Makayla L. Pickett v. Gregg Roberts (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 02 2018, 9:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT APPELLEE PRO SE
Alex Beeman Gregg Roberts
Beeman Law Sheridan, Indiana
Anderson, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Makayla L. Pickett, March 2, 2018
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A04-1706-JP-1489
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
Gregg Roberts,
The Honorable William J. Hughes,
Appellee. Judge
The Honorable David Najjar,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
29D03-9504-JP-366
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Makayla Lauren Pickett appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to reduce
to a judgment amounts owed by Gregg Roberts (“Father”) for college expenses
and the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error. We reverse and
remand.
Issue
[2] Pickett raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
found that she failed to demonstrate the amount of college expenses owed by
Father.
Facts
[3] Makayla was born in 1995 to Father and Shonda Pickett (“Mother”). In
December 2014, the trial court ordered the following regarding payment of
Makayla’s college expenses:
7. Prior to the child reaching her 19th birthday, [Mother]
requested that the Court allocate college expenses
between the parties.
8. The Court finds that the child has been enrolled at
Butler University and has obtained significant financial
aid in paying for her own college expenses, through
scholarships, grants, and other sources of funding. The
balance of such expenses is currently being paid by
[Mother] through a loan. [Mother] has requested that
[Father] be responsible for a portion of the college
expenses not covered by Makayla’s scholarships, grants
and other financial aid.
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9. The Court finds that Makayla should be responsible for
at least one-third of her own college expenses, and that
her share may be satisfied by any scholarships, grants,
work-study, or any other “free” money available to her.
If the financial aid (not including any loans) available
to her exceeds her one-third portion of the total college
expenses, such funding shall be used to reduce the total
balance of her college expenses before allocation of
expenses to the parties.
10. The parties shall be responsible in equal shares for the
balance of Makayla’s college expenses, up to two-thirds
of the total college expenses. After the application of
Makayla’s portion and any financial aid over and
above Makayla’s portion of expenses, the parties shall
each be responsible for 50% of the balance of the
expenses. Total college expenses shall be defined as
expenses relating to tuition, room and board, books,
and any and all necessary fees.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11.
[4] Father appealed the trial court’s order. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision to require Father to pay half of the remaining balance of Makayla’s
college expenses. In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 767 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015). However, we also concluded that “the trial court’s decision to order
Father to contribute to Child’s college expenses based on the cost of a private
university rather than a public university is against the logic and effect of the
circumstances before it.” Id. at 768. Consequently, we remanded to the trial
court with instructions to recalculate Father’s expenses based on the costs of a
public university. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1706-JP-1489| March 2, 2018 Page 3 of 11
[5] On remand, the trial court ordered the following in December 2015:
1. Paragraph 10 of the December 5, 2014 [order] is amended
as follows:
10. The parties shall be responsible in equal shares for the
balance of Makayla’s college expenses, up to two-thirds of
the total college expenses as calculated and limited below.
After the application of Makayla’s portion and any
financial aid over and above Makayla’s portion of
expenses, the parties shall each be responsible for 50% of
the balance of the expenses. However, neither party is
liable for college expenses of more than $7,400, which is
approximately one-third the cost of an Indiana public
university.
2. Neither party is responsible for any of Makalya’s college
expenses incurred prior to February 18, 2014.
3. The parties are liable, however, for Makayla’s college
expenses incurred on and after February 18, 2014 as set
forth in Paragraph 10.
4. As to the college expenses incurred by Makayla her
freshman year at Butler University, each party is
responsible for $4,016.75, the prorated amount of college
expenses incurred on and after February 18, 2014.
5. Parties shall pay all college expenses by May 5 of the
relevant academic calendar year.
Id. at 13-14.
[6] In August 2016, Makayla filed a verified motion for contempt. In the motion,
Makayla alleged that Father had paid the $4,016.75 toward a prorated portion
of her freshman year at Butler University but that he had failed to pay any
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amount for her sophomore or junior years. She alleged that he was obligated to
pay $7,400.00 for both the sophomore and junior years. After a hearing, the
trial court denied Makayla’s motion.
[7] In January 2017, Makayla filed another verified motion for contempt. In the
motion, she alleged that she had finished her senior year at Butler University
and that Father still had not paid any college expenses toward her sophomore
or junior years. Makayla also filed a motion to reduce to judgment, requesting
a judgment against Father for $14,800. After a hearing, the trial court issued
the following order:
1. Makayla has completed her college education. As a result,
[Father’s] obligation to pay a portion of such expenses has
expired and the Court cannot compel [Father] to comply
with such orders at this time. Therefore, the Court finds
that a contempt petition is inappropriate at this time. The
Child’s Verified Motion for Contempt is therefore denied.
2. The Court has reviewed the evidence and testimony
presented at the hearing on April 25, 2017 as well as the
hearing on November 1, 2016. While the Court finds that
it is likely that [Father] is and was obligated to pay a
portion of the Child’s college education expenses, the
Court cannot find that the Child has presented sufficient
evidence for the Court to determine what that amount is.
The Court would note that [Father] presented as evidence
copies of bursar statements from Butler University. These
statements contain information regarding expenses and
credits for scholarships and grants and have varying
amounts listed as a balance due. The Court, from these
documents, cannot determine what the total amount due
would be, or the source of all the credits and payments
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made. Additionally, [Father] has submitted his letters to
counsel regarding his dispute over the figures and making
demands that he is entitled to certain credits. The Court
cannot follow his logic and has no evidence to support his
claims for credits.
