Eric Dontre Freeman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 12 2018, 8:43 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin Wild Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric Dontre Freeman, March 12, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1710-CR-2217
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Anne Flannelly,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1604-F5-15733
Altice, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Eric Freeman appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony carrying a handgun
without a license and Class A misdemeanor unlawful possession of a firearm by
a domestic batterer. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and
seizure.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On the evening of April 24, 2016, Officer Clayton Portell of the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department responded to a 911 call reporting a fight in
progress, with shots fired by both a man and a woman. Officer Portell arrived
on the scene within three minutes of the 911 call and observed four people—
two men and two women—engaged in a very heated argument. The scene was
chaotic, with neighbors yelling from their yards and porches.
[4] One of the men involved in the altercation was later identified as Freeman.
When Freeman saw Officer Portell get out of his police cruiser, Freeman
abruptly stopped arguing, “got real wide-eyed” and started walking toward a
house. Transcript Vol. 2 at 11. Officer Portell ordered Freeman to stop and then
patted him down. During the pat-down, Officer Clayton felt what he
immediately recognized to be a handgun in Freeman’s pocket. Officer Clayton
put Freeman’s hands behind his back, retrieved the firearm, and sought
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assistance from another officer. After Freeman was in handcuffs and the
handgun was secured, Officer Portell ran Freeman’s information and
discovered that he was precluded from possessing a firearm in Indiana.
[5] As a result of these events, the State charged Freeman with Level 5 felony
carrying a handgun without a license and Class A misdemeanor possession of a
firearm by a domestic batterer. The case proceeded to a bench trial on July 21,
2017, at the conclusion of which Freeman was found guilty as charged. On
September 5, 2017, the trial court sentenced Freeman to three years, with one
year executed on community corrections and two years suspended to probation.
Freeman now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[6] On appeal, Freeman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure. Trial courts
have broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and such
rulings will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion.
Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In reviewing a trial
court’s evidentiary rulings, we will not reweigh the evidence, and we will
consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
also consider uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Joseph v. State,
975 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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[7] As this court has explained:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
Malone v. State, 882 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Searches performed by government officials without warrants
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to
a ‘few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
(1967)). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the
State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the
warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Id.;
Malone, 882 N.E.2d at 786.
One such exception was established in Terry v. Ohio, in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may
briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes if, based on
specific and articulable facts together with reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably
suspect that criminal activity was afoot. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Howard v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1208,
1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Reasonable suspicion is determined
on a case-by-case basis by examining the totality of the
circumstances. Id. In addition to detainment, Terry permits a
police officer to conduct a limited search of the individual’s outer
clothing for weapons if the officer reasonably believes that the
individual is armed and dangerous. Id. An officer’s authority to
perform such a pat-down search of a detained individual during a
Terry stop is dependent upon the nature and extent of the officer’s
particularized concern for his or her safety. Rybolt v. State, 770
N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
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[8] Freeman argues that Officer Portell lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him
as he walked away from the scene of the altercation or to conduct the pat-down
search that led to the discovery of the handgun. We disagree.
[9] The evidence presented establishes that Officer Portell responded to a 911 call
reporting a fight in progress. The fight was taking place in a high-crime area,
and the caller indicated that one shot had been fired by a woman and a second
shot had been fired by a man. Upon arriving at the scene within three minutes
of the 911 call, Officer Portell encountered a situation consistent with the 911
caller’s account. Specifically, two men and two women were engaged in a
heated argument and “they were very animated arguing up [in] each other’s
faces.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 9. Upon spotting Officer Portell, Freeman abruptly
broke off from the argument, “got real wide-eyed,” and started walking back
toward a house. Id. at 11. When Officer Portell ordered Freeman to stop, he
did not immediately comply. These facts provide ample support for the trial
court’s finding that Officer Portell had reasonable suspicion both to detain
Freeman and to pat him down for weapons, which led to the discovery of the
handgun. See Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997) (explaining
that “as a general rule, an anonymous tip alone is not likely to constitute the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a valid Terry stop” but “where significant
aspects of the tip are corroborated by the police, a Terry stop is likely valid”);
Patterson, 958 N.E.2d at 486 (finding presence in a high-crime area to be a
relevant factor in determining whether officer had a reasonable belief that the
defendant was armed so as to justify a pat-down search); Howard v. State, 862
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N.E.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that “nervous and evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists”). Freeman has not established that the stop and pat-down search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
[10] Freeman also argues that the stop and pat-down search violated his rights under
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11, like the
Fourth Amendment, bars unreasonable searches and seizures. Carpenter v. State,
18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). “Although Indiana’s Section 11 and the
Federal Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically
distinct.” Id. Specifically, while Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether
the subject of a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy, analysis under
Article 1, Section 11 turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1001-02. In evaluating the
reasonableness of police conduct, we consider: “1) the degree of concern,
suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion
the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities,
and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Litchfield v.
State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)). The State bears the burden at trial of
establishing that the police conduct was reasonable. Id.
[11] In this case, the degree of suspicion or concern that a violation had occurred
weighs in the State’s favor. Officer Portell arrived within three minutes of the
911 call, and he came upon a scene consistent with what the 911 caller had
described. Moreover, a very heated argument between two men and two
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women was ongoing, and Freeman abruptly stopped arguing and walked away
when he saw Officer Portell. Further, the degree of intrusion in this case was
relatively minimal. See Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (finding a pat-down search of a defendant’s clothing was a minimal
intrusion in the context of a search incident to arrest). Finally, law enforcement
needs were great. Officer Portell had been informed that one of the men at the
scene had fired a gun, and it was therefore critical for police to determine
whether Freeman was armed in order to ensure their own safety and the safety
of the many bystanders. Freeman has not established that the pat-down search
was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[12] Judgment affirmed.
[13] May, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
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