Byron Snelbaker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON REHEARING
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Nov 21 2017, 10:59 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the
CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Leeman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Leeman Law Office and Cass County Attorney General of Indiana
Public Defender
Katherine Cooper
Logansport, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Byron Snelbaker, November 21, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
09A05-1704-CR-756
v. Appeal from the Cass Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Richard Maughmer,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Trial Court Cause No.
09D02-1610-F5-59
Bradford, Judge.
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[1] In a memorandum decision issued on September 5, 2017, we affirmed the
convictions entered and sentence imposed after Appellant-Defendant Byron
Snelbaker pled guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony battery. Snelbaker argued
that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for his battery
convictions and that those convictions violated constitutional and common-law
prohibitions against double jeopardy, arguments we found to be without merit.
Snelbaker now seeks rehearing, arguing that we did not fully address his
double-jeopardy claims, specifically his claim that his battery convictions
violate the double jeopardy clause of the Unites States Constitution. We grant
rehearing for the limited purpose of doing so now.
[2] Snelbaker notes that, under federal law, while a knowing and voluntary guilty
plea generally results in waiver of a double-jeopardy argument, “[s]ome courts
have noted an exception to the waiver rule applies when a double jeopardy
claim is so apparent either on the face of the indictment or on the record
existing at the time of the plea that the presiding judge should have noticed it
and rejected the defendant’s offer to plead guilty to both charges.” U.S. v. Kurti,
427 F.3d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 2005). While Snelbaker argues that this case fits
within the exception to the general rule, neither the charging information nor
the record at his guilty plea hearing support his claim.
[3] The charging information alleged that Snelbaker (1) “did knowingly or
intentionally touch Shonn Parmeter in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, said
touching being committed with a vehicle” and also (2) “did knowingly or
intentionally touch Shonn Parmeter, a public safety officer, in a rude, insolent,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision on Rehearing 09A05-1704-CR-756 | November 21, 2017 Page
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or angry manner while said officer was engaged in the execution of his official
duties, resulting in bodily injury, pain[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13. The
charges are not, as Snelbaker claims, “essentially identical on their face[s,]”
Appellant’s Br. p. 19, and, as such, no double jeopardy violation is apparent on
the face of the charging information.
[4] The record generated during the guilty plea hearing also does not help
Snelbaker. While generating a factual basis for Snelbaker’s guilty plea, the
prosecutor elicited testimony that Snelbaker attempted to force Officer
Parmeter’s vehicle from the road by intentionally steering his vehicle into the
officer’s, causing Officer Parmeter injuries, and that, after being forced into a
field, Snelbaker again intentionally struck Officer Parmeter’s occupied police
vehicle with his. As we noted in our original memorandum decision, “[t]he
factual basis included separate facts supporting each of these convictions.”
Snelbaker v. State, 2017 WL 3865748, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017). As
with the charging information, then, no double jeopardy violation is apparent
from the record. In summary, Snelbaker has failed to establish that his two
battery convictions violate the United States Constitution’s prohibition against
double jeopardy. While we grant Snelbaker’s petition for the limited purpose of
addressing his claim, we find it to be without merit, and once again affirm the
trial court’s judgment in all respects.
May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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