3. The Court wishes to clarify that this order does not relieve
[Father] of the obligation to pay a portion of the Child’s
college expenses as previously ordered. That order
remains as the law of this case. The Hearing held on April
25, 2017 was to determine if [Father] was in contempt for
failing to pay for the portion of the Child’s college
expenses that he was obligated to pay, or to enter a
judgment against [Father] for the amounts due. On these
questions, the Child has failed to sustain her burden of
proof and the Court now denies her motions.
Id. at 22-23.
[8] Makayla filed a motion to correct error arguing that she met her burden of
showing the amount that Father owed. According to Makayla, “the cost of
Butler is so high each year, that even after Makayla’s financial aid and
scholarships, the $7,400 ‘public university’ cap is reached.” Id. at 26. The trial
court denied the motion. Makayla now appeals.
Analysis
[9] On appeal, Makayla argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to
reduce to a judgment and motion to correct error. Makayla does not appeal the
denial of her motion for contempt.
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[10] Where a trial court enters findings sua sponte, the specific findings of fact
control only as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment standard
applies to any issue upon which the trial court has made no findings. Hays v.
Wise, 19 N.E.3d 358, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the judgment, we
must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the
findings, in turn, support the conclusion and judgment. Id. We will reverse a
judgment only when it is shown to be clearly erroneous, i.e., when the
judgment is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the
findings. Id. In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly
erroneous, an appellate court’s review of the evidence must leave it with the
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining the validity
of the findings or judgment, we consider only the evidence favorable to the
judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and we will not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Id.[11] On appeal, Makayla argues that she presented sufficient evidence for the trial
court to reduce the amounts owed by Father to a judgment. It is undisputed
that Father has entirely failed to pay Makayla’s college expenses for her
sophomore and junior year. Under the trial court’s orders and this court’s
opinion in Pickett, Father was required to make such payments. The only issue
here is whether Makayla presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate how
much Father owed.
[12] Makayla testified that her sophomore year “tuition” was $49,500 and that
$22,000 was owed after financial aid and scholarships. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
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p. 8. As for her junior year, she testified that “tuition” was $49,500 and that
$20,000 was owed after financial aid and scholarships. Id. She claimed that
Father owed $7,400 for each year for a total of $14,800. Makayla concedes that
she “did not present evidence of the specific amounts that [Father] would be
liable, however, the specific amount is not relevant as long as that amount is
over $14,800.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12.
[13] In response, Father makes several arguments and, like the trial court, we have
difficulty “follow[ing] his logic.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 23. Father argues
that he is entitled to a credit because he overpaid Makayla’s college expenses
for her freshman year when he paid $4,016.75. He paid that amount pursuant
to a December 2015 trial court order, which he did not appeal. Father cannot
now challenge that payment amount. See Holman v. Holman, 472 N.E.2d 1279,
1287 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the husband waived any error in
the trial court’s order that he pay the cost of his daughter’s parochial school
education because he failed to appeal from the original decree).
[14] Father seems to argue that Makayla’s testimony is incorrect because she did not
live on campus during the entire time period. We note that the trial court’s
orders require Father to pay his portion of not just tuition, but also room and
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board. There is no requirement that the room and board be provided only by
the university and be listed on the university bills.1
[15] Finally, Father also seems to argue that, in order to calculate the amount he
owes, Makayla’s financial aid should be subtracted from the amount she would
have owed at a public school. There is no evidence that Makayla’s grants and
scholarships would have been available at a school other than Butler
University. For example, one of the grants was a “Butler Grant.” Ex. p. 36.
Further, this argument does not follow the trial court’s December 2015 order,
which Father did not appeal.
[16] The trial court’s December 2015 order explained how Father’s college expense
obligation would be calculated as follows:
The parties shall be responsible in equal shares for the
balance of Makayla’s college expenses, up to two-thirds of
the total college expenses as calculated and limited below.
After the application of Makayla’s portion and any
financial aid over and above Makayla’s portion of
expenses, the parties shall each be responsible for 50% of
the balance of the expenses. However, neither party is
liable for college expenses of more than $7,400, which is
approximately one-third the cost of an Indiana public
university.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 13.
1
Father also appears to argue that Makayla did not include all of her financial aid in her calculations.
However, Father has waived this contention by failing to make a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule
46.
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[17] Consequently, from Makayla’s testimony, the amount of college expenses due
after application of her financial aid, was $22,000 for her sophomore year and
$20,000 for her junior year. Makayla more than covered her one-third of the
expenses through financial aid. Half of the remaining college expenses would
be $11,000 for her sophomore year and $10,000 for her junior year. However,
the maximum amount of college expenses that Father could be liable for in a
year was $7,400. Under Makayla’s calculations, Father owed $7,400 per year,
or $14,800.
[18] Father disputed those calculations and presented account summaries from
Butler University. By our analysis, based on those account summaries, Father’s
share of the college expenses would have been approximately half of $23,000
for Makayla’s sophomore year and approximately half of $19,500 for her junior
year. Those amounts exceeded the cap of $7,400 per year pursuant to the trial
court’s order. Consequently, even under the documents presented by Father,
he would have owed $7,400 per year for those two years.
[19] Although it would have been preferable for Makayla to introduce her exact
expenses, we conclude that she did present sufficient evidence to demonstrate
the amount owed by Father. We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter
a judgment against Father in the amount of $14,800.
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Conclusion
[20] The trial court erred by denying Makayla’s motion to reduce amounts owed by
Father to a judgment. We reverse and remand for the entry of a judgment
against Father for $14,800.
[21] Reversed and remanded.
Najam, J, and Mathias, J., concur.
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