Nakya M. Ramseyer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Mar 21 2018, 9:04 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Samuel J. Beasley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nakya M. Ramseyer, March 21, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
05A02-1709-CR-2189
v. Appeal from the Blackford Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable J. Nicholas Barry,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
05D01-1705-CM-126
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] While on probation for another crime, Nakya M. Ramseyer was charged with
class A misdemeanor possession of a schedule IV controlled substance. The
evidence supporting the charge was discovered during a warrantless search of
her residence. In combined proceedings, the trial court convicted Ramseyer as
charged and revoked her probation. Ramseyer appeals her conviction, claiming
that the trial improperly admitted evidence obtained during an allegedly
unlawful search of her residence, in violation of her constitutional rights. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In December 2016, Nakya Ramseyer was on supervised probation through
Blackford County Community Corrections in case number 05D01-1607-CM-
259 (“Case 259”). As a condition of probation, she agreed to subject herself to
searches of her person, property, or residence with or without probable cause,
suspicion, or a search warrant. Additionally, her probation agreement
prohibited her from possessing illegal drugs and from having direct or indirect
contact with any person on parole or probation. Community corrections case
manager Kelly Cale explained the conditions of the probation agreement to
Ramseyer, and Ramseyer acknowledged that she understood them and signed
the agreement.
[3] In May 2017, when Ramseyer was placed on day reporting, she again met with
Cale, who explained the terms of the day reporting agreement. The agreement
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included a nearly identical provision concerning searches, as well as the same
prohibitions against illegal drug use and contact with other probationers and
parolees. State’s Ex. 2. Again, Cale reviewed the rules with Ramseyer,
specifically instructing her not to associate with her boyfriend Kurt Reichard, a
parolee. Acknowledging that she understood and would comply with the rules,
Ramseyer signed the agreement.
[4] Later that month, Blackford County Sheriff’s Deputy James Robbins received a
report of a domestic disturbance at a Montpelier residence. When he and
Montpelier Police Officer Al Johnson arrived on the scene, they heard a man
shouting and saw Reichard exit a stairwell door. Deputy Robbins attempted to
engage Reichard in conversation, but Reichard yelled, cursed, swung his arms,
and reached inside his pocket. When the deputy ordered him to remove his
hand from his pocket, Reichard initially turned away and then began to scuffle
with the deputy. Deputy Robbins arrested Reichard for resisting law
enforcement and patted him down, discovering a syringe and a spoon-like
utensil. Reichard’s behavior led the deputy to believe that Reichard was under
the influence of drugs at the time.
[5] Meanwhile, Ramseyer stood nearby, shouting. The officers handcuffed and
Mirandized her, and she admitted that she and Reichard had used
methamphetamine (“meth”) two days earlier. Having recognized Ramseyer’s
name from the current probationer’s list, Deputy Robbins contacted community
corrections and explained the situation to Cale. The two agreed that
Ramseyer’s residence should be searched. The officers waited for Cale to arrive
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at the residence before they began the search. When Cale arrived, she tried to
calm the visibly upset Ramseyer while the law enforcement officers searched
the residence. The search produced a crusty spoon, a mirror with a white
powdery residue, Alprazolam pills, three packages of rolling papers, and
baggies. Ramseyer later told officers that she had used the spoon to take meth
and that the meth had been purchased in the baggies.
[6] The State charged Ramseyer with class A misdemeanor possession of a
schedule IV controlled substance and filed a petition to revoke her probation in
Case 259. Ramseyer moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
search of her residence, claiming a violation of her protections against unlawful
search and seizure under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The trial
court denied her suppression motion and held combined proceedings on the
misdemeanor possession charge and the revocation petition. Ramseyer
objected to the admission of the evidence on the same basis at trial. The court
convicted her as charged and sentenced her to 365 days suspended to probation.
The court also found that she violated her probation in Case 259 and revoked it,
ordering the execution of her remaining sentence. Ramseyer appeals her
conviction. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Ramseyer contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence obtained
from the search of her residence, which she characterizes as an unlawful search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We review
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a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion
standard. Collins v. State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court
misinterprets the law. Id. In conducting our review, we do not reweigh
evidence. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). Where the issue
concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure, the ultimate determination
is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998,
1001 (Ind. 2014).
[8] As a preliminary matter, we note that Ramseyer has failed to develop a cogent
argument concerning her claim under the Indiana Constitution, as required by
Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Thus, she has waived it for our
consideration. Nur v. State, 869 N.E.2d 472, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied (2008). As such, we limit our analysis to her claim of unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which states, “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Fourth Amendment’s
fundamental purpose is “to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that
citizens possess in their person, their homes, and their belongings.” State v.
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Terrell, 40 N.E.3d 501, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Montgomery v. State,
904 N.E.2d 374, 377-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied).
[9] Significantly, here, Ramseyer was on supervised probation in Case 259 when
her residence was searched. In State v. Schlechty, our supreme court recognized
that “a warrantless search may be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion
to believe that the probationer has engaged in criminal activity and that a search
condition is one of the terms of probation.” 926 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 2010) (citing
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)). In State v. Vanderkolk, the
court went a step further, holding that
Indiana probationers and community corrections participants,
who have consented or been clearly informed that the conditions
of their probation or community corrections program
unambiguously authorize warrantless and suspicionless searches,
may thereafter be subject to such searches during the period of
their probationary or community corrections status.
32 N.E.3d 775, 779 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis added). “The Vanderkolk court did
not specify what a valid search condition must look like under the Fourth
Amendment … but merely stated that Indiana probationers must be
‘unambiguously informed of a clearly expressed search condition in the
conditions of their release to probation.’” Hodges v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1055, 1060
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[10] Ramseyer signed an agreement, acknowledging that she had read and
understood the rules of probation, which include the following provision with
respect to searches: “You are subject to searches of your person, property and
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place of residence by your probation officer, community corrections officer or
law enforcement officer without probable cause, any suspicion or a search
warrant.” State’s Ex. 1. Five months later, when she was placed on day
reporting, she signed an agreement acknowledging that she understood and
agreed to comply with the rules and guidelines for the day reporting program,
which include a nearly identical provision: “I am subject to searches of my
person, property and place of residence by my probation officer, community
corrections officer or law enforcement officer without probable cause, and
suspicion or a search warrant.” State’s Ex. 2. In both instances, case manager
Cale went over the rules with Ramseyer to ensure that she understood what she
was about to sign, and in each case Ramseyer’s signature indicated her
acknowledgment that she understood and agreed to comply with the
terms/rules.
[11] Simply put, Ramseyer was clearly informed about and consented to the search
provisions found in both documents, and as such, her circumstances fall
squarely within Vanderkolk. Her attempt to parse the terms “probation” and
“investigatory” when it comes to searches of a probationer’s property is
unpersuasive.1 Accordingly, we affirm.
1
Similarly, Ramseyer’s hairsplitting argument concerning which authority actually conducted the search of
her property is not well taken. First, the terms/rules of both agreements specify that searches may be
conducted by Ramseyer’s probation officer, community corrections officer, or other law enforcement.
Second, Ramseyer’s community corrections case manager actually agreed to and was present at the residence
during the law enforcement officers’ search.
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[12] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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