John W. Anthony v. State of Indiana

FILED
May 31 2018, 8:54 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth Ann Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Victoria L. Bailey Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John W. Anthony, May 31, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1712-CR-2859
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marcel A. Pratt,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G13-1707-IF-35689
May, Judge.
[1] John W. Anthony appeals the trial court’s determination he violated Indiana
Code section 9-19-19-3, which prohibits driving “with a sign, poster,
sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the front
windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the vehicle that obstructs the
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driver’s clear view of the highway or an intersecting highway.” As the State did
not present any evidence to prove Anthony violated that statute, we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 25, 2017, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Kenneth Greer observed a car being driven by Anthony. The car “had plastic
bags of trash, canned foods, clothes, piled from the bottom of [its] floor to the
ceiling . . . on the dashboard and along the side windows and rear windows.”
(Tr. Vol. II at 6.) After looking around the car and being able to see in only the
driver’s window, Officer Greer issued a citation to Anthony for violation of
Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3.
[3] On November 13, 2017, at a bench trial, Anthony represented himself and
denied violating the statute. Throughout his testimony Anthony repeatedly
noted the statute prohibits “nontransparent material upon the” windows, Ind.
Code § 9-19-19-3 (emphasis added), and argued he “didn’t have nothing on the
windshield. [He] didn’t have nothing on the side windows. [He] did have
items in the automobile.” 1 (Tr. at 13) (errors in original).
1
Anthony submitted a picture of his vehicle as Defendant’s Exhibit A. An affidavit from the court reporter
indicates the Exhibit was admitted but could not be located when the Exhibit volume was being prepared for
appeal.
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[4] The State, during its cross-examination of Anthony, told Anthony he was not
understanding the statute correctly. The following exchange occurred:
[State:] A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign,
poster or non-transparent material, that’s debris, on the front
windshield, side windows, rear window of the vehicle, obstructs
the driver’s clear view of the highway or intersection highway.
You read this?
[Anthony:] It says nothing on the windshield. I don’t have
nothing on the windows.
[State:] I don’t believe you understand what I’m saying, sir.
[Anthony:] I understand what you’re saying. I understand what
I’m reading too.
[State:] So you do understand that non-transparent
materials is not a decal? That’s not a sticker. It’s any non-
transparent material, do you understand?
[Anthony:] Yeah, it’s not on the windows. It’s in the vehicle.
[State:] That’s correct and as you can see here, it actually
says that you cannot have those things inside your vehicle to
obstruct your view of the highway.
(Id. at 17.) The trial court found Anthony had committed the violation and
assessed a fine. Anthony paid the fine and filed this appeal.
Discussion and Decision
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Statutory Interpretation
[5] Anthony was cited for violating Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3, which
provides:
(b) A person may not drive a motor vehicle with a sign, poster,
sunscreening material, or other nontransparent material upon the
front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows of the
vehicle that obstructs the driver’s clear view of the highway or an
intersecting highway. However, signs, posters, or other
nontransparent material not larger than four (4) inches square
may be placed upon the front windshield, side wings, or side or
rear windows in the lower corner farthest removed from the
driver’s position.
[6] Anthony asserts the “State presented no evidence of any nontransparent
materials upon [his] windshield or windows[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 7)
(formatting changed). Although Anthony concedes his car had items stacked to
the ceiling, he argues the statute requires the items to be upon the windows and
they were not. The State argues the legislature’s intent was to prevent drivers
having their view obstructed by items blocking the windows. Further, it argues
the word “upon” should be construed broadly and not just mean “affixed”
because the legislature uses that word in other statutes and would have used it
here if it meant the nontransparent material only applied to items affixed to the
windows. (Appellee’s Br. at 7-8.) The crux of the parties’ arguments, and thus
our review, focuses on the meaning of the word “upon.”
