Mark S. Wright v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Nov 15 2017, 8:30 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark S. Wright Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James D. Boyer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mark S. Wright, November 15, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
46A03-1701-CR-230
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Greta S. Friedman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-9806-CF-94
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Mark S. Wright (“Wright”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his
motion for additional earned credit time. Because the post-conviction court
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denied Wright’s motion for additional credit time without determining whether
Wright had exhausted his administrative remedies, we reverse and remand with
instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Wright has been incarcerated in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) since
1999. During his time in prison, Wright has taken advantage of numerous
programs and courses offered, including earning educational credit time by
obtaining a bachelor’s degree from Ball State University in 2009. Recently,
Wright completed the following programs for which he asserts he did not
receive additional earned credit time: (1) Aramark In2Work Kitchen Basics
101, (2) Aramark In2Work Retail Basics 101, (3) ServSafe Food Protection
Manager Certification Program, (4) Thinking for a Change PLUS Program,
and (5) the Anger/Stress PLUS Program. Appellant’s App. pp. 23–28.
[3] On May 6, 2016, Wright filed a motion for earned credit time for completion of
these programs with the post-conviction court. The post-conviction court
denied Wright’s motion on December 15, 2016, stating in relevant part:
[Wright] has provided a plethora of documents in support of his
Petition, but the documents do not answer the critical
questions[:]
1. Did he receive a certificate of completion for a program set
forth in IC 35-50-6-3.3 (b) (3) (A) through (D)?
2. If he did, has he already received credit for that program?
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The answers to these questions can only be provided by proper
documentation from the Department of Correction, and the
documentation heretofore provided does not support the
Petition. [Wright] may refile with appropriate documents if he
chooses.
Id. at 11.
[4] Based on the post-conviction court’s response, Wright filed a motion to correct
error1 on January 4, 2017. As part of his motion to correct error, Wright
attached documentation that he believed satisfied the post-conviction court’s
requests. On January 11, the post-conviction court denied Wright’s motion.
Wright now appeals
Discussion and Decision
[5] Wright argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for
earned credit time not previously awarded by the DOC. Specifically, he
contends that the post-conviction court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear
his petition, 2 and that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion
for additional earned credit time and his subsequent motion to correct error.
1
Although Wright labeled this document as a motion to reconsider, and despite their similarity, “a motion
requesting the court to revisit its final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error.” Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
2
Wright relies on our decision in Stevens v. State, 895 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), to support his claim
that the post-conviction court here had proper jurisdiction over his case. Wright appears to be conflating
jurisdiction with the exhaustion of administrative remedies. We note that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a question of procedural error, and not subject matter jurisdiction. Alkhalidi v. Indiana Dep’t. of
Correction, 42 N.E.3d 562, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
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The State counters that Wright’s appeal should be dismissed because he has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.3 In the alternative, the State
contends that Wright failed to provide proper documentation to the post-
conviction court to support his claim.
[6] Generally, the trial court determines the amount of initial credit time a
defendant is entitled to at sentencing, and thereafter the credit due is
determined by the DOC. Ellis v. State, 58 N.E.3d 938, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
trans. denied. “The DOC is required to implement a departmental grievance
procedure in which a committed person may submit grievances arising out of
administrative acts that affect that person, including claims that the DOC
wrongfully denied education credit time.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
“When educational credit time is denied, a person must exhaust his
administrative remedies within the DOC before appealing to a court because
determinations altering credit time are the responsibility of the DOC.” Stevens v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 418, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Wright bears the burden to
show what the relevant DOC procedures are, and that he has exhausted
them. Burks-Bey v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1041, 1043–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
3
The State also argues “that Wright’s appeal should be dismissed because his motion in this case is an
unapproved successive petition for post-conviction relief.” Appellee’s Br. at 8. However, on June 23, 2017,
this court’s motions panel dismissed a motion by the State on the same argument. It is well established that
we may reconsider a ruling of our motions panel, but we decline to do so here. State v. Sagalovsky, 836 N.E.2d
260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
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[7] Here, the post-conviction court did not deny Wright’s petition for earned credit
time based on a finding that Wright failed to show he had exhausted his
administrative remedies with the DOC. Instead, the post-conviction court
denied Wright’s motion because the petition had failed to answer two critical
questions: (1) whether Wright received the certificates for a program in
accordance with Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3, and (2) if he did, whether
Wright had already received credit for those programs. Appellant’s App. p. 11.
The post-conviction court then explained that “[t]he answers to these questions
can only be provided by proper documentation from the Department of
Correction, and the documentation heretofore provided does not support the
petition. [Wright] may refile with appropriate documents if he chooses.” Id.After Wright attached the documents4 the post-conviction court had requested
as part of his motion to correct error, the trial court denied it without stating
that Wright had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
[8] We find that the post-conviction court erred when it denied Wright’s initial
petition for credit time and his subsequent motion to correct error without first
considering whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies. See Ellis, 58
N.E.3d at 941 (reversing post-conviction court’s denial of Ellis’s petition for
credit time where the court denied Ellis’s motion without first considering
4
Wright attached an “Offender Information System” print-out notarized by DOC staff which shows the
programs he has received credit for and those he has not. The document shows that Wright has not been
given credit for the five programs at issue in this appeal. Appellant’s App. pp. 34–35. Wright also attached
five documents of the actual completed programs for which he is seeking additional earned credit time for. Id.
at 23–28.
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whether Ellis had exhausted his administrative remedies), trans. denied; Burks-
Bey, 903 N.E.2d at 1043–44 (reversing post-conviction court’s dismissal or
Burks-Bey’s motion for additional credit time because the court failed to
determine whether Burks-Bey had exhausted his administrative remedies).
Therefore, we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of Wright’s petition for
earned credit time and remand to allow the DOC to respond to Wright’s
claims, and for the post-conviction court to determine whether Wright has
exhausted his administrative remedies.
[9] If Wright establishes that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, then
the post-conviction court should reconsider the merits of his motion for
additional credit time. If Wright fails to establish that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies, then the post-conviction court may dismiss the
petition without prejudice.
[10] Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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