Stefanie A. Vastine v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Feb 02 2018, 6:10 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana
Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stefanie A. Vastine, February 2, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
15A01-1709-CR-2063
v. Appeal from the Dearborn
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jonathan N.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cleary, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
15D01-1502-F6-43
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1709-CR-2063 | February 2, 2018 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] Stefanie A. Vastine (“Vastine”) appeals from the revocation of her probation.
She presents the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering her to serve four years of her five-year suspended sentence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vastine pleaded guilty to three Level 6 felonies:
Possession of a Narcotic Drug,1 Maintaining a Common Nuisance,2 and
Obstruction of Justice.3 The trial court accepted the plea, and sentenced
Vastine in accordance with the agreement, imposing an aggregate sentence
length of seven and one-half years, with five years suspended to probation.
[3] In February 2017, Vastine agreed to several conditions of probation. The
following month, the State requested a hearing, alleging that Vastine violated
the conditions of her probation by committing the crime of escape. The trial
court held a fact-finding hearing on August 10, 2017, at which Vastine admitted
to leaving her residence and cutting off her monitoring bracelet. There was also
evidence that Vastine had previously failed to return to a work-release program.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a).
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(1).
3
I.C. § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1709-CR-2063 | February 2, 2018 Page 2 of 4
[4] In considering a sanction, the trial court reflected on the seriousness of
Vastine’s underlying crimes as well as the nature of the violation, which had led
to an additional felony conviction. The trial court ultimately determined that
an “extreme intervention” was appropriate, Tr. at 33, and ordered Vastine to
serve four years of the five-year suspended sentence, specifying that it would
consider modifying the sanction if Vastine completed a therapeutic program.
[5] Vastine now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h), if the trial court finds that a
probationer has violated a condition of probation, the court may impose one of
several sanctions, including ordering “execution of all or part of the sentence
that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” When a party challenges
the sanction imposed, we review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs when the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
[7] Vastine argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a
“significantly harsher sentence than was warranted by the circumstances.”
Appellant’s Br. at 13. She mainly relies on Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), and asserts that her violation was merely “technical” in
nature. Appellant’s Br. at 13. Yet, Johnson involved an individual with limited
intellectual ability who had difficulty understanding the terms of his placement
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1709-CR-2063 | February 2, 2018 Page 3 of 4
with community corrections. See Johnson, 62 N.E.3d at 1226-29. Moreover,
unlike in Johnson and the cases cited therein, here, Vastine intentionally cut off
her monitor, leading to a felony conviction; this was no mere technicality.
[8] Vastine also asserts that she “readily admitted” to the violation, and that she
“has serious medical conditions that make the severe sentence a significant
hardship for both Vastine and the State.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. However,
probation is “a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. In this case, the
trial court determined that Vastine’s admission to the violation and poor health
were mitigating factors, but concluded that Vastine would benefit from a more
severe sanction. Moreover, the trial court specifically recommended that
Vastine participate in the purposeful incarceration program, which it had seen
deliver “wonderful results” deserving of sentence modification. Tr. at 35.
[9] Ultimately, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
Vastine to serve four years of the previously suspended five-year sentence.
[10] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1709-CR-2063 | February 2, 2018 Page 4 of 4