[7] When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. In
re M.W., 913 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We first decide if the
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statute is ambiguous. Id. If not, we need not and do not interpret it, but instead
apply its plain and clear meaning. Id. If the statute is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must determine the
legislature’s intent so that we can give effect to that intent. Maroney v. State, 849
N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Statutes must be read in harmony with
related statutes. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Poland, 828 N.E.2d
396, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We assume the legislature intended
statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s
underlying policy and goals. B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1167 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003).
[8] “Upon” was defined in Clark v. Clark, 971 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 2012), a case that
interpreted Indiana’s Guest Statute. 2 Our Indiana Supreme Court held:
The word “upon,” both at the time it was originally added to the
Guest Statute, see Act of Mar. 11, 1937, ch. 259, § 1, 1937 Ind.
Acts 1229, and when the statute was most recently amended, see
Pub.L. 68-1984, 1984 Ind. Acts 925, should be given its literal
meaning: “[u]p and on” or simply “on.” The New Century
Dictionary 2112 (1929); American Heritage Dictionary 1328 (2d
college ed. 1985). Being “in or upon the motor vehicle” thus
connotes a physical connection to or contact with the vehicle,
such as being “in” a car or “upon” a motorcycle or truck bed. . .
. Thus, if the injury is sustained at a time when a passenger is in
mere physical contact with the motor vehicle but standing
2
Indiana’s Guest Statute provides one is not responsible for damages “arising from injuries to or death of
[certain family members or hitchhikers] resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle while [those persons
were] being transported . . . in or upon the motor vehicle[.]” Ind. Code § 34-30-11-1.
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outside of or off of it or at a time when the passenger is not being
“transported” by the vehicle, then the Indiana Guest Statute does
not bar a passenger’s damage action against the driver.
Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted).
[9] The plain meaning of the word “upon” has not changed. Simply, it means
“on.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upon (last visited May
2, 2018). The definition of the word “on” is “a function word to indicate
position in contact with and support by the top surface of[.]”
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on (last visited May 2, 2018).
The word “on” (and thus, the word “upon”) does not merely mean “near” but
rather “fixed” to or in some way resting atop or dependent on. The word
“upon” in this statute is not ambiguous. It clearly means the listed items are
not allowed to be affixed to the windows.
[10] The State argues the statute should be construed broadly to include the
circumstances at issue herein. However, the legislature has already seen fit to
prohibit the operation of a vehicle when the driver’s view of the roadway is
obstructed by materials loaded in the vehicle. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-43
provides: “A person may not drive a vehicle when [it] is loaded in a manner . . .
so as to obstruct the view of the person who drives the vehicle to the front or
sides of the vehicle.” Because the legislature has already provided a means to
punish citizens who drive vehicles loaded in a manner that obstructs the driver’s
view, we need not interpret Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 so broadly that
“on” means more than its plain and ordinary meaning. See House of Prayer
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Ministries, Inc. v. Rush Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 N.E.3d 1053, 1063-64 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2018) (if the language of the statute is plain, the “judiciary has no
discretion to substitute different language for that of the statute[;]” however,
even if the language is ambiguous, the judiciary “would be obliged to avoid
interpreting it” in a way that would lead to an absurd result).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] “[T]raffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, in nature and the State must
prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the
evidence.” Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). If there
is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial court’s judgment,
it will not be overturned. Rosenbaum, 930 N.E.2d at 74.
[12] While there seems to be little doubt Anthony’s vehicle was full of items that
obstructed his view, those items were not affixed to the windows or dependent
on the windows for their support. Rather, the items in Anthony’s car were
resting on the floors, the seats, and the dashboard. By all accounts, his
operation of the vehicle raised safety concerns because his view was obstructed.
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However, Indiana Code section 9-19-19-3 does not prohibit an “obstructed
view,” generally. It prohibits placement of “material upon . . . windows . . .
that obstructs the driver’s clear view.” Ind. Code § 9-19-19-3. The State did not
present such evidence. Accordingly, we reverse. See Atteberry v. State, 911
N.E.2d 601, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“State’s failure to properly charge . . . is
no mere technicality . . . the State must prove the elements of the crime it
charged, not the elements of some other crime the defendant may have
committed.”).
[13] Reversed.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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