James R. Martz, Sr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 31 2018, 11:03 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark A. Thoma Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Evan Matthew Comer
Fort Wayne, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James R. Martz, Sr., May 31, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1712-CR-2979
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-1705-F6-559
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] James R. Martz, Sr., (“Martz”) appeals the sentence imposed after he pled
guilty to Level 6 felony possession of cocaine.1 He specifically argues that the
trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that his sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of this offense and his character. Because
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Martz
and that Martz’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and Martz’s character, we affirm Martz’s sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Martz.
2. Whether Martz’s sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[3] When Martz was stopped for speeding in May 2017, he admitted that he was
driving with a suspended license. A search of Martz’s car revealed 97.2 grams
of synthetic marijuana, a digital scale with plant residue, a cup with plant
1
IND. CODE 35-48-4-6. Martz also pled guilty to: (1) Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug;
(2) Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license; and (3) Class B misdemeanor
possession of marijuana. However, he specifically states in his brief that this appeal concerns only his
sentence for possession of cocaine. (Martz’s Br. 11).
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residue, a box of clear plastic bags, rolling papers, and a red gummy edible
substance that tested positive for marijuana. Martz also had .2 grams of
cocaine in his wallet.
[4] In June 2017, Martz pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of cocaine and
three misdemeanor offenses. The trial court took Martz’s plea under
advisement pending his completion of the Drug Court Diversion Program.
After Martz tested positive for synthetic drugs in August and October 2017, he
was removed from the Drug Court program.
[5] In November 2017, the trial court entered judgment of conviction on the four
counts to which Martz had pled guilty and held a sentencing hearing. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court summarized the evidence and
addressed Martz as follows:
[You have] a criminal record with failed efforts at rehabilitation
covering a period of time from 2002 to 2017. You’ve got nine
misdemeanor convictions, two prior felony convictions. You’ve
been given the benefit of short jail sentences, longer jail
sentences, Brown and Associates, the Bowen Center, Park
Center, unsupervised probation, home detention, probation, the
Department of Correction, and then Drug Court. You’ve been
unsatisfactorily discharged every time you’ve been on home
detention, four times I show that you were unsatisfactorily
discharged. You’ve had suspended sentences revoked seven
times. You’ve had suspended sentences modified twice. Your
probation’s been revoked twice and your home detention
placement was revoked once.
(Tr. 8-9).
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[6] The trial court then found that Martz’s criminal history and his fifteen-year
history of failed efforts at rehabilitation were aggravating factors and that his
guilty plea and remorse were mitigating factors. The trial court sentenced
Martz to two years for the Level 6 felony, and Martz now appeals this sentence.
Decision
1. Abuse of Discretion
[7] Martz first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is
within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.
Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial
court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to
enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that
includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record;
(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported
by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that
are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[8] Here, Martz argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
consider two mitigating factors. A finding of a mitigating factor is not
mandatory but is within the discretion of the trial court. Page v. State, 878
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N.E.2d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In order to show that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to find a mitigating factor, the
defendant must establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and
clearly supported by the record. Rogers v. State, 958 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011).
[9] Martz first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find his
history of substance abuse to be a mitigating factor. Although we have
recognized that a history of substance abuse may be a mitigating factor, Field v.
State, 843 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, we have also
held that where a defendant is aware that he has a substance abuse problem but
has not taken appropriate steps to treat it, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion by rejecting substance abuse as a mitigating factor. Bryant v. State,
802 N.E.2d 486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Here, Martz has an
extensive criminal history related to his drug use. He has known for some time
that he has a substance abuse problem, and for fifteen years, his many attempts
at rehabilitation have proven to be unsuccessful. Under these circumstances,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find Martz’s history of
substance abuse to be a mitigating factor.
[10] Martz further contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
“mention that [] Martz had family support. Specifically, [] Martz explained
that he had a brother who had successfully completed the Drug Court
Program.” (Martz’s Br. 16). Martz has waived appellate review of this issue
because his brief three-sentence argument is supported neither by citation to
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authority nor cogent argument. See Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202-03 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal where
the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to
authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding,
we agree with the State that the trial court was not required to find that
“hypothetical family support that Martz might receive in the future” was a
mitigating circumstance. (State’s Br. 11). We further agree that there “is no
evidence in the record that Martz’s brother had played any role in Martz’s
efforts to obtain treatment in the past, and Martz’s assertions that he may do so
in the future are nothing more than speculation.” (State’s Br. 12). Because
Martz has failed to meet his burden to establish that this factor was both
significant and clearly supported by the record, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to consider Martz’s alleged family support as a mitigating
factor.
2. Inappropriate Sentence
[11] Martz further argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
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other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
[12] The Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that “[s]entencing is
principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should
receive considerable deference.” Id. “Such deference should prevail unless
overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[13] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, Martz was convicted of
Level 6 felony possession of cocaine. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony
is between six months and two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of
one year. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7. The trial court sentenced Martz to two years,
which is less than the maximum sentence and more than the advisory sentence.
[14] With regard to the nature of the offense, Martz possessed cocaine in his wallet.
With regard to the nature of Martz’s character, he has nine misdemeanor
convictions and two felony convictions. In addition, he has a fifteen-year
history of failed efforts at rehabilitation. He has been unsatisfactorily
discharged from treatment centers and home detention. He has also had
suspended sentences revoked seven times and probation revoked two times.
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His former contacts with the law have not caused him to reform himself. See
Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[15] Martz has failed to meet his burden to persuade this Court that his two-year
sentence for his Level 6 Felony possession of cocaine conviction is
inappropriate.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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