman then grabbed C.R.’s testicles, told C.R. that he had a “good
load in there[,]” and measured his testicles. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 153). Kaufman also
told C.R. not to think that “this is gay” because it was “just skin” and because
Kaufman was an EMT and had “been trained to do this[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 153).
Kaufman then told C.R. that he needed to get an erect penis measurement and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 15 of 27
offered to “[s]uck it off” to help “get [C.R.] hard[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 152). C.R.
declined Kaufman’s offer, went into the bathroom, and accomplished the task
by himself. Thereafter, Kaufman touched and measured C.R.’s erect penis and
his testicles.
[26] Following C.R.’s testimony, the State, outside the presence of the jury, made a
proffer for K.R.’s testimony. The State told the trial court that K.R. would
testify that: (1) when he was eighteen years old in 2007 when Kaufman
approached him to do the study; (2) he agreed to participate in the study; (3)
part of the study included flaccid and erect measurements of his penis; (4)
Kaufman manually stimulated K.R.’s penis to get it erect; and (5) Kaufman
continued to manually stimulate K.R. to collect a sperm sample. The State
argued that K.R.’s testimony was relevant to show plan and intent. Kaufman
objected to K.R.’s testimony regarding a semen sample and argued that it was
prejudicial.
[27] The trial court ruled that the State could introduce K.R.’s testimony but that it
would be more limited than C.R.’s. The trial court stated that K.R.’s
testimony, with exception of any testimony relating to a semen sample, would
be admissible because it was “offered for one purpose, to show that this was the
intent and that this was plan[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 160). The trial court specifically
explained that any semen sample testimony was not to be introduced because
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 16 of 27
the “probative value [wa]s outweighed by cumulativeness and prejudice.” (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 161).7
[28] Prior to K.R.’s testimony, the trial court again advised the jury that “the same
caveats [applied] as the last witness” so that K.R.’s testimony was to be
considered only for the purpose of plan and intent. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 164).
Thereafter, K.R. testified while he in the cadet program at the Fire Department,
Kaufman had asked him to participate in a college study “for a college out of
the State of Michigan.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 171). K.R. further testified that, when he
was eighteen years old, he went to Kaufman’s house for a landscaping job and
that Kaufman again asked him to do the study. After K.R. agreed, Kaufman
asked him some questions about his sex life; measured and touched K.R.’s
flaccid penis with his bare hands while K.R. was on Kaufman’s bed; “jacked . .
. off” K.R.’s penis “to get it hard;” and measured K.R.’s erect penis. (Tr. Vol. 3
at 176). K.R. also testified that he never signed a university form or agreement
to participate in the study and that he was never contacted by anyone at a
university.
[29] A representative of the University of Michigan, who oversaw the university’s
research regulatory and compliance oversight and the protection of human
subjects, testified that the university did not have any records of Kaufman or
7
The trial court told the State that “any further corroborating” evidence not related to the facts of the crimes
charged, such as semen sample testimony, was not necessary and stated that “we’re already tempting the
Court of Appeals to throw the whole thing out anyway.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 161).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 17 of 27
any records to indicate that Kaufman was affiliated with a research study for
the university.
[30] During Detective Rhine-Walker’s testimony, the State sought to introduce a
redacted version of Kaufman’s videotaped police interview.8 The trial court
and the parties discussed, outside the presence of the jury, the admissibility of
the video and watched the redacted version. Kaufman’s counsel objected based
on Evidence Rule 404(b), arguing that Kaufman had “admit[ted], in general, to
certain conduct over some course of time never referenced by day or person”
and that his admissions “never relat[ed] to [B.D.].” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 187).
Kaufman’s counsel also argued that any reference to Kaufman’s sex life,
potential for homosexuality, allegations from the 1990’s, or discussion of semen
samples should not be admitted. The trial court agreed with Kaufman on this
latter point and stated that it did not want “to risk the danger of the jury
painting a picture that this exact same scenario took place for 25 years.” (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 192). The trial court explained that Kaufman’s claim that he was
conducting a study was the “only probative” part of the video because it went
towards “intent and plan” and that the objected-to parts of the video would be
exclude because it went “too much into propensity” and was outweighed by
8
The State had initially sought to introduce the entire two-hour video but then redacted it after the trial court
had explained the limitations regarding the admission of evidence under the Rule 404(b) exceptions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 18 of 27
prejudicial value. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 192). Thereafter, the trial court admitted a
further redacted version of the video as State’s Exhibit 1B.9
[31] When the State sought to admit the thumb drive (State’s Exhibit 2) and nine
photographs of naked men contained thereon (State’s Exhibits 4-12), Kaufman
objected to the photographs based on Rule 404(b) and 403.10 Kaufman argued
that the photographs, especially the ones that may have been placed on the
drive in 2002, were “remote in time” and that, additionally, they were
“cumulative” because the trial court had already allowed other evidence in
relation to intent. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 248). Kaufman also argued that because the
State would have a witness from the University of Michigan to testify that there
was no study, then the photographs were not necessary and seemed to be
offered only to “enflame this jury[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 50). The State argued that
they were seeking to admit the photographs under the 404(b) exceptions to
prove, in relation to the attempted possession of child pornography charge, that
the photographs were non-scientific, that Kaufman did not have the intent to do
a scientific study, and that he intended to retain the photographs.
