Grange Mutual Insurance Company and Fieldstar, Inc. v. Faye L. Kessler and William J. Kessler (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 09/06/2017, 9:51 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES –
Jeffrey C. Gerish FAYE L. KESSLER AND
Plunkett Cooney WILLIAM J. KESSLER
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan Matthew J. Schad
George A. Budd, V
Schad & Schad, P.C.
New Albany, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
LORETTA LYNN JOHNSON, AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM
JOSEPH CHARLES
Cara W. Stigger
Kerstin Schuhmann
Kaufman & Stigger, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
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Grange Mutual Insurance September 6, 2017
Company and Fieldstar, Inc., Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Defendants, 22A01-1702-CT-376
Appeal from the Floyd Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Susan L. Orth,
Faye L. Kessler and William J. Judge
Kessler, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Plaintiffs, 22D01-1501-CT-34
and
Loretta Lynn Johnson, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
William Joseph Charles, et al.,
Appellees-Defendants.
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Fieldstar, Inc. (“Fieldstar”) and Grange Mutual Insurance Company
(“Grange”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their joint motion for summary
judgment. Fieldstar and Grange present a single issue for our review, which we
restate as whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Fieldstar and
Grange are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[2] We affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] Fieldstar is an Indiana corporation that reads meters for utility companies. In
2013, Fieldstar operated a fleet of about fifty vehicles at numerous locations
throughout Indiana. Fieldstar orally contracted with Rick Day to have Day do
various jobs for Fieldstar. Day’s work included performing vehicle repairs,
which he did through his New Albany business, Rick’s Auto Body. Day’s
relationship with Fieldstar also included transporting vehicles between
Fieldstar’s various Indiana locations and selling Fieldstar’s vehicles when
Fieldstar downsized its fleet. On some occasions, Day “would go pick . . . up”
a vehicle that needed to be repaired and transport it to his shop to repair it.
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 177.
[4] Usually, Fieldstar paid Day separately for each of those three types of work.
Specifically, Day invoiced Fieldstar for repair work; Fieldstar paid Day a lump-
sum for transporting vehicles between Fieldstar locations; and Fieldstar paid
Day a commission for each vehicle he sold. However, Fieldstar sometimes
paid Day “at once . . . for the repair and the $200 commission if he sold the
vehicle” following the repair. Id. at 167.
[5] In January of 2013, Fieldstar needed trucks transported from its location in
Richmond, which it was closing, to its location in Bloomington. In
Bloomington, the trucks were to be “swap[ped]” out for cars that needed to be
transported from Bloomington to Day’s shop in New Albany. Id. at 182. And,
in New Albany, the cars were “to be repaired” as needed “and sold.” Id. at
166. Fieldstar paid for the fuel required to transport the vehicles; Fieldstar
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“control[led]” when Day could pick the vehicles up at a given Fieldstar
location; and Fieldstar “instruct[ed]” Day on where to transport the vehicles.
Id. at 178. Fieldstar never required Day to provide any proof of insurance.
[6] On January 12, Fieldstar’s owner, Norman Stroud, contacted Day about
transporting the vehicles. Day then contacted Aaron Weddle, a friend of Day’s
son, and others to help Day transport the vehicles. Fieldstar paid Day a lump
sum of $775 to transport the trucks and the cars. Day, in turn, paid Weddle a
lump sum of $50.
[7] Weddle transported a truck from Richmond to Bloomington. In Bloomington,
Weddle picked up a Chevrolet Aveo to transport to New Albany. En route,
Weddle crossed the center line of U.S. 150 and struck, head on, a vehicle being
driven by Faye Kessler. William Joseph Charles was a passenger in Kessler’s
vehicle. Prior to the collision, the Aveo had no known mechanical issues that
required repair, and Stroud described the Aveo as “in service” for Fieldstar. Id.
at 171.
[8] At the time of the collision, neither Day nor his business had “any kind of
insurance.” Id. at 178. However, Fieldstar had an automobile insurance policy
with Grange. That policy stated as follows:
SECTION II LIABILITY COVERAGE
A. Coverage
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We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages
because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this
insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered “auto.”
