Stephen Byrd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 26 2018, 10:29 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffery Haupt Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Law Office of Jeffery Haupt Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stephen Byrd, March 26, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1709-CR-2228
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Elizabeth C.
Appellee-Plaintiff Hurley, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D08-1505-F5-85
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Stephen Byrd pled guilty to level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon. He
now appeals that conviction arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no abuse of discretion,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 19, 2015, the State charged Byrd with level 5 felony battery with a
deadly weapon. On August 3, 2015, the parties entered into a written plea
agreement. The agreement provided that in exchange for Byrd’s guilty plea to
level 5 felony battery, the State agreed not to pursue a heightened charge of
level 3 felony aggravated battery. On that same date, the trial court held a
guilty plea hearing during which the trial court heard the factual basis for the
plea. In establishing the factual basis, Byrd admitted that a person named
Michael O’Neal came to his house, they had an argument, and Byrd shot
O’Neal in the abdomen with a handgun. The trial court took the plea under
advisement and set a date for sentencing. On December 10, 2015, Byrd moved
to withdraw his guilty plea claiming it was neither knowing nor voluntary.
Specifically, during the hearing on the motion to withdraw, Byrd stated that he
did not fully understand that he had a possible self-defense claim and that he
would not have pled guilty if he had understood. Following the hearing, the
trial court denied Byrd’s motion to withdraw. On September 1, 2017, the trial
court sentenced Byrd to three years’ imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[3] Byrd appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Indiana Code Section 35-35-1-4(b) governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas where
a plea has been entered but the defendant has not yet been sentenced. In such a
situation, upon a written and verified motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial
court may allow withdrawal “for any fair and just reason unless the state has
been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Ind. Code
§ 35-35-1-4(b). This decision is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.
Id. “However, the court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty
... whenever the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Id. In other words, the trial court
is required to grant [a motion to withdraw a guilty plea] only if
the defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. The court must deny a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea if the withdrawal would result in
substantial prejudice to the State. Except under these polar
circumstances, disposition of the petition is at the discretion of
the trial court.
Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 61-62 (Ind. 1995) (quotation marks and
emphases omitted). A defendant moving to withdraw his plea bears the burden
of establishing the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.
Code § 35-35-1-4(e).
[4] “‘Manifest injustice’ and ‘substantial prejudice’ are necessarily imprecise
standards, and an appellant seeking to overturn a trial court’s decision faces a
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high hurdle.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied (2015). Thus, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
“arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” State v. Oney,
993 N.E.2d 157, 166 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted). “We will not disturb the
court’s ruling where it was based on conflicting evidence.” McGraw v. State, 938
N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, (2011). Rather, this
Court will uphold the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty absent an abuse of discretion. Flowers v. State, 528 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind.
1988).
[5] Here, Byrd makes no claim of manifest injustice. In fact, he concedes that,
during the guilty plea hearing, the trial court “went through a series of questions
regarding [his] understanding of his rights, possible penalties, the possible
penalties he faced for the charge in question, and ultimately if he was satisfied
with counsel.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. He further concedes that the trial court
asked him additional questions regarding his understanding of the plea, and
that there is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that his guilty plea was
not entered into “knowingly and freely.” Id. at 14. He even admits that the
trial court specifically inquired regarding his possible self-defense claim, and
that after the court advised him that his guilty plea would result in waiver of
such claim, he stated that he understood. Id.
[6] Nevertheless, Byrd argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw because his “claims of self-defense throughout the case”
were akin to “claiming a type of innocence” and that “a trial court cannot
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accept a guilty plea from a defendant who pleads guilty and maintains his
innocence at the same time.” Appellant’s Br. at 18-20 (citing Johnson v. State,
734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000)). However, a claim of self-defense is not a
claim of innocence; rather it is a claim of legal justification for an otherwise
criminal act. Hood v. State, 877 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied (2008). Moreover, Byrd’s former attorney testified at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw that he and Byrd thoroughly discussed and weighed the
likelihood of being successful on a self-defense claim and determined that a
guilty plea was in his best interest. Tr. Vol. 2 at 125. Under the circumstances,
the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw,
and we cannot say that Byrd has overcome the presumption of validity
accorded the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm.
[7] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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