Vassil Markov Marinov v. Fiat Chrysler Automotive (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 20 2018, 10:15 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Vassil M. Marinov Todd M. Nierman
West Lafayette, Indiana Bonnie L. Martin
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Vassil Markov Marinov, March 20, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A05-1707-SC-1723
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
Fiat Chrysler Automotive, The Honorable Laura Zeman,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D04-1508-SC-2922
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, Vassil Marinov (Marinov), appeals the trial court’s denial of
his motion to correct error which challenged the dismissal of his small claims
complaint against his employer, Appellee-Defendant, Fiat Chrysler Automotive
(Fiat), in which Marinov denied the validity of an assignment of wages for
payment of union dues.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Marinov presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether
the small claims court properly granted Fiat’s motion to dismiss concluding that
Marinov’s claim is preempted.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On July 8, 2013, Marinov started his employment with Fiat pursuant to the
terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement between the United
Automobile and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Fiat.
This collective bargaining agreement was valid October 2011 through October
2015. Pursuant to its terms and as a condition of employment, all employees
were required to be dues-paying members of the UAW. Employees could pay
their union dues either by a check-off and automatic deduction from their
paycheck or they could elect to pay the UAW directly. Marinov signed a union
dues check-off form, which explicitly stated the dues requirements and the
procedure an employee must follow if the employee wants to revoke the dues
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check-off authorization. As a result of Marinov signing the dues check-off
form, Fiat began to deduct UAW dues from his paycheck and to forward the
dues to UAW as required by the collective bargaining agreement. Marinov
claims that he notified Fiat in September 2013 of his objection to having union
dues deducted from his paycheck based on religious reasons. However, Fiat
continued to deduct UAW dues from Marinov’s paycheck.
[5] On August 4, 2015, Marinov filed a Complaint with the small claims court,
alleging that Fiat improperly deducted union dues from his paychecks, in
violation of the Indiana Wage Deduction Statute, Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2. On
December 23, 2015, Fiat filed a motion to dismiss Marinov’s Complaint,
claiming that the small claims court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim as it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
151 et seq. and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141,
et seq. On February 25, 2016, Marinov appeared at a non-evidentiary hearing,
at the conclusion of which the small claims court entered an order of dismissal.
On March 21, 2016, Marinov filed a motion to correct error, which was denied
by the small claims court on the same day. Marinov appealed.
[6] On June 21, 2016, while the appeal was pending, Marinov filed a Charge
Against Employer with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). After
investigation, the NLRB dismissed Marinov’s filing because he completed an
Authorization for Check-Off of Dues and Initiation Fee form which he has
never revoked. Upon receiving the decision, Marinov appealed. The NLRB
denied the appeal, citing the same reasons given previously.
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[7] On December 29, 2016, this court of appeals remanded the case to the small
claims court to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to develop jurisdictional
facts. See Marinov v. Fiat Chrysler Automotive, 2016 WL 7493516 (Ind. Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 2016). On June 7, 2016, the small claims court conducted an
evidentiary hearing at which it took sworn testimony to develop jurisdictional
facts and reaffirmed its dismissal of Marinov’s claims. On June 26, 2017,
Marinov filed a motion to correct error, which was denied on June 29, 2017.
[8] Marinov now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[9] Marinov appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error, in which
he asserted that Fiat improperly deducted union dues from his paycheck.
Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an
abuse of discretion. City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010), trans. denied. However, to the extent the issues raised on appeal
are purely questions of law, our review is de novo. Id.
[10] Indiana is a so-called “right to work” state, meaning that employees cannot be
required to join a union as a condition of employment. 1 See I.C. § 22-6-6-8.
However, Indiana Code section 22-2-6-2 permits an employee to authorize a
1
However, Fiat’s employees would still be required to proceed under the terms of the active collective
bargaining agreement until it expired in October 2015. This included membership in the union and payment
of union dues.
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wage assignment as one method of paying union dues. Yet, “[w]hen it is clear
or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate
are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that the
state jurisdiction must yield.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).
[11] As we already acknowledged in our memorandum opinion issued after
Marinov’s first appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana recently recognized that there is a conflict of law, to some
extent, between Indiana Code section 22-2-6-2 and federal law regarding dues
checkoff authorizations:
[T]o the extent that an Indiana law conflicts with federal law
regarding dues checkoff authorizations, the State law is
preempted, and [employer] has no obligation to comply with it.
Indiana’s wage assignment statute requires that all assignments
of wages be revocable at any time. The assignment of wages for
union dues, however, is an area that has long been regulated by
federal law. So regulated, in fact, that there is no room for
regulation by the states, and laws like Indiana’s wage assignment
statute are preempted when it comes to dues checkoffs. As a result,
Indiana’s wage assignment statute does not govern dues checkoff
authorizations[.]
General Cable Indus. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local
Union No., 135, 2016 WL 3365133, slip op. at 3, (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2016)
(internal citations & references omitted) (emphasis added).
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[12] Accordingly, as Marinov signed a valid union dues check-off form and as there
is no evidence of coercion or lack of consent, this court’s jurisdiction is
preempted by federal law and, therefore, the small claims court properly
dismissed Marinov’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2
CONCLUSION
[13] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the small claims court properly dismissed
Marinov’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
[14] Affirmed.
[15] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
2
We note that to this date Marinov has still not properly notified Fiat and the UAW Local 685 of his
decision to withdraw from membership in the union. The instructions for the required procedures are set
forth in the check-off form signed by Marinov in July 2013. Counsel for Fiat has repeatedly informed
Marinov of the required procedure and the strict time frame in which to do this. During the evidentiary
hearing before the small claims court, Fiat’s counsel again informed Marinov of the upcoming time frame in
which he may revoke his union membership.
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