Sybron L. Pinkston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Mar 14 2018, 10:35 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nicholas F. Wallace Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Fort Wayne, Indiana Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sybron L. Pinkston, March 14, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1707-CR-1745
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-1704-F6-355
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] A jury convicted Sybron L. Pinkston of level 6 felony resisting law enforcement,
class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and
class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. He appeals, claiming
that he was denied due process when he was forced to wear shackles during
trial and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
He also challenges the trial court’s treatment of mitigating circumstances during
sentencing and claims that his two-and-a-half-year aggregate sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In March 2017, Fort Wayne Police Detective George Nicklow was working a
midafternoon patrol. A silver vehicle passed him, and he noticed what
appeared to be a bullet hole in the vehicle. He contacted fellow Detective
Robert Hollo to request assistance. Detective Hollo pulled up next to the silver
vehicle and recognized the driver as Pinkston, based on previous dealings. He
later testified that he had “no doubt in [his] mind” that the driver was Pinkston,
that he had a “clear unimpeded view” through the driver’s side window, and
that there was nobody else inside the vehicle. Tr. Vol. 3 at 75-76, 82-83, 138-39.
[3] Detective Nicklow, also familiar with Pinkston from past entanglements with
law enforcement, knew that Pinkston had a suspended driver’s license, so he
followed him. When Pinkston failed to use his turn signal, Detective Nicklow
initiated a traffic stop. As he walked toward the vehicle, he recognized
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Pinkston’s face in the driver’s sideview mirror. Before he could engage
Pinkston, Pinkston sped away. Detective Hollo pursued Pinkston, who
momentarily evaded him by driving through a residential area at sixty-five
miles per hour. Shortly thereafter, Detective Hollo came upon the vehicle,
which Pinkston had crashed into a small tree in a private yard. Pinkston had
fled the scene, and the officers were unable to apprehend him. The homeowner
told police that the driver of the silver vehicle had not stopped to give him any
insurance information or identification. Police discovered that the registered
owner of the silver vehicle was Pinkston’s grandmother (“Grandmother”), who
told police that she had given Pinkston her vehicle that afternoon and asked
him to go buy her some food. According to Grandmother, Pinkston was alone
when he left her home and never returned with any food. She later learned that
her damaged vehicle was in the tow yard.
[4] The State charged Pinkston with level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, class
A misdemeanor driving on a suspended license, and class B misdemeanor
leaving the scene of an accident. Pinkston proceeded pro se, and just before his
jury trial, he asked the trial court about removing his leg shackles. The trial
court indicated that they would not be removed but that the court had put
safeguards in place to ensure that the jury would not be aware that he was
wearing them. The jury convicted Pinkston as charged. During sentencing, the
trial court found as aggravators Pinkston’s criminal history, particularly his
convictions for escape and resisting law enforcement, his failure to respond to
rehabilitation efforts, and his active warrant in Ohio. The trial court found his
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parental status to be mitigating and sentenced him to concurrent terms of two
years and 183 days for resisting law enforcement, one year for driving while
suspended, and 180 days for leaving the scene of an accident. Pinkston now
appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Pinkston waived his due process argument by
failing to object to wearing leg shackles during trial.
[5] Pinkston first maintains that he was denied due process when the trial court
forced him to wear leg shackles during his jury trial.1 At the outset, we note
that Pinkston chose to proceed pro se throughout the proceedings below. It is
well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed
attorneys. Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This
means that they must follow the established rules of procedure and accept the
consequences when they fail to do so. Id.[6] Where a party claims that he was denied due process, we review the matter de
novo. Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Because he
is presumed innocent until proven guilty, a defendant “has the right to appear
1
Pinkston also alleges that he was forced to wear prison attire. Because he has failed to develop a cogent
argument with citation to relevant authority, he has waived this issue. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8); Nur v.
State, 869 N.E.2d 472, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2008). Even so, the record simply does not
bear this out. During a pretrial conference, the trial court addressed clothing with Pinkston and indicated
that the public defender’s office could provide him with an outfit suitable for trial. Pinkston assured the trial
court that he could obtain clothing for trial. Also, two separate times, Pinkston was identified in court during
trial as wearing two different-colored shirts, which suggests that he was not wearing prison garb.
Accordingly, we limit our discussion to Pinkston’s leg shackles.
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before a jury without physical restraints, unless such restraints are necessary to
prevent the defendant’s escape, to protect those present in the courtroom, or to
maintain order during the trial.” Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 160 (Ind.
2007). “For this presumption [of innocence] to be effective, courts must guard
against practices that unnecessarily mark the defendant as a dangerous
character or suggest that his guilt is a foregone conclusion.” Id. “[G]iven their
prejudicial effect, due process does not permit the use of visible restraints if the
trial court has not taken account of the circumstances of the particular case.”
