Keijuan Ramey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 24 2018, 7:36 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew M. Kubacki Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Keijuan Ramey, October 24, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1711-CR-2699
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Bradley Keffer,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Pro Tempore
The Honorable Marshelle D.
Broadwell, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1708-CM-32073
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Keijuan Ramey (Ramey), appeals his conviction for
Counts I and II, domestic battery, Class A misdemeanors, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-
1.3(a).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Ramey presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Ramey’s
domestic battery convictions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On August 25, 2017, Ramey and his eight-month pregnant girlfriend, Bricia
Chaves (Chaves), were in an apartment leased by Ramey’s sister, Shalika
Parcher (Parcher). At some point, Chaves and Ramey walked into Parcher’s
bedroom, and Parcher sensed that Ramey was “mad about something.”
(Transcript Vol. II, p. 49). Chaves then stated that she needed to go home, and
she borrowed Parcher’s cellphone to contact her sister who would arrange for
“an Uber home.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). While talking on the phone, Ramey
snatched the phone from Chaves. Ramey then paced back and forth in the
living room, hurling insults and threats to Chaves’ sister. Because Parcher
“didn’t want [Ramey] to break” her phone, she took it back. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50).
At that point, Ramey was “yelling and screaming.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50).
Parcher ordered Ramey to leave and she threatened to call the police. Ramey
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refused, and he angrily threw his own phone against the wall. Annoyed by
Ramey’s conduct, Parcher began pushing Ramey out of her apartment. Ramey
refused and stated, “If I’m leaving, then [Chaves is] leaving with me.” (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 52). Ramey then “yanked [Chaves] by the back