[32] The trial court agreed with Kaufman that the photographs in Exhibits 4-12 were
cumulative of the evidence of intent relating to the attempted sexual
misconduct with a minor and child solicitation charges. However, the trial
9
The content of the video is discussed in the fact section above.
10
The photographs that the State sought to admit was narrowed from twenty-nine to nine based on the trial
court’s explanation of limitations regarding the admission of evidence under the Rule 404(b) exceptions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 19 of 27
court noted that the thumb drive had been “possessed in an area that
circumstantially could [have] be[en] [Kaufman’s]” and ruled that the
photographs were indicative of “intent” and “plan” and were “relevant to the
[attempted] possession of child pornography” charge. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 249). The
trial court stated that the photos “could clearly be probative of whether the
stated reason for this quote, unquote, ‘study,’ was true or not[,] [a]nd the fact
that they go beyond anything that could resemble any type of scientific study
into more prurient—prurient photographs would be evidence of the true intent
of the defendant[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 47). The trial court also informed Kaufman
that it would give the jury a limiting instruction that the photographs were to be
used only for consideration of intent in relation to the child pornography
charge. After the photographs were admitted into evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury that the photographs were relevant only to and to be
considered only for “the count dealing with pornography” and not the other
two counts. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 11).
[33] In closing arguments, both the State and Kaufman’s counsel reminded the jury
that some of the evidence could be considered for a limited purpose only. More
importantly, in its final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
Evidence has been introduced that the Defendant was involved
in bad acts other than those charged in the information. This
evidence has been received solely on the issue of Defendant’s
intent and plan. This evidence should be considered by you only
for that limited purpose.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 20 of 27
(App. Vol. 3 at 53).
[34] The jury found Kaufman guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgments
of conviction for Class C felony attempted misconduct with a minor and Class
D felony attempted possession of child pornography.11 The trial court imposed
a five (5) year sentence, with four (4) years executed and one (1) year suspended
to probation, for Kaufman’s Class C felony attempted misconduct with a minor
conviction, and it imposed a concurrent six (6) month sentence for his Class D
felony attempted possession of child pornography conviction. Kaufman now
appeals.
Decision
[35] Kaufman argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting: (1)
C.R.’s testimony; (2) K.R.’s testimony; (3) State’s Exhibit 1B, the video of his
police interview; and (4) State’s Exhibits 4-12, the photographs of naked men.
Specifically, he contends that the evidence was inadmissible under the intent
11
The record before us contains conflicting information about the Class D felony child solicitation verdict.
The chronological case summary indicates that the trial court “accept[ed] the verdicts of the Jury and
enter[ed] judgment[s] accordin[g]ly.” (App. Vol. 2 at 13). The trial court’s sentencing order does not contain
any indication that a judgment of conviction or a sentence was entered upon the Class D felony child
solicitation verdict. The amended abstract of judgment indicates that Class D felony child solicitation charge
was dismissed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 21 of 27
and plan exceptions of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and under Evidence Rule
403 because it was unfairly prejudicial.12
[36] The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of
discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied.
[37] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind.
Evid. Rule 404(b)(1). However, such evidence may be admitted to prove
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). Evidence “Rule 404(b) is
designed to prevent the jury from making the forbidden inference that prior
wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681
(Ind. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hicks, 690
N.E.2d at 218 (explaining that Evidence Rule 404(b) is “designed to prevent the
jury from assessing a defendant’s present guilt on the basis of his past
12
Kaufman also argues that the trial court should have excluded State’s Exhibits 4-12 based on a lack of
foundation. We acknowledge that the record shows that the State laid the foundation in a rather piecemeal
fashion; however, we find his argument without merit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 22 of 27
propensities”). When determining whether to admit evidence of specific acts
under Rule 404(b), the trial court is required to: (1) determine whether the
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other
than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act;13 and (2) balance the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Indiana
Evidence Rule 403.14 Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221.
[38] Here, the trial court admitted the challenged evidence under the intent and/or
plan exceptions of Evidence Rule 404(b). We choose to focus our analysis on
the intent exception. See Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018) (explaining that our Court “may affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is
sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even thought it was not the reason
enunciated by the trial court”), trans. denied. Our supreme court has explained
that the intent exception in Evidence Rule 404(b) is to be narrowly construed
and “will be available when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the
charged culpability and affirmatively presents a claim of particular contrary
intent.” Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 799. When determining whether a defendant
has raised a contrary intent, our appellate courts have considered a defendant’s
pretrial statement to police, opening statement, cross-examination of the State’s
13
“When inquiring into relevance, the court may consider any factor it would ordinarily consider under Rule
402.” Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221. These factors may include “the similarity and proximity in time of the prior
bad act to the charged conduct[] and will presumably typically include tying the act to the defendant.” Id.