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005). In other words, if the trial court
decides to physically restrain the defendant in the jury’s presence, it must place
in the record its reasons and facts supporting its decision to use those restraints.
Corbin v. State, 840 N.E.2d 424, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting French v.
State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. 2002)). That did not happen in this case.
[7] Here, the trial court instructed Pinkston to conduct his voir dire while seated at
counsel table. After voir dire and before the jury re-entered the courtroom,
Pinkston asked why he still had to wear his leg shackles. The trial court
responded, “Because you are in custody,” and Pinkston said, “Okay.” Tr. Vol.
2 at 230. The court explained safeguards that it had put in place to ensure that
the jury would be unaware of Pinkston’s shackles, i.e., the courtroom had been
rearranged and counsel tables had been skirted. Id. As to each safeguard,
Pinkston responded, “Okay,” and asked questions, if any clarification was
necessary. Id. The court also explained the special procedure for proffered
exhibits to be given to the bailiff to bring forward for introduction and ordered
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that any bench conferences be held outside the jury’s presence. Id.Additionally, to ensure parity, the court ordered that all arguments and
questioning by both Pinkston and the prosecutor be made from a seated or
standing position behind counsel tables. Id. at 223-24.
[8] For as thoroughly as the trial court explained the safeguards, it failed in its duty
to explain the reasons for requiring Pinkston to remain shackled in the first
place, i.e., that he posed a flight risk or a risk to the security or order in the
courtroom due to certain facts. See Overstreet, 877 N.E.2d at 160. Simply put,
the trial court’s general in-custody statement, standing alone, is insufficient to
warrant the use of restraints during trial. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 634 (trial court’s
stated reason for defendant’s restraints during sentencing that he “has been
convicted” held insufficient explanation of reasons).
[9] However, Pinkston never objected to the trial court’s decision to keep him
restrained in leg shackles. In fact, his repeated “okay” responses indicate his
tacit agreement to the trial court’s arrangements. As such, he has waived the
issue for appeal. See Corbin, 840 N.E.2d at 431 (finding waiver of argument that
shackled defendant was denied constitutional presumption of innocence where
defendant failed to object on that basis below); see also Howard v. State, 459
N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ind. 1984) (failure to object to being tried in prison clothes held
sufficient to waive due process right to appear before jury in civilian clothes).
Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court put safeguards in place to eliminate the
possibility that the jury would see Pinkston’s leg shackles, and the record before
us is devoid of any evidence indicating that the jury in fact saw them or that the
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restraints interfered with the presentation of his case. We find no reversible
error here.
Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to support Pinkston’s
convictions.
[10] Pinkston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh
evidence nor judge witness credibility. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 754 (Ind.
2015). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most
favorable to the verdict and will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable
factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would be
unable to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. McCray v.
State, 850 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The evidence
need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Dalton v. State,
56 N.E.3d 644, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016 (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d
144, 147 (Ind. 2007)), trans. denied.
[11] Pinkston’s only argument concerns his identity as the driver of the vehicle
during the chase and ensuing crash. He asks that we impinge upon the jury’s
function to judge witness credibility by applying the “incredible dubiosity” rule,
which states,
If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and
there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s
conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate only where the
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court has confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced,
equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible
dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be
applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or
inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted). For this
rule to apply, there must be a sole testifying witness, testimony that is inherently
contradictory, equivocal, or coerced, and a complete absence of circumstantial
evidence. Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756.
[12] Pinkston’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced. Detectives
Nicklow and Hollo both testified that they recognized Pinkston as the driver of
the vehicle involved in the police chase and registered to Grandmother, who
testified that she lent Pinkston her vehicle shortly before the police chase. In
other words, the identification testimony of more than one witness was
supported by circumstantial evidence that Pinkston was the driver of the
vehicle. As such, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply.
[13] Pinkston attempts to discredit Grandmother’s testimony based on her advanced
age and medications that cause confusion. He also challenges the accuracy of
the detectives’ identification through car windows and sideview mirrors and
cites their conflicting testimony as to whether he was wearing a hat or a hoodie.
These arguments are invitations to reweigh evidence and judge witness
credibility, which we may not and will not do. See id. at 754. The evidence is
sufficient to support Pinkston’s convictions, and therefore we affirm them.
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Section 3 – The trial court acted within its discretion in its
treatment of mitigating circumstances during sentencing.
