In re the Commitment of D.E. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
May 16 2018, 9:07 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
Patricia C. McMath
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Commitment of May 16, 2018
D.E., Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MH-128
Appellant-Respondent,
Appeal from the Henry Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
State of Indiana, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner.
33C02-0605-MH-6
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MH-128 | May 16, 2018 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] D.E. appeals an order continuing his involuntary commitment to Richmond
State Hospital. He presents the sole issue of whether there is clear and
convincing evidence that he is gravely disabled, pursuant to Indiana Code
Section 12-7-2-96. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] D.E. has been diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia. In 2006, he was
involuntarily committed to Logansport State Hospital. D.E.’s placement has
changed over the years, and he has most recently resided in a transitional living
program administered by Richmond State Hospital. He has obtained
employment within the facility and saved several thousand dollars from his
wages.
[3] On December 1, 2017, a review hearing was conducted, at which D.E. and Dr.
Christhart Schilbach testified. Dr. Schilbach opined that D.E. was gravely
disabled and that he could be dangerous if he discontinued medication, as Dr.
Schilbach feared would happen without court-ordered supervision. D.E.
testified that he disagreed with the mental health diagnosis, but was willing to
continue taking medication.
[4] The trial court found that D.E. was suffering from a mental illness, specifically,
chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and that he was gravely disabled as defined in
Indiana Code Section 12-7-2-96. Based upon these findings, the trial court
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concluded: “[D.E.] is in need of custody, care and treatment at Richmond
State Hospital or an appropriate facility for a period expected to exceed ninety
(90) days.” (Appealed Order at 1, App. at 161.) D.E. appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] To obtain a regular1 involuntary commitment of an individual, the petitioner
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the individual is
mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or
commitment of that individual is appropriate. Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e); In re the
Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind.
2015). The facts justifying an involuntary commitment must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence to satisfy the requirements of due process. Id. This
heightened standard of proof is required because the liberty interest at stake
goes beyond a loss of one’s physical freedom and may involve serious stigma
and adverse social consequences. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
425-26 (1979)). The application of the heightened standard functions to reduce
the chance of inappropriate commitments. Id.
[6] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a civil commitment
decision, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences to
1
The petitioner sought to continue D.E.’s regular commitment, which is for an indefinite period of time that
might exceed 90 days. Our statutes also provide for immediate detention by law enforcement lasting up to 24
hours, Ind. Code § 12-26-4 et seq., an emergency commitment lasting up to 72 hours, Ind. Code § 12-26-5 et
seq., and a temporary commitment for up to 90 days, Ind. Code § 12-26-6 et seq.
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be drawn therefrom which support the decision and we will neither weigh the
evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We will affirm if, considering the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, the
trial judge could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory
elements were proven. Id. at 273-74.
[7] D.E. does not challenge the trial court’s finding of mental illness and the trial
court did not find D.E. to be dangerous. Accordingly, D.E. argues only that
the evidence failed to establish, clearly and convincingly, that he is gravely
disabled.
[8] Indiana Code Section 12-7-2-96 defines “Gravely disabled” as:
a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is
in danger of coming to harm because the individual:
(1) is unable to provide for that individual’s food, clothing,
shelter, or other essential human needs; or
(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of
that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results
in the individual’s inability to function independently.
[9] Dr. Schilbach testified that D.E. has been diagnosed with chronic paranoid
schizophrenia. He explained that “the hallmark of paranoid schizophrenia is
delusions and/or auditory hallucinations,” but D.E. “has no auditory
hallucinations whatsoever.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 51.) Rather, in Dr. Schilbach’s
opinion, D.E. has “fixed delusions about what brought him to the mental
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health system,” denying both that he has mental health issues and a need to
take medication “to help fix” psychiatric issues. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 51.) Dr.
Schilbach also opined that D.E. expressed a delusional fear of coming to harm
from other persons if he were placed in a facility in Indianapolis.
[10] Dr. Schilbach found D.E. to be very responsible and able to take care of his
personal needs. He denied ever seeing D.E. act in a physically aggressive
manner. When asked if D.E. was “gravely disabled as a result of this mental
illness,” and “whether or not his judgment is impaired to the extent that it
affects his ability to function independently,” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 57), Dr. Schilbach
replied indirectly:
Apart from the statements he has made regarding non-
compliance, he has done a very good job holding down a job,
and I expect him to continue doing that if he stays on his
medication, with community support, and with mental health
support. I expect him to continue doing that.
(Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 57-58.)
[11] Dr. Schilbach later summarized his concerns:
There’s always some temptation with drugs, with cigarettes.
He’s stayed away from all this, so he’s [] an exemplary young
man who takes it seriously. The big problem is not accepting of
his mental health diagnosis and potentially not accepting the
medication, and then – then the consequences on [sic] that.
(Tr. Vol. II, pg. 69.)
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[12] As Dr. Schilbach concluded his direct testimony, the trial court asked him,
“does Mr. E. have a substantial impairment of his judgment, reasoning, or
behavior, that results in his inability to function independently” and Dr.
Schilbach responded “judgment, yes.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 71.) At the conclusion
of the hearing, the trial court addressed D.E. The trial court summarized
portions of Dr. Schilbach’s testimony – the diagnosis and the response to the
trial court’s statutory inquiry – and advised D.E., “the standard’s been met by
clear and convincing evidence.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 104.)
[13] We look to the evidence presented at the December 1, 2017 commitment
hearing which supports the judgment. In re T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 237. Relative to
grave disability, Dr. Schilbach opined that D.E.’s judgment was substantially
impaired such that he was unable to function independently and explained that
D.E.’s judgment fell short in two areas: acceptance of the mental health
diagnosis and acknowledgment of the need for medication. The trial court
credited Dr. Schilbach’s assessment. However, refusal to admit to having a
mental illness and refusal to medicate, “standing alone, are insufficient to
establish grave disability because they do not establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that such behavior ‘results in the individual’s inability to function
independently.”’ In re T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 276 (quoting Ind. Code § 12-7-2-
96(2)).
[14] The State points out, and we acknowledge, that the appellant in In re T.K. was
functioning independently in society – he was employed and renting a house.
D.E. was not likewise living independently. Nonetheless, D.E. was not
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required to establish that he was functioning independently; the petitioner for
commitment was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
D.E., as a result of his mental illness, had the inability to function
independently. I.C. § 12-7-2-96. Evidence that a person has denied having a
mental illness and refuses medication is, standing alone, insufficient to establish
this inability to function independently. In re T.K., 27 N.E.3d at 276.
Testimony that D.E. has impaired judgment because of his rejection of a mental
health diagnosis and his potential rejection of psychotropic medications did not
meet the statutory burden of proof.
Conclusion
[15] The evidence supporting the judgment was not sufficient to permit the trial
court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statutory elements were
proven.
[16] Reversed.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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