Brian Firestone v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 15 2016, 9:13 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brian Firestone Gregory F. Zoeller
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
Carlisle, Indiana Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brian Firestone, July 15, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1511-CR-2029
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-0104-CF-1083368
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Fourteen years after he was convicted of class A felony conspiracy to commit
murder, class A felony kidnapping, and class C felony sexual battery, Brian
Firestone filed a petition for modification of his eighty-eight-year sentence. The
trial court denied his petition, and he now appeals. Because the trial court
lacked authority to modify Firestone’s sentence without the approval of the
prosecutor, we find no error in its denial of his petition for sentence
modification. As such, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] One night in August 2001, Firestone and Jamie Robinson abducted seventeen-
year-old A.G. as she left work at the Brown County Inn. The two men took
A.G.’s vehicle and drove her to Robinson’s home. They cut off her clothing
with a knife, and Firestone held her down while Robinson tied her to the bed
with rope and duct tape. Firestone touched her breasts and genitals and
watched as Robinson raped her.
[3] Firestone and Robinson put A.G. back into the vehicle, engaged the safety
locks to prevent her escape, and drove to Missouri. The two men agreed to use
her as a sex slave and then kill her when they got to the mountains.
Meanwhile, A.G.’s parents notified the Brown County Sheriff’s Department
about their missing daughter. At some point, Firestone drove the vehicle off the
road and damaged it to the extent that it would not run. Missouri law
enforcement located the vehicle with all three occupants still inside.
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[4] The State charged Firestone with class A felony conspiracy to commit murder,
class A felony kidnapping, class B felony criminal confinement, class C felony
sexual battery, class D felony auto theft, and class B felony robbery. A jury
found him guilty on all charges except for class B felony robbery. The trial court
merged the criminal confinement and auto theft convictions into the class A
felony kidnapping conviction. The trial court sentenced Firestone to
consecutive terms of thirty years for conspiracy to commit murder, fifty years
for kidnapping, and eight years for sexual battery, for an aggregate eighty-eight-
year term.
[5] Fourteen years later, Firestone wrote a letter to the prosecutor asking for
approval to file a petition for modification of sentence. He did not receive a
response from the prosecutor and thereafter filed a petition with the trial court
for modification of his sentence. The trial court denied his petition in an order
reading in part as follows: “After reviewing the file and the Defendant’s
petition, the Court believes the original sentence imposed was appropriate given
the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. Therefore,
no modification will be considered.” Appellant’s App. at 12. Firestone now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Firestone maintains that the trial court erred in denying his petition for
modification of sentence. We review a trial court’s decision on a petition to
modify sentence for an abuse of discretion. Carr v. State, 33 N.E.3d 358, 358
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial
court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court.” Id. at 359.
[7] Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17, as it existed at the time of Firestone’s
offenses, reads in pertinent part as follows:
(b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed
since the defendant began serving the sentence and after a
hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may
reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the
prosecuting attorney.
(Emphasis added.) 1 A trial court lacks statutory authority to modify a
defendant’s sentence if more than 365 days have elapsed since that defendant
began serving his sentence and the prosecutor does not approve the
modification. Reed v. State, 796 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[8] Firestone was sentenced in 2001 but did not file his petition for modification of
sentence until 2015. Since the 365-day period had elapsed, the approval of the
1
Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17 has undergone numerous amendments over the last twenty years. The
parties appear to rely on relatively recent versions of the statute, which include new filing limitations as well
as the classification of certain convicted persons as “violent criminals.” However, the statute as it existed at
the time of Firestone’s offenses made no such distinctions. In Jaco v. State, 49 N.E.3d 171, 173-75 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015), another panel of this Court discussed at length whether the proper version of the statute to be
applied is the one in effect at the time the defendant committed his offense or the one in effect on the date of
his petition for sentence modification. The Jaco court held that a defendant seeking sentence modification
shall be subject to the version of the statute in effect when he committed the offense. Id. at 173. Because
Firestone committed his offenses in August 2001, we apply the statute as it existed at that time. No hearing
was held on Firestone’s petition, but because the prosecuting attorney did not approve of reducing or
suspending Firestone’s sentence and the trial court did not do so, no hearing was required.
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prosecuting attorney was necessary. Firestone wrote the prosecutor’s office in
August 2015 to request approval to file a petition for modification of sentence.
The record is devoid of any evidence that the prosecutor gave its consent to
Firestone’s request for sentence modification. Firestone argues that the
prosecutor’s lack of response/objection to his correspondence is “acquiescence
tantamount to consent,” citing State v. Harper, 8 N.E.3d 694, 695 (Ind. 2014).
Appellant’s Br. at 4.
[9] In Harper, our supreme court addressed the question of whether a prosecutor’s
silence can be deemed consent to sentence modification where the petition is
filed after the 365-day period has elapsed. Id. There, the trial court held a
hearing on the defendant’s modification petition, and the deputy prosecutor
was in attendance and did not object. The trial court indicated its inclination to
grant the petition but emphasized that it lacked the authority to do so absent the
approval of the prosecutor. Id. at 697. The deputy prosecutor indicated that he
would think about it and talk it over with another person from the prosecutor’s
office. Id. At the close of the hearing, the trial court reiterated its inclination to
grant the petition and directed the prosecutor’s office to give its input “in the
near future” or “in the next week or so.” Id. When the prosecutor’s office
failed to respond in the ensuing five weeks, the trial court granted the
defendant’s modification petition. Id. at 697-98. Another panel of this Court
reversed, and on transfer, our supreme court held that under the unique
circumstances of that case, the prosecutor’s conduct was sufficient to establish
prosecutorial consent to modification. Id. at 697.
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[10] We find Harper distinguishable. There, the trial court specifically asked the
prosecutor’s office for a response – within a week. In contrast, here, Firestone
sought prosecutorial approval for sentence modification through a letter. He
did not receive a response and filed a modification petition with the trial court.
The trial court denied Firestone’s petition after reviewing the file and petition.
There is nothing in the record indicating any unique circumstance that would
establish tacit prosecutorial approval.
[11] Simply put, the prosecutor never approved of a sentence modification for
Firestone, and as such, the trial court did not have statutory authority to grant a
sentence modification. 2 Even if it had, the record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that modification was not appropriate given Firestone’s criminal
history and the heinous nature of Firestone’s offenses in this case. Thus, the
trial court therefore acted within its discretion in denying Firestone’s petition
for sentence modification. Accordingly, we affirm.
[12] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
2
Citing paragraph (e)(2) of the current version of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17, Firestone also asserts
that the trial court was required by statute to order a report from the Department of Correction or take into
consideration his rehabilitative efforts while imprisoned. However, paragraph (e)(2) was not included in the
2001 version of the statute, and similar language included in the 2001 version concerning obtaining a report
from the Department of Correction applies in situations where the 365-day period has not yet elapsed. Ind.
Code § 35-38-1-17(a)(3) (2001). Even so, the record reflects that the trial court was aware of Firestone’s
remorse and efforts at rehabilitation and nevertheless denied the petition.
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