John Means v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 12 2018, 9:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Means, July 12, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1711-CR-2701
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Peggy Ryan Hart,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G05-1702-F4-5409
Baker, Judge.
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[1] John Means appeals his conviction for Level 4 Felony Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon.1 Means argues that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence stemming from the execution of an arrest
warrant that he maintains violated his federal and state constitutional rights.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On February 6, 2017, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Ernest Waterman,
Deputy Ryan Tunny, and Lieutenant Lewis Perrine went to 539 North Gray
Street in Indianapolis to serve an arrest warrant on Terry Edwards. The
address was provided in a warrant packet created by analysts from the
intelligence unit of the Sheriff’s Office.
[3] Deputy Waterman and Lieutenant Perrine went to the front door, while Deputy
Tunny went behind the house. Deputy Waterman knocked on the front door,
announced that he was an officer, stated that he had a warrant, and said that
someone should open the door. At that point, Deputy Waterman “heard a
bunch of what sounded like people running inside, jumping around.” Tr. Vol.
II p. 13. After the knock, Deputy Tunny heard “the sound of something being
put up against the side door” as a barricade and heard someone inside the
1
Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).
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house say, “F*ck, the cops are here.” Id. at 168, 178. Approximately ten
minutes after the first knock, someone in the house opened the front door.
[4] Deputy Waterman and Lieutenant Perrine looked inside the house and saw five
people, one of whom was later identified as Means, sitting on a couch.
Edwards was not among the group. The five people fidgeted in their seats and
moved their hands. The officers ordered everyone to show them their hands
but one person kept moving their hands around. The officers placed all five
individuals in handcuffs.
[5] The officers then proceeded to search the house for Edwards. They did not find
Edwards, but Deputy Waterman and Lieutenant Perrine did find, in plain sight,
a gallon bag of synthetic marijuana, two bags of marijuana, a scale, and other
drug paraphernalia. Deputy Waterman then contacted Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Detective Zachary Mauer, who works in the narcotics unit.
[6] Upon arrival, Detective Mauer first questioned the individuals in handcuffs.
They all claimed that they did not live there and did not know who the owner
was. Detective Mauer then began to prepare an application for a warrant to
search the home. As Mauer was typing the application, Deputy Waterman
tripped over a vent grate on the floor, looked down, and saw a handgun. The
search warrant was granted, and after a complete search of the home, deputies
found two additional handguns, including a Glock 27, and small baggies of
marijuana.
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[7] On February 9, 2017, the State charged Means with Level 4 felony unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon; Level 5 felony possession of a
narcotic drug; Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana; Level 6 felony dealing in a
synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike substance; Level 6 felony possession
of marijuana; and Class A misdemeanor possession of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike substance.
[8] On February 10, 2017, at Means’s initial hearing, the judge found no probable
cause and ordered Means released. After his release order had been signed,
Means was waiting in the book-out area of the jail. As he waited, he shouted
across the room to another inmate that “he had a Glock 27 but they couldn’t
charge him with it.” Tr. Vol. III p. 34. Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy
Jedediah Capps overheard this statement and told Means, “you know you just
admitted to a police officer, to a deputy.” Id. at 35. Deputy Capps testified that
Means replied, “I don’t care, I’m getting out anyway.” Id.
[9] Deputy Capps contacted Detective Mauer and told him what Means had said.
Detective Mauer amended the probable cause affidavit and requested that
Means be held in custody. The trial court granted the amended affidavit’s
request and Means was held pending bond. On February 15, 2017, the judge
found probable cause to proceed with the case.
[10] On April 17, 2017, Means filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was
improperly seized after the officers illegally executed the arrest warrant. He
claimed that all the evidence discovered as a result of this illegal entry should be
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suppressed. On May 31, 2017, the trial court orally denied Means’ motion to
suppress.
[11] Before trial, the State dismissed all charges except for Level 4 felony possession
of a handgun by a serious violent felon. Following Means’s October 19, 2017,
jury trial, the jury found Means guilty as charged. On October 31, 2017, the
trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. Means now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Means argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence, but because he is appealing following a completed trial, the issue is
properly framed as an argument regarding the admission of the evidence at
trial. E.g., Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). We will only
reverse a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence if the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. D.F.
v. State, 34 N.E.3d 686, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In conducting our review, we
will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, but we apply a
de novo standard of review to matters of law. Id. In other words, when a
defendant contends that the trial court admitted evidence alleged to have been
discovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure, an appellate court will
generally assume the trial court accepted the evidence as presented by the State
and will not reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether that
evidence established the constitutionality of the search or seizure. Id. at 689.
