In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.S., Je.S., and Ja.S. (Minor Children) and C.I. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
May 09 2018, 9:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Melinda K. Jackman-Hanlin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Plainfield, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary May 9, 2018
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: M.S., Je.S., and 32A01-1711-JT-2582
Ja.S. (Minor Children) Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
and The Honorable Karen M. Love,
Judge
C.I. (Mother), Trial Court Cause Nos.
Appellant-Respondent, 32D03-1611-JT-17,
32D03-1611-JT-18,
v. 32D03-1611-JT-20
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 1 of 12
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] C.I. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to M.S., Je.S., and Ja.S. (“the Children”). The Indiana Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) became involved in the Children’s lives after receiving
reports that maternal grandmother, their then-legal guardian, was unable to
properly care for them. The Children were subsequently determined to be
children in need of services (“CHINS”) and Mother was ordered to complete
certain services. Mother, however, failed to successfully complete the court-
ordered services.
[2] DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of Mother’s parental rights to the
Children on November 17, 2016. Following a three-day evidentiary hearing,
the juvenile court issued an order granting DCS’s petition. On appeal, Mother
contends that DCS did not provide sufficient evidence to support the
termination of her parental rights. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother and Jo.S. (“Father”) are the parents of the Children. 1 M.S. was born on
March 7, 2009; Je.S. was born on March 3, 2005; and Ja.S. was born on
1
Father does not challenge the termination of his parental rights to the Children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 2 of 12
February 19, 2004. At some point in 2009, the Children were removed from
their parents’ care and maternal grandmother was named their legal guardian.
DCS became involved with the Children in August of 2015, after receiving
reports that maternal grandmother could not properly supervise the Children
due to her poor health and the Children’s behavioral issues. At the time,
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown and Father was incarcerated. The
Children were removed from maternal grandmother’s care and placed together
in foster care. They were subsequently found to be CHINS. As a result of the
CHINS finding, Mother was ordered to complete a number of services. Mother
failed to successfully complete these services.
[4] On November 17, 2016, DCS filed a petition seeking the termination of
Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The juvenile court conducted a three-
day evidentiary hearing on DCS’s petition on February 16 and 17, 2017, and
May 10, 2017. DCS presented evidence indicating that Mother had not made
significant progress towards reunification and continued to struggle with
sobriety. Numerous service providers testified that Mother’s failure to maintain
sobriety negatively impacted her ability to care for the Children. DCS also
presented evidence that although Mother had secured potentially adequate
housing at one point during the proceedings, as of the date of the final hearing,
she no longer lived at that residence. Instead, she was living at a residence
deemed inappropriate for the Children.
[5] DCS also presented evidence that the Children were currently placed in a
secure and stable home environment and had “made huge leaps in their
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 3 of 12
behaviors” while in the care of their foster parents. Tr. Vol. III, p. 92. It
additionally presented evidence that the termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the Children’s best interests, and its plan was for the Children’s current
foster family to adopt the Children.
[6] Following the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter
under advisement. On October 11, 2017, the juvenile court issued an order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
Discussion and Decision
[7] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children. Bester v.
Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005).
However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law
allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling
to meet her responsibility as a parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must
be subordinated to the best interests of the children. Id. Termination of
parental rights is proper where the children’s emotional and physical
development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the
children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social
development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 4 of 12
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s
order terminating her parental rights to the Children. In reviewing termination
proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the
credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of
S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the
evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of
fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our
standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id.[9] In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we
set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child
relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the
juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.[10] Mother claims that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 5 of 12
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child[ren]’s removal or
the reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied[; or]
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child[ren].
****
(C) termination is in the best interests of the child[ren.]
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
A. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
[11] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence both that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from her
home would not be remedied and that there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child poses a threat to the well-being of the Children.
It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written
in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find either that (1) the conditions
resulting in removal from or continued placement outside the parent’s home
will not be remedied or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the children. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines one of the
above-mentioned conditions has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in
the record supporting the juvenile court’s determination, it is not necessary for
DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, either of the other two
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 6 of 12
conditions listed in Indiana Code section 31-34-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H.,
806 N.E.2d at 882.
1. Whether Conditions Will Be Remedied
[12] In order to determine whether the conditions will be remedied, the juvenile
court should first determine what conditions led DCS to place the Children
outside or to continue the Children’s placement outside Mother’s care, and,
second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will be
remedied. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; In
re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882. When assessing the latter, the juvenile court must
judge the parent’s fitness to care for the children at the time of the termination
hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re A.N.J.,
690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The juvenile court must also
evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is
a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id.[13] A juvenile court may properly consider evidence of the parent’s prior criminal
history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a
juvenile court “‘can reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the
parent and the parent’s response to those services.’” Id. (quoting In re A.C.C.,
682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The evidence presented by DCS
“need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish only
that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 7 of 12
change.” In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867
N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[14] With regard to whether the conditions leading to removal would be remedied,
the trial court found as follows:
208. Mother has been involved in services with DCS since
September of 2015. Mother is not in any better position to parent
the children today than … she was when the children were
removed. Mother has consistently chosen to do what she wants.
