In the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., and D.R. (Minor Children), and P.M.L. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 19 2018, 9:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Catherine S. Christoff Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Christoff & Christoff Attorneys Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Involuntary Termination July 19, 2018
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., 18A-JT-456
and D.R. (Minor Children), Appeal from the Allen Superior
and Court
The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
P.M.L. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause Nos.
02D08-1705-JT-100
v. 02D08-1705-JT-101
02D08-1705-JT-102
The Indiana Department of 02D08-1705-JT-103
Child Services, 02D08-1705-JT-104
Appellee-Petitioner
Baker, Judge.
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[1] P.M.L. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her relationship
with P.L., C.B.(1), C.B.(2), K.P., and D.R. (collectively, the children), her
minor children. Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the
termination. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On September 29, 2014, the children were removed from Mother’s care and
custody after Mother left then-three-year-old D.R. at home alone, marijuana
paraphernalia was found in the home, and Mother was arrested. The
Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging the children to be
children in need of services (CHINS) on October 1, 2014.
[3] On October 27, 2014, Mother admitted that the children were CHINS based on
the following: (1) Mother left three-year-old D.R. at home alone for hours;
(2) Mother sped away from law enforcement, driving around a stopped school
bus that was letting children, including her own, off of the bus; (3) Mother was
arrested and ultimately pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement, criminal
recklessness, reckless driving, and operating a vehicle without a license;
(4) there were marijuana blunts and paraphernalia in the home in reach of the
children; and (5) Mother smokes marijuana. At the dispositional hearing, the
trial court ordered Mother to submit to a diagnostic assessment and a substance
abuse assessment and comply with any recommendations; participate with
home-based case management; submit to random drug screens; and attend
supervised visitation with the children.
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[4] Mother completed a diagnostic assessment and a substance abuse assessment.
It was recommended that she participate in individual counseling, random drug
screens, and home-based case management. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved
to Chicago. DCS referred her services to a nearby location, but she never
followed up to initiate the services.
[5] Mother had “an abundance of no-shows” at the provider that administered her
random drug screens. Tr. Vol. II p. 167. She submitted to screens through
DCS after court hearings and sporadically at other times, continuing to test
positive for marijuana throughout the case.
[6] Mother’s visits with the children were inconsistent. When she attended, the
visits were chaotic, Mother failed to discipline the children, and Mother
frequently made negative comments about the children’s foster parents. In July
2015, the visits became therapeutically supervised visits because of Mother’s
behavior. After Mother failed to attend multiple therapeutically supervised
visits, the service was closed because it was stressful to the children that they
expected to see Mother but she failed to show. Between October 2014 and June
2016, Mother attended only sixteen visits and had multiple no shows. Mother’s
last visit with the children occurred in October 2016. The children did not
express a desire to visit with anyone outside of their sibling group. 1
1
C.B.(1), C.B.(2), and K.P. were placed in the same foster home. P.L. and D.R. were placed together in a
different foster home.
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[7] In June 2016, Mother’s services were transferred to another provider to better
accommodate her geographical location—she lived in Chicago and was
employed in Merrillville. She began working with a home-based case manager,
who met with Mother in Merrillville at her place of work. Mother was initially
motivated to participate, but her attendance became sporadic and she
eventually stopped participating altogether. In May 2017, Mother contacted
the home-based case manager and asked to restart the service. Mother met with
the case manager once and then stopped participating again; the service was
closed as unsuccessful.
[8] During the underlying CHINS case, Mother’s housing was unstable. She had
sporadic periods of homelessness, moved between Fort Wayne and Chicago
multiple times, and often lived with different relatives. At the time of the
termination hearing, Mother was living in a one-bedroom apartment in
Chicago. Her employment was also inconsistent. At one point during the
CHINS case she was employed at a nursing home and a restaurant, but at the
time of the termination hearing, she had been unemployed for months.
[9] On June 1, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
The termination hearing took place on November 6 and 8, 2017. At that time,
all the children were thriving in their respective foster placements. The Family
Case Manager (FCM) and the children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA) each testified that they believed termination was in the children’s best
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interests. On February 7, 2018, the trial court issued an order terminating
Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.2
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[10] Our standard of review with respect to termination of parental rights
proceedings is well established. In considering whether termination was
appropriate, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility.
