Perry Robbins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Sep 20 2017, 6:05 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Perry Robbins, September 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1703-CR-578
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable David Hooper,
State of Indiana, Magistrate.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1605-CM-20602
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Perry Robbins appeals his conviction of Class A misdemeanor battery, arguing
the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
[2] The evidence favorable to the judgment revealed that Wayne Gray and Perry
Robbins knew each other for over thirty years. They occasionally worked
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together, and their wives were first cousins. Gray and Robbins had agreed that
Robbins would install an engine in Gray’s truck for $150. Robbins’ initial
efforts were unsuccessful. On May 27, 2016, Robbins and a friend returned to
Gray’s house to continue the work. Gray had offered Robbins some scrap
metal, in addition to the money, to complete the job. Robbins was unable to
install the engine but still asked for the scrap metal. Gray refused, and Robbins
became angry and left. Later that day, Robbins called Gray several times to
shout at him. During one call, Robbins said he was coming back that evening
to retrieve his tools. Gray told Robbins he was not welcome at his house.
[3] At 10:30 or 11:00 that night, Robbins and his wife Debra arrived at Gray’s
house. Gray was in bed, and Debra talked with him while Robbins stood
outside the house, shouting about his tools. Gray told Debra that Robbins was
unwelcome and they should leave, but Debra said she could not do that.
[4] Next, Gray went outside, to his front porch. Robbins was standing in Gray’s
yard, and he continued to shout as Gray told him to leave. Gray stepped off the
porch into the yard, and Robbins approached him and pointed a finger at
Gray’s face, almost making contact. Gray told him to move his finger and put
his hands up to move Robbins’ hand, but Robbins continued to shout and point
a finger in Gray’s face. Next, as Gray started to turn away, Robbins struck him
in the face, knocking him against the side of his truck. Gray stood up and tried
to hit Robbins but missed, and Robbins struck him in the face again.
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[5] The two backed away from each other as Gray’s wife called 911, but Robbins
refused to leave Gray’s yard. During the conversation with the 911 dispatcher,
Gray’s wife said Robbins “sucker-punched” Gray in the face. Tr. Ex. Vol.,
State’s Ex. 7. Robbins continued to shout, bragging that he “whooped [Gray’s]
butt.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 17. When the police arrived, Robbins refused an officer’s
requests to calm down and was taken into custody. Meanwhile, Gray gave the
tools to Robbins’ wife. Gray had cuts on his nose, his ear was swollen, and he
developed bruises where he was knocked against his truck. In addition,
Robbins broke Gray’s glasses during the fracas.
[6] Debra presented a different version of events at trial. She said when she and
Robbins arrived at Gray’s house, Robbins was calm but Gray was angry.
When Gray exited the house, he shouted at Robbins, and Robbins responded in
kind. According to Debra, Gray walked up to Robbins and pushed him before
Robbins struck him in the face. Next, as Robbins tried to walk away, Gray
came at him again, and Robbins struck him in the face again.
[7] The State charged Robbins with battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A
misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014). Robbins requested a jury trial and
presented a claim of self-defense. The jury found Robbins guilty, and the court
imposed a sentence.
[8] A person may use reasonable force against another to protect himself or a third
person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2 (2013). A valid claim of self-defense is legal
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justification for an otherwise criminal act. Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind.
2001).
[9] To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must show: (1) he was in a
place where he had a right to be; (2) he did not provoke, instigate, or participate
willingly in the violence; and (3) he had a reasonable fear of death or great
bodily harm. Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Once self-
defense has been raised, the State must negate at least one of the three elements.
Madison v. State, 534 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 1989).
[10] In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of
self-defense, we use the same standard as for any claim of insufficient evidence.
Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799 (Ind. 2001). We neither reweigh the evidence
nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A conviction despite a claim of
self-defense will be reversed only if no reasonable person could say that self-
defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.[11] The jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which it could have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Robbins did not act in self-defense.
Robbins had no right to be in Gray’s yard that evening because Gray repeatedly
told him to leave, but Robbins remained and continued to shout at Gray.
Further, Robbins instigated the violence, jabbing his finger at Gray’s face and
then striking him twice in the face. Robbins cites Debra’s testimony and
portions of Gray’s testimony to argue Gray was the aggressor, but this
argument is a request to reweigh the evidence.
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[12] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[13] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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