***
1. Who is An Insured
The following are “insureds”:
***
b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered
“auto” you own . . . except:
***
(3) Someone using a covered “auto” while he or she is working in a
business of selling, servicing, repairing, parking or storing “autos” unless
that business is yours.
Id. at 91 (italics added).
[9] Following the collision, Kessler and her husband filed suit against Fieldstar,
Grange, Rick’s Auto Body, Weddle, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company,
which had an insurance contract with the Kesslers. Loretta Lynn Johnson, as
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the personal representative for the estate of Charles, was also joined as a party.1
Thereafter, Fieldstar and Grange (hereinafter collectively referred to as
“Fieldstar”) jointly moved for summary judgment on the theory that Weddle
was not an “insured” under the policy. The Kesslers responded and cross-
moved for summary judgment.
[10] The trial court denied Fieldstar’s motion for summary judgment but did not
rule on the Kesslers’ motion. However, in its order denying summary judgment
for Fieldstar, the court stated that “the insurance policy in question provides
insurance coverage regarding the actions of Aaron Weddle on January 12,
2013.” Id. at 245. The court entered its order as a final judgment, and this
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Fieldstar appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment.
Our standard of review is clear:
As we have recently reiterated, summary judgment imposes a
heavy factual burden on the moving party—and a
correspondingly light burden for the non-movant’s response—
because “Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal
cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-
circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000,
1004 (Ind. 2014). By definition, cases that hinge upon disputed
facts are inappropriate for summary judgment, because
1
It is not clear from the record on appeal the degree to which Kessler or Charles were injured in the car
accident or whether Charles’ ensuing death was a result of injuries sustained in that accident.
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“weighing [evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may
seem to tip—[is] a matter for trial, not summary judgment.” Id.
at 1005-06.
By contrast, matters of contract interpretation are “particularly
well-suited for de novo appellate review,” because they
“generally present [ ] questions purely of law.” Holiday
Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 577
(Ind. 2013). A contract may be construed on summary judgment
if it “is not ambiguous or uncertain,” or if “the contract
ambiguity, if one exists, can be resolved without the aid of a
factual determination.” Warrick County ex rel. Conner v. Hill, 973
N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The
meaning of a contract is a question for the factfinder, precluding
summary judgment, only where interpreting an ambiguity
requires extrinsic evidence. Tate v. Secura Ins., 587 N.E.2d 665,
668 (Ind. 1992).
Moreover, our standard of review remains unchanged when, as
here, the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment—we
simply “consider each motion separately to determine whether
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” SCI
Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015) (quoting
Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)).
Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n (In re Ind. State Fair Litigation),
49 N.E.3d 545, 548 (Ind. 2016) (alterations, except the addition of the footnote,
in the original).
[12] As an initial matter, we recognize that, in denying Fieldstar’s motion for
summary judgment, the trial court affirmatively declared that “the insurance
policy in question provides insurance coverage regarding the actions of Aaron
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Weddle on January 12, 2013.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 245. Nevertheless, it
does not appear from the record that the trial court has entered an order on the
Kesslers’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Rather, insofar as we can
discern, the trial court’s statement in its order on Fieldstar’s motion is
gratuitous in that the court has not entered summary judgment for the Kesslers.
Thus, we confine our review to the only issue raised on appeal, namely,
whether Fieldstar is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nothing in this
decision shall be construed as an opinion or comment on the Kesslers’ cross-
motion for summary judgment.
[13] On appeal here, the parties dispute the application of the policy to the
designated evidence. Again, the policy excludes from coverage someone who
uses a covered automobile “while he or she is working in a business of selling,
servicing, repairing, parking or storing ‘autos’ unless that business is yours.”
Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 91. We have acknowledged that such exclusions
apply when the use of the automobile is “pursuant to the performance of” or
“to effectuate” a third party’s independent business in one of the listed fields of
work. Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Ins. Ass’n, 577 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991) (quoting Truck Ins. Exch. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 538 P.2d 529, 532
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975)).
