Kristopher G. Richter v. Laurenz Place, LLC (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Sep 28 2017, 8:10 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kristopher G. Richter Marcellus M. Lebbin
South Bend, Indiana Trevor Q. Gasper
Hilary R. Johnson
May Oberfell Lorber
Mishawaka, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kristopher G. Richter, September 28, 2017
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1610-SC-2526
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
Court.
The Honorable Paul E. Singleton,
Laurenz Place, LLC, Magistrate.
Appellee-Defendant. Trial Court Cause No.
71D02-1606-SC-5542
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Appellant Kristopher G. Richter appeals the trial court’s judgment against him
in his small claims action against his landlord, Laurenz Place, LLC.
Concluding that Richter was a tenant under the landlord-tenant statutes, we
reverse and remand with instructions to consider the costs he bore as a result of
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his landlord’s failure to afford him the statutory protections to which he was
entitled under Indiana law.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 28, 2012, Kaylie Sexton entered into a lease agreement for an
apartment with Park Jefferson Realty, LLC, the predecessor of Laurenz Place,
LLC. On April 30, 2013, a second lease was executed with Park Jefferson.
This lease was signed and initialed by both Kaylie Sexton and Kristopher
Richter.
[3] On January 1, 2016, the leasehold having expired, Sexton and Richter moved
out. Thereafter, Laurenz Place conducted a routine inspection of the apartment
to assess damages. Following the inspection, it sent an itemized bill for
damages to Sexton, but not to Richter. Richter attempted to obtain an
itemization of the damages, but Laurenz Place would not release the
information to him. Unable to obtain a copy of the itemized charges, Richter
hired counsel to do so.
[4] After receiving the notice of damages from Laurenz Place, Sexton sued Richter.
She won a judgment against him for a portion of the amount. Sexton’s lawsuit
prompted Richter to bring the current action against Laurenz Place, in which he
(1) claimed that he was a tenant and therefore should have received notice of
the alleged damages, (2) disputed some of the damages, and (3) asserted he was
wrongly denied access to the apartment in December 2015. He requested
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money damages, filing fee, attorney fees, and transcript fees. After a bench
trial, the court entered judgment against Richter.
Issue
[5] Richter enumerates six issues for our review. We consolidate and restate the
dispositive issue as: whether the trial court erred by determining Richter was
not a “tenant” within the meaning of the landlord-tenant provision of the
Indiana Code.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Implicit in the small claims court’s judgment, and the crux of this case, is the
determination that Richter was not a tenant of Laurenz Place. Small claims
court judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules
and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we
review the facts determined in a bench trial under the clearly erroneous
standard of review, with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to
assess witness credibility. Hamilton v. Schaefer Lake Lot Owners Ass’n, Inc., 59
N.E.3d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This deferential standard of review is
particularly important in small claims actions where trials are informal and
where the sole objective is to dispense speedy justice between the parties
according to the rules of substantive law. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196(Ind. 2008); Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A).
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[7] For the purposes of landlord-tenant relations, Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10
(2002) defines the term “tenant” as “an individual who occupies a rental unit:
(1) for residential purposes; (2) with the landlord’s consent; and (3) for
consideration that is agreed upon by both parties.”
[8] The evidence at trial showed that a one-year lease, executed on April 28, 2012,
was signed and initialed only by Sexton. The first page of the lease designates
Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized occupant. Ex. 1, p. 1. On
the last page of the lease, Sexton signed as “Resident.” Id. at 3. On the
Clubhouse Addendum to the lease, Sexton signed as “Leaseholder” and was
noted as having been issued one club membership card. Id. at 4.
[9] A subsequent lease was executed on April 30, 2013, with the word “Renewal”
handwritten at the top of the first page. Id. at 9. Although the first page of this
lease also identifies Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized
occupant, each page of the lease was initialed by both Sexton and Richter, and
both of them signed the last page of the lease under the “Resident” column. Id.
at 9-11. In addition, both Sexton and Richter signed the Clubhouse Addendum
to the 2013 lease as “Leaseholder” and both received club membership cards.
Id. at 12.
[10] In as much as Laurenz Place provided the contract for Richter to sign and
initial, the lease terms and their meaning for purposes of resolving later disputes
are strictly construed against the party who drafted and furnished the
agreement. Vertucci v. NHP Mgmt. Co., 701 N.E.2d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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[11] Other evidence at trial reflected on whether Richter was a “tenant” under
section 32-31-3-10.
[12] Richter testified that the previous management company with whom he signed
the lease explained to him that he was indeed a leaseholder. He further testified
that he paid rent, and he presented evidence of other payments to the landlord.
For instance, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 is a receipt from Laurenz Place with his name
typewritten in both the “Bill To” and “Customer Name” lines. The receipt
notes that on July 31, 2015, and August 26, 2015, Richter paid door
replacement charges for the apartment.
[13] To be a “tenant” under the pertinent section of the Code, Richter must have
occupied the premises “for residential purposes.” On that, there is no dispute.
Second, he must have occupied with the landlord’s consent. It is plain that he
did. Third, there must have been consideration for this occupancy agreed upon
by both parties. Construing the leases between the parties strictly against
Laurenz Place and doing so in the context of the other evidence at trial, it is
apparent that there was an agreement on monthly rent and the like.
Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous to determine that Richter was not a
“tenant” as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10. He was.
[14] The tenant rights Richter held as a tenant are set forth in Indiana Code sections
32-31-3-12 and -14 (2002) and 32-31-5-6 (2007). Section 32-31-3-12 requires
that, upon termination of a lease, the landlord must return to the tenant(s) the
security deposit less any amount applied to the payment of accrued rent,
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damages, and unpaid utility charges. It further requires that any damages be
specifically itemized in a written notice as mandated by section 14. If the
landlord fails to comply with these requirements, the tenant(s) may recover all
of the security deposit and a reasonable attorney fee. Section 32-31-3-14
requires that, within forty-five days after termination of occupancy, a landlord
must mail to the tenant(s) an itemized list of damages claimed.
[15] In addition, Indiana Code section 32-31-5-6 prohibits a landlord from
interfering with a tenant’s access to or possession of the tenant’s apartment.
[16] Relying on its contention that Richter was merely an occupant and not a
tenant, Laurenz Place does not dispute that it did not send him an itemized list
of damages and that it denied him access to the apartment. See Appellee’s Br.
p. 7, Tr. pp. 32-33, Ex. 3, 9; Appellee’s Br. pp. 6, 15, Tr. pp. 25-26. However,
we conclude today that Richter was a tenant who should have been afforded all
1
of the corresponding rights.
1
In his brief to this Court, Richter also asserts a claim of negligence against Laurenz Place and alleges error
with the trial court’s pre-trial denial of his motion to consolidate. The negligence claim was not included in
Richter’s Notice of Claim, and neither of these claims were presented at trial; they are thus waived. See
Commitment of T.S. v. Logansport State Hosp., 959 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating long-held rule that
party may not present argument or issue to appellate court that was not raised in trial court), trans. denied.
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Conclusion
[17] For the reasons stated, we conclude that under this lease Richter was a tenant,
as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10, yet he was not
afforded the corresponding statutory rights.
[18] Reversed and remanded with instructions to consider the costs experienced by
Richter as a result of Laurenz Place’s failure to afford him the rights to which
he was entitled as a tenant, enter judgment against Laurenz Place for that
amount, and determine the amount of attorney fees this failure cost Richter.
Vaidik, C.J., and May, J., concur.
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