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I. Fourth Amendment
[13] Means argues that he was seized as the result of an unconstitutional execution
of Edwards’s arrest warrant. The State first responds that Means does not have
standing to raise this argument because he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the house that was searched; Means counters that because he was
seized pursuant to the arrest warrant, he has standing to challenge it. We will
assume for argument’s sake that Means has standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim.
[14] Means first argues that the execution of the arrest warrant was illegal because
the warrant was based on faulty and insufficient information. The Fourth
Amendment protects people from unreasonable search and seizure. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. With respect to arrest warrants,
the police may not enter a home by force to make a “routine”
arrest without a warrant. An arrest warrant founded on probable
cause gives the police “limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.” The belief is judged on the information
available to the officers at the time of entry and need not prove to
have been correct in hindsight.
Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 15 (Ind. 2010) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980)). It is generally accepted
that “reason to believe” involves something less than probable cause. Id.
Police officers must have a reasonable belief that the dwelling is the residence of
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the subject of the warrant and that the subject is present at the time the officers
attempt to enter on authority of an arrest warrant. Id. at 16.
[15] Here, Deputy Waterman explained that before serving a warrant, the Criminal
Warrant Unit is given a packet of information to aid in its service. Intelligence
analysts who work for the intelligence unit with the Marion County Sheriff’s
Office are responsible for creating the packets of information. The packets
generally contain the warrant itself; the subject’s name, address, picture, and
date of birth; information about the subject’s friends and what vehicle he drives;
and what offense the subject is being arrested for.
[16] The packet for Edwards’s arrest contained the arrest warrant, which listed an
address of 539 North Gray Street. On an information page also in the packet,
this address appears again; directly to the right of this address is a heading that
reads, “Date of Info,” and under this heading is the date “1/25/2017[.]” Tr.
Ex. 1 p. 3.
[17] Means contends that the warrant and the packet did not give the officers a
reason to believe that 539 North Gray Street was Edwards’s residence or that
Edwards would be home at the time the warrant was served. Consequently,
Means maintains that the officers’ entry into the home violated the Fourth
Amendment.
[18] We do not find Means’s argument to be persuasive. The warrant and
accompanying packet contained the same address multiple times; no other
addresses were listed. The “Date of Info” information page indicates that the
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warrant was served less than two weeks after the most recent information on
Edwards’s address was obtained.2 As the information was consistent and not
stale, we find that the officers had a reason to believe that Edwards was living at
539 North Gray Street.
[19] Means directs our attention to Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10 (Ind. 2010), in
support of his argument, but we find that case easily distinguishable from the
present circumstances. In Duran, officers went to the address listed on an arrest
warrant but did not find its target at that address. They then received
information from another officer indicating that the warrant’s subject lived at a
particular apartment complex. The information did not include the apartment
number, however. When the officers went to the apartment complex, they
confronted a random person leaving the building and spoke with him; that
person indicated that the subject lived in an upstairs apartment with a green
door. Officers did nothing to determine this person’s basis of knowledge,
knowledge of the subject, or residency in the complex. The officers went to the
apartment with the green door, knocked, and after receiving no response, broke
down the door. Our Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, the
officers had insufficient information to form a reasonable belief that the subject
was living in the apartment into which they forcibly broke. Id. at 16-17.
2
Means complains that there is no evidence in the record establishing what, precisely, “Date of Info” refers
to, and also notes that other pages of the packet indicate that it was printed on February 7, 2017—the day
after the warrant was executed. Nonetheless, we believe it perfectly reasonable to conclude that “Date of
Info” refers to the date on which the information—Edwards’s address—was obtained.
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[20] In this case, the officers had information from their intelligence unit regarding
the most recent (and only) address associated with Edwards. Whereas in
Duran, the police’s information was from a random, unknown, unverified
source, the information in this case came from an intelligence unit with the
Marion County Sheriff’s Office. Unlike in Duran, the officers in this case were
entitled to rely upon the information in these packets. 3 Therefore, the arrest
warrant was based on sufficient information and its execution did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.4
[21] Means next argues that even if the warrant itself was valid, the officers’ seizure
of him was unconstitutional because he was not named in the warrant. He
notes that while caselaw holds that officers have the right to seize the occupants
of a home in which they are executing a search warrant, there is no such
articulated right during the execution of an arrest warrant. See Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding that it is constitutionally
permissible to detain the occupants of a home pursuant to a search warrant so
that a proper search can be conducted).