[14] The parties’ arguments on appeal are based on selected readings of the
designated evidence. Fieldstar asserts that Weddle is excluded by the policy
because he was driving the Aveo as an employee for Day; that Day had an
independent automobile repair business; and that Day was going to repair and
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sell the Aveo pursuant to that business.2 On the other hand, the Kesslers, joined
in a separate brief by Johnson, assert that Weddle is covered by the policy
because he was merely transporting the Aveo and was not himself in the
business of repairing or selling automobiles. Alternatively, the Kesslers and
Johnson assert that Fieldstar often hired Day—who then hired others, including
Weddle—to transport vehicles from one Fieldstar location to another and that
that work had nothing to do with Day’s automobile repair business.
[15] The designated evidence supports the conclusion that Fieldstar had an informal
relationship with Day and hired Day to work in different capacities. In one
capacity, Day serviced or repaired Fieldstar’s vehicles through Day’s New
Albany business, for which he invoiced Fieldstar. In another capacity, Day
transported Fieldstar’s vehicles from one Fieldstar location to another, for
which he was separately paid in lump sums by Fieldstar. And in a third
capacity, Day sold Fieldstar’s vehicles, for which Day received a commission
from each sale. Thus, the central question on appeal is the capacity in which
Day—through Weddle—acted pursuant to Fieldstar’s January 12, 2013,
request.
[16] Contrary to Fieldstar’s argument on appeal, the designated evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Weddle transported the Aveo
in furtherance of Day’s independent automobile repair business. While a
2
Fieldstar does not allege that Weddle’s act of transporting the Aveo from Bloomington to New Albany was
within the policy’s exclusions for “parking” or “storing” that vehicle.
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reasonable fact finder could conclude that Fieldstar hired Day, and—contrary
to the Kesslers’ and Johnson’s arguments on appeal—that Day then hired
Weddle, to transport the Aveo from Fieldstar’s Bloomington location to Day’s
New Albany shop location, there is no designated evidence that Day intended
or expected to perform any repairs on the Aveo driven by Weddle. Rather,
although Day and Stroud testified that Day often repaired vehicles before he
sold them, Stroud expressly testified that there were no known mechanical
problems with the Aveo driven by Weddle on January 12, 2013, that required
repairs. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 171. He further expressly testified that the
Aveo was “in service for Fieldstar” at the time of the accident. Id. Thus, a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that Weddle’s operation of the Aveo was
not in furtherance of Day’s independent automobile repair business.
[17] But we agree with Fieldstar that the designated evidence supports the
conclusion that Day intended to sell the Aveo. He testified that the vehicles
were being transported to his shop in New Albany so that he could sell them
from that location. And he hired Weddle to assist him in bringing the Aveo to
New Albany to sell it.
[18] Nonetheless, we disagree with Fieldstar that that evidence demonstrates that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fieldstar’s policy exclusion does not
apply when the “business of selling . . . is yours.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at
91. And a reasonable fact finder could conclude from the designated evidence
that Day’s selling of the vehicles was not independent of Fieldstar’s business.
Rather, Fieldstar paid Day a commission on the sale of each vehicle. A
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reasonable inference from that evidence is that Fieldstar retained the remainder
of the sale proceeds. Further, Fieldstar retained control over the fuel costs for
transporting the Aveo from Bloomington to New Albany; Fieldstar controlled
when Day could pick up the Aveo to transport it; Fieldstar controlled where
Day was permitted to drive the Aveo; and, again, Stroud admitted that the
Aveo continued to be “in service” for Fieldstar on the date in question. Id. at
171.
[19] Accordingly, the designated evidence does not demonstrate that Fieldstar is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rather, one reasonable inference and
conclusion from that evidence is that Fieldstar hired Day, who then hired
Weddle, not “pursuant to the performance of” or “to effectuate” Day’s repair
business but, rather, pursuant to Fieldstar’s business of selling its own vehicles.
See Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 577 N.E.2d at 972. As such, we cannot say that
Weddle’s use of the Aveo was excluded by the policy as a matter of law. Thus,
we affirm the trial court’s denial of Fieldstar’s motion for summary judgment.
[20] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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