K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We will
consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom in support of the judgment, giving due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge witness credibility firsthand. Id. Where, as here, the trial
court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the
findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. In making that
determination, we must consider whether the evidence clearly and convincingly
supports the findings, and the findings clearly and convincingly support the
judgment. Id. at 1229-30. It is “sufficient to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by
2
The parental rights of the father of C.B.(1) and C.B.(2) were also terminated; he is appealing in a separate
cause. The parental rights of the father of D.R. were also terminated; he is appealing in a separate cause.
The parental rights of K.P.’s father were terminated, but he did not appeal. The identity of P.L.’s father was
unknown at the time of termination.
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the respondent parent’s custody.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children,
839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005).
[11] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate
parental rights for a CHINS must make the following allegations:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at
least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a
description of the court’s finding, the date of the
finding, and the manner in which the finding was
made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a local office or
probation department for at least fifteen (15) months
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months,
beginning with the date the child is removed from
the home as a result of the child being alleged to be
a child in need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons
for placement outside the home of the parents will
not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
of the child.
DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.
[12] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in
the children’s removal will not be remedied; and (2) termination is in the
children’s best interests.
II. Conditions Resulting in Removal
[13] Mother first argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
in the children’s initial removal and continued placement outside her care and
custody will not be remedied.
[14] The children were initially removed from Mother’s care and custody because of
her arrest, her decision to leave three-year-old D.R. at home alone for hours,
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and the drug paraphernalia found in the home in reach of the children. They
have continued to be placed outside of her care and custody because of her
failure to comply with court-ordered services, inconsistent visitation with the
children, and instability in housing and employment.
[15] The record reveals that Mother failed to successfully complete any of her court-
ordered services, including random drug screens, home-based case
management, and individual counseling. When Mother did provide drug
screens, they were regularly positive for marijuana. She did not consistently
visit with the children. Indeed, at the time of the termination hearing, she had
not seen them for over a year. It is apparent that despite years to do so, Mother
has not addressed any of the underlying issues in this case. This evidence
readily supports a conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the children’s initial and continued removal from
Mother’s care and custody will not be remedied. See Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a
“pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with
those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged condition, will
support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions
will change”).
[16] Mother argues that her geographical location—in Chicago, a three-hour drive
away from where the children lived in Fort Wayne—made “both visits with her
children and completion of services difficult.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. She
argues that as in In re B.L.P., 91 N.E.3d 625, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), we
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should find that termination is unwarranted where it was based on the facts that
“a parent lives out of state, works full-time, and cannot afford to fly to another
state and home again in the same day . . . .” As in B.L.P., Mother insists that
she is being punished for her “geographic location and economic wherewithal.”
Id.[17] We find B.L.P. to be distinguishable. Here, unlike in B.L.P., DCS made every
effort to transfer Mother’s services to a geographically convenient location. She
still failed to participate consistently. And we acknowledge that although a
multiple hour drive to visit with the children is challenging to do regularly, she
could at least have done so occasionally. At the time of the termination
hearing, she had not seen her children for over a year. Whereas in B.L.P. the
father lived in Georgia, meaning that travel was a major (and expensive)
undertaking, in this case, Mother was just a few hours away by car. We can
appreciate that the distance involved made things challenging for Mother, but
she did not even take advantage of the opportunities available to her. We do
not find this argument to be compelling.
III. Best Interests
[18] Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred by concluding that
termination is in the children’s best interests. At the time of the termination
hearing, the children had been in foster care for three years and deserved
permanency. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235 (observing that permanency and
stability are key considerations in determining the best interests of a child).
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Mother had all that time to begin to address the issues underlying the CHINS
case and simply failed to do so. She failed to complete a single court-ordered
service successfully. She tested positive for marijuana throughout the case. She
had not seen the children in over a year at the time of the termination hearing.
The children no longer even wished to see her. The children’s CASA and FCM
both testified that they believed termination is in the children’s best interests.
We find that this evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination
is in the children’s best interests. Mother’s arguments to the contrary merely
amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we may not do.
[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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