[14] Pinkston asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in its treatment of
mitigating circumstances during sentencing. Sentencing decisions rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and so long as a sentence is within the
statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer
v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Sloan v. State, 16
N.E.3d 1018, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). One of the ways in which a trial court
may abuse its discretion is if the sentencing statement omits mitigating factors
that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
[15] The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s argument concerning
what constitutes a mitigating factor. Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Moreover, if the trial court does not find the
existence of a mitigator after it has been argued by counsel, the court is not
obligated to explain why it found the circumstance not to be mitigating.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[16] Here, Pinkston claims that the trial court overlooked as mitigators his desire to
seek higher education as well as his being a loving father to his children. When
pronouncing sentence, the trial court identified as mitigating Pinkston’s status
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as a father but simply commented no further. As for Pinkston’s educational
pursuits, the transcript shows an exchange during which Pinkston claimed that
he “was on [his] way to college …. [in] Salt Lake City, Utah,” to which the trial
court pointedly asked, “While you were on bond?” and Pinkston responded,
“Yes ma’am.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 29-30. The fact that Pinkston disagrees with the
court’s conclusion regarding the effect of his proffered mitigators on his
sentence does not create an abuse of discretion on the court’s part. See Healey,
969 N.E.2d at 616. The trial court acted within its discretion in its treatment of
mitigating factors.
Section 4 – Pinkston has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offenses and his character.
[17] Pinkston asks that we review and revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), which states that we “may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [this] Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” When a defendant requests appellate review and
revision of his sentence, we have the power to affirm or reduce the sentence.
Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010). In conducting our review, our
principal role is to leaven the outliers, focusing on the length of the aggregate
sentence and how it is to be served. Bess v. State, 58 N.E.3d 174, 175 (Ind.
2016); Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This allows for
consideration of all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court
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in sentencing, i.e., whether it consists of executed time, probation, suspension,
home detention, or placement in community corrections, and whether the
sentences run concurrently or consecutively. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d
1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). We do “not look to see whether the defendant’s
sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather,
the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Foutch, 53 N.E.3d at 581
(quoting Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied
(2014)). The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his
sentence meets the inappropriateness standard. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d
1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).
[18] In considering the nature of Pinkston’s offenses, “the advisory sentence is the
starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence.” Green v.
State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 637-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). When
determining the appropriateness of a sentence that deviates from an advisory
sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about
the offense as committed by the defendant that “makes it different from the
typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory
sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[19] The jury convicted Pinkston of one level 6 felony, one class A misdemeanor,
and one class B misdemeanor. The statutory range for a level 6 felony is six
months to two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-7(b). A person convicted of a class A misdemeanor shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term not to exceed one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. A
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person convicted of a class B misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term
not to exceed 180 days. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3.
[20] At first glance, Pinkston’s offenses are not especially egregious. After all, no
one was injured, and Pinkston damaged only a tree and his grandmother’s
vehicle. However, the record shows that he led police on a high-speed chase,
reaching speeds of over sixty-five miles per hour, in a residential neighborhood
where pedestrians and residents were present. Thus, Pinkston’s actions were
extremely dangerous and could have had catastrophic consequences. But
Pinkston, a suspended driver out on bond for other crimes, and with an active
arrest warrant in another state, did not stick around to assess or report the
damage he had caused. Instead, he ran.
[21] Pinkston’s character does not militate toward a shorter sentence. We conduct
our review of his character by engaging in a broad consideration of his qualities.
Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g, 11 N.E.3d 571. Pinkston is a career criminal and “runner.” In reviewing
the record and particularly the presentence investigation report, we find that
Pinkston’s significant and protracted criminal history reflects a lifestyle of
disregard for the law. He began his criminal activities at just thirteen years of
age, and by the time he was twenty-eight, he had amassed nineteen
misdemeanor and four felony convictions. He has demonstrated a penchant for
violence, flight, and defiance of authority. His record includes battery and
domestic battery, escape, and four previous convictions for resisting law
enforcement, two as felonies, plus a juvenile true finding for the same offense.
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He has failed to respond positively to lenient sentencing alternatives, having
accumulated two probation revocations and one suspended sentence
revocation. He was out on bond when he committed the current offenses and
was the subject of an active arrest warrant in Ohio.
[22] Finally, Pinkston’s allocution statement reflects an attempt to deflect blame and
relitigate his guilt. He persisted in painting Grandmother as a forgetful and
heavily medicated old woman and continued to hurl disparaging accusations
against Detectives Nicklow and Hollo. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 4 at 29 (the “officers
are fabricating stories … deflating my character, and lying under perjury on
myself”). Simply put, Pinkston’s behavior during sentencing was detrimental to
making his case for a reduced sentence. Consequently, we affirm.
[23] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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