Mother has continued her use of methamphetamine despite the
services she has received. Mother has refused to consistently
provide drug screens.
****
213. Mother’s past and continued use of methamphetamine is
the best prediction of her future behavior, i.e., she will continue
to use.…
214. Mother’s … use of methamphetamine is a significant and
substantive reason the children have continued to be removed
from [her] care. [Mother’s] continuing use of methamphetamine
has significantly hindered [her] ability to provide [the Children]
with appropriate supervision and care. [Her] inability to achieve
and maintain sobriety is a long-term issue.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 40, 41. Based on these findings, the trial court
concluded that Mother has not “demonstrated the ability or willingness to make
lasting changes from past behaviors. There is no reasonable probability that
[she] will be able to maintain sobriety or stable housing for the children in order
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 8 of 12
to care and provide adequately for the children.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.
46.
[15] The evidence demonstrates that throughout the underlying CHINS and instant
TPR proceedings, Mother has displayed ongoing drug abuse. Mother has been
diagnosed with moderate to severe stimulant use disorder, in part because she
continues to use illegal substances despite the negative consequences. Dating
back to 2015, Mother would sometimes be under the influence of drugs during
visitation with the Children. In November of 2016, Mother opted out of the
Marion County drug-court program, choosing to serve time in jail rather than
remain drug-free. Further, as of the dates of the evidentiary hearing, Mother
continued to test positive for drugs, specifically methamphetamine. DCS
presented testimony that while using methamphetamine, Mother would not be
able to provide appropriate care for the Children.
[16] Further, as of the dates of the evidentiary hearing, the Children were receiving
extensive one-on-one services beyond that usually offered by DCS. Mother did
not demonstrate an understanding of what these services entailed or why such
services were necessary. The Children responded well to these services and,
throughout the course of their treatment, had shown great improvement.
Mother acknowledged that she was not ready for the Children to be returned to
her care and could not provide a time frame for when she thought she would be
ready to care for the Children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 9 of 12
[17] It is well-established that the juvenile court, acting as a trier of fact, was not
required to believe or assess the same weight to the testimony as Mother. See
generally Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind. 1993) (providing that it is
for the trier of fact to determine which witnesses to believe or disbelieve).
Mother’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
conclusions of the juvenile court effectively amount to an invitation for this
court to reassess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence, which we will not
do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
[18] Upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in concluding that
the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from and continued placement
outside Mother’s care were unlikely to be remedied. Having concluded that the
evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination, and
finding no error by the juvenile court, we need not consider whether the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s
well-being because DCS has satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section
31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(B)(2)(C)
[19] Mother also argues that DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the Children’s best
interests. We are mindful that in considering whether termination of one’s
parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court is required to
look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 10 of 12
evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. In doing so, the juvenile court must
subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id.Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of the
case worker, a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), or a court appointed special
advocate (“CASA”) regarding the child’s need for permanency supports a
finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.; see also Matter of
M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
[20] Suzanne Conger, the Children’s GAL, testified that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in the Children’s best interests and additionally that it is in
the Children’s best interests to be adopted by their current foster family.
Conger also testified that she would “have safety concerns for the [C]hildren if
they were returned back to [Mother’s] care at this time.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 42.
DCS Family Case Manager Hannah Lyman agreed and testified that DCS
believes termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best
interests.
[21] In addition, maternal grandmother testified that she believes the termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. Maternal
grandmother acknowledged that although she loves the Children, she is unable
to provide adequate care for them because of her poor health and limited
financial resources. The trial court explicitly found maternal grandmother to be
credible, finding that she “is putting the [C]hildren’s needs and best interests
above her own desire.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 11 of 12
[22] The juvenile court found that the Children require extensive services and that
they are thriving in their current foster placement. Numerous individuals
testified that they would be concerned about the Children’s mental stability if
they were removed from their current placement as Mother has shown no
ability to comprehend or provide the care and services required by the Children.
The juvenile court did not have to wait until the Children were irreversibly
harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development was
permanently impaired before terminating Mother’s parental rights. See In re
C.M., 675 N.E.2d at 1140. In light of the above-discussed testimony, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy DCS’s burden of proving that
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.
Mother’s claim to the contrary merely amounts to an invitation for this court to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
Conclusion
[23] Having concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, we affirm the
judgment of the juvenile court.
[24] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1711-JT-2582 | May 9, 2018 Page 12 of 12