14
Evidence Rule 403 provides that a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 23 of 27
witnesses, or evidence in the defendant’s case-in-chief. See id. (setting forth in-
trial examples of ways a defendant could raise a contrary intent); 12 Robert L.
Miller, Indiana Practice, Indiana Evidence, § 404.214 (4th ed.) (discussing
consideration of a defendant’s pretrial police statements when considering a
defendant’s contrary intent); Whitehair v. State, 654 N.E.2d 296, 302 n.2 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995) (noting that, although the Wickizer court set forth in-trial
examples of assertions of contrary intent, it also took into consideration the
defendant’s pretrial responses to police questions). The State may respond to
the defendant’s contrary intent “by offering evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or
acts to the extent genuinely relevant to prove the defendant’s intent at the time
of the charged offense.” Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 799. Thereafter, the trial court
will balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 403. Id.
[39] Here, as noted by the trial court, Kaufman’s contrary intent was advanced by
the unique nature of the facts of this case. Specifically, the facts reveal that
Kaufman had told B.D. that he was seeking B.D.’s penis measurements and
photographs on behalf of a university study, which constitutes a contrary intent
to the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires as was part of the
charges against him. Additionally, Kaufman asserted a contrary intent in his
interview with Detective Rhine-Walker.15 During the interview, Kaufman was
15
We reject Kaufman’s challenges to the admissibility of the video of his police interview. The trial court
had the state substantially redact the video and limited what portion was admitted into evidence. We agree
with the trial court that it was probative of Kaufman’s intent, and we conclude that Kaufman has made no
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 24 of 27
resolute in his assertion that he was part of a university study that sought sexual
lifestyle information and penis measurements. Kaufman insisted that during
the study he never did anything of a “sexual nature” and that everything he did
was for “information and research.” (State’s Ex. 1B). Based on Kaufman’s
assertion of contrary intent, the trial court allowed the State to respond by
offering its challenged evidence that was relevant to proving defendant’s intent
at the time of the charged offenses. We conclude there was no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s determination. See Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 799
(explaining that the State may respond to the defendant’s contrary intent “by
offering evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts to the extent genuinely
relevant to prove the defendant’s intent at the time of the charged offense”).
[40] In balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
under Rule 403, we note that “[a]ll evidence that is relevant to a criminal
prosecution is inherently prejudicial; thus[,] [the] proper inquiry under
Evidence Rule 403 boils down to a balance of the probative value of the
proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.”
Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “When
determining the likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers
cogent argument to show how the probative value was outweighed by any prejudicial effect, especially where
he asserts that his statements during the interview described “legal acts between consenting adults” and
where he acknowledges that he did not make any admissions relating to his alleged offenses against B.D.
(Kaufman’s Br. 21).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 25 of 27
that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the
evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Id.
[41] Here, the trial court carefully considered and limited the State’s evidence that
was relevant to showing Kaufman’s intent. The trial court recognized the
potential for prejudice and tempered it by instructing the jury as to the limited
nature of the challenged evidence when it was introduced at trial. Specifically,
the trial court instructed the jury that C.R.’s and K.R.’s testimony was to be
used only to determine Kaufman’s intent in regard to the attempted sexual
misconduct with a minor and child solicitation charges and that the
photographs were to be so considered for the attempted possession of child
pornography charge. During closing arguments, the State and Kaufman’s
counsel reminded the jury of the limited purpose for the challenged evidence.
Additionally, the trial court gave a final jury instruction regarding the limited
purpose for the evidence and expressly stated that it was to be considered only
for intent and plan. “When limiting instructions are given that certain evidence
be considered for only a particular purpose, the law will presume that the jury
will follow the court’s admonitions.” Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294, 303
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. See also Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 623
(Ind. 2001) (explaining that “when a jury is properly instructed by the trial
court, the jury is presumed to have followed such instructions”). Given the
“safeguards” set in place by the trial court to ensure that the jury did not make a
forbidden inference that Kaufman’s prior conduct suggested present guilt, we
conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the challenged
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 26 of 27
evidence under the intent exception of Evidence Rule 404(b). See Monegan v.
State, 721 N.E.2d 243, 249 (Ind. 1999) (affirming the trial court’s admission of
evidence under the intent exception of Rule 404(b) and explaining that the trial
court’s admonition and instruction—that the jury was to consider evidence of
the defendant’s previous act of murder only for the purpose of establishing the
defendant’s intent—were “safeguards” and were “sufficient to prevent the jury
from drawing the ‘forbidden inference’ that the prior wrongful conduct suggests
present guilt”).
[42] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1596| February 18, 2019 Page 27 of 27