Carlos Ramirez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Sep 20 2017, 6:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Carlos Ramirez Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Pendleton, IN Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlos Ramirez, September 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1703-PC-495
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Terry C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Shewmaker, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1512-PC-54
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Carlos Ramirez sought post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he did not inform him of a plea offer from the State before
trial. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that trial counsel had in
fact informed Ramirez of the plea offer and that Ramirez had turned it down.
Because we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the
witnesses, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In the summer of 2008, a confidential informant purchased cocaine from
Ramirez in Goshen on three separate occasions. The State charged Ramirez
with three counts of dealing in cocaine, two as Class B felonies and one as a
Class A felony. Brent Zook, an attorney since the late 1970s and a public
defender in Elkhart County, represented Ramirez at trial. The jury found
Ramirez guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years for
each of the Class B felonies and forty years for the Class A felony, to be served
concurrently. On direct appeal, we found that Ramirez’s sentences were
inappropriate and remanded for the trial court to impose a thirty-year sentence
for the Class A felony and a ten-year sentence for each of the Class B felonies,
to be served concurrently. Ramirez v. State, No. 20A03-0907-CR-337 (Ind. Ct.
App. Feb. 25, 2010).
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[3] In 2015, Ramirez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was
later amended. Specifically, Ramirez alleged that Attorney Zook failed to
inform him of a plea offer from the State before trial. A hearing was held in
2016. Attorney Zook had passed away by this time. Ramirez testified at the
hearing that there was a twenty-five-year plea offer from the State that Attorney
Zook never told him about and that had he known about the offer he would
have accepted it. See P-C Tr. Vol. II p. 7. In response, the State presented
testimony from Clifford Williams, the Chief Public Defender for Elkhart
County since 1985. Williams testified that he was familiar with the customs
and practices of the public defenders in his office, that most criminal cases
involve an attempt to negotiate a plea, that public defenders have a legal and
ethical obligation to discuss every plea offer with their clients, and that
ultimately it is the defendant’s choice whether to accept a plea offer. Williams
testified that Attorney Zook was a “thorough” attorney who handled serious
felony cases and “many, many, many” jury trials. Id. at 23-24. In addition,
Williams brought Attorney Zook’s file from Ramirez’s case with him to the
hearing. Williams confirmed that it was Attorney Zook’s file based on his
familiarity with Attorney Zook’s handwriting. Inside the file, there was a sheet
called “Attorney Notes.” See Ex. 1. Williams described the purpose of the
“Attorney Notes” sheet as follows: “[B]asically you put in a date of . . . possibly
a jail visit or the date maybe when you’ve interviewed someone or the date
when you’ve looked at a video, that sort of thing. It’s kind of [a] log of what
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you’ve done . . . .” P-C Tr. Vol. II p. 25. On May 28, 2009,1 Attorney Zook
handwrote that Ramirez “turn[ed] down the deal of 25 cap on A [felony].” Ex.
1.
[4] The post-conviction court denied relief, reasoning:
Considering that there is physical evidence indicating that
[Attorney Zook] made a note in the case file that [Ramirez]
turned down a deal of 25 cap, [Ramirez’s] self serving statement
that counsel never brought a plea offer to him for consideration
carries very little weight and [Ramirez’s] assertion is not credible.
Therefore, the Court cannot draw the conclusion based on the
evidence before it that [Attorney Zook] was ineffective in his
representation of [Ramirez] with respect to any plea negotiations
in this case.
Appellant’s App. Vol II p. 40.
[5] Ramirez, pro se, now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Defendants who have exhausted the direct-appeal process may challenge the
correctness of their convictions and sentences by filing a petition for post-
conviction relief. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied.
Post-conviction proceedings are not an opportunity for a “super-appeal,” and
1
The CCS reveals that a hearing was held on May 28, 2009. Ramirez’s jury trial then began on June 1,
2009.
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not all issues are available. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001),
reh’g denied. Rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions must be
based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Ind. Post-
Conviction Rule 1(1); Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597. In post-conviction
proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are cognizable only
when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues
demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal. Sanders v. State,
765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002).
[7] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings, requiring the petitioner to
prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at
745. We review the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions de novo but
accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 746. We will
not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses; we examine
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the decision
of the post-conviction court. Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1031 (Ind.
2007), reh’g denied. The petitioner must establish that the evidence as a whole
leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the
post-conviction court. Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ind. 2002).
[8] A defendant claiming that his attorney was ineffective must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness based on “prevailing” professional norms
and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by this substandard performance, i.e.,
there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s errors or omissions,
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the outcome of the case would have been different. Stephenson, 864 N.E.2d at
1031.
[9] Ramirez notes the general principle that criminal-defense attorneys have a duty
to inform their clients of plea agreements proffered by the prosecution and that
failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Dew v.
State, 843 N.E.2d 556, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. He then claims
that Attorney Zook was ineffective because he “did not proffer a plea agreement
to the Appellant for 25 years.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. Ramirez fails to
acknowledge, however, that the post-conviction court found, based on the
evidence presented at the hearing, that (1) Attorney Zook informed him of the
twenty-five-year plea deal, (2) Ramirez turned down that deal, and (3)
Ramirez’s “self serving” claim to the contrary was “not credible.” Because we
do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, we affirm
the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.
[10] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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