3
Moreover, whereas in Duran, the officers knocked down the door, in this case, the officers entered after an
occupant of the house opened the door for the officers.
4
Means also argues that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that Edwards would be home at the time
of day they served the warrant. Service occurred around 9:00 p.m. on a weekday, which is a time of day
when most people are home. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that Edwards would have been
home at that time.
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[22] We agree with the State that the same reasons that justify detentions of people
in a house where a search warrant is being executed should likewise justify
detentions of people in a house where an arrest warrant is being executed.
Among other things, the Summers Court noted that there is an “obvious . . .
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found.” Id. at 702. Moreover, “[t]he risk of harm to
both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation.” Id. As the State aptly notes, “[t]he
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and, just as it is
reasonable for officers to detain those people present in a home where a search
warrant is [being] executed, it is likewise reasonable to freeze the scene where
an arrest warrant is being executed, especially when the subject of their search
could be waiting in the wings to either flee or fight.” Appellee’s Br. p. 19.
[23] As a general matter, therefore, it may be proper for law enforcement officers to
“freeze the scene” by detaining occupants of a house while they search the
house for the subject of the arrest warrant being executed, to prevent flight and
to minimize the risk of harm to all involved. And in this particular case, the
officers had reason to be concerned both that Edwards was hiding in the home
and that flight was a possibility, given the furtive and panicky behavior of the
occupants of the home after Deputy Waterman knocked on the front door.
Under these circumstances, we find that the seizure of Means did not violate
the Fourth Amendment even though he was not named in the arrest warrant.
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[24] In sum, there was sufficient reliable information supporting the arrest warrant,
and the fact that Means was not named therein does not mean that his seizure
was unconstitutional. We find that the execution of the arrest warrant did not
violate Means’s Fourth Amendment rights and that the trial court did not err by
admitting the evidence at issue.
II. Article I, Section 11
[25] Means also challenges the execution of the arrest warrant under Article I,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although this provision directly tracks
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the analysis under
Article 1, Section 11 “turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
officers’ conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Tate v. State, 835
N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of an officer’s
conduct depends on a “balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion or
knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.
2005).
[26] The parties again disagree on whether Means has standing to raise a claim
under the Indiana Constitution. We again assume for argument’s sake that he
does.
[27] First, we find that there was a substantial degree of concern, suspicion or
knowledge that a violation had occurred. An arrest warrant for Edwards had
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been issued. The warrant and the packet of information provided by the
intelligence unit showed 539 North Gray Street as Edwards’s address, and it
was reasonable to believe based on the packet that the address information was
less than two weeks old. This information came from an intelligence unit of a
law enforcement agency, and there is no authority requiring that more than this
is required to walk up to a house and knock on the door to serve the arrest
warrant. Furthermore, after knocking on the front door, the officers heard
multiple people in the house running around, barricading a side door, and
expressing dismay that the police were there. It was approximately ten minutes
after the officers first knocked that someone finally opened the door, and when
they looked inside, they did not see Edwards. These facts and circumstances
supplied the officers with a high degree of suspicion that Edwards was hiding
elsewhere in the house.
[28] Second, we find that the degree of intrusion was moderate. Means was
handcuffed and prohibited from leaving the premises while the officers searched
the house for Edwards. The search was relatively brief, however, and had no
contraband been discovered, Means would have been allowed to leave in a
timely fashion. Tr. Vol. II p. 58 (testimony of narcotics Detective Mauer that
he received the call regarding the drugs found during the search from Deputy
Waterman around 9:45 p.m.), 158 (testimony of Deputy Waterman that the
team arrived at the residence at 8:59 p.m.).
[29] Finally, the extent of law enforcement needs was high. They were executing an
arrest warrant, which is an order to find a person, secure them, and bring them
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before the court. The officers at the scene observed furtive and panicky
behavior from the occupants of the house, leading to a suspicion that Edwards
was hiding somewhere inside. To ensure that they could conduct a safe search
and prevent flight, the officers had a significant need to detain the occupants of
the house.
[30] We find that under the totality of these circumstances, the decision to detain the
occupants of the house for a brief time while the officers conducted a protective
sweep to look for Edwards was reasonable. Means’s rights under Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution were not violated and the trial court did
not err by admitting the evidence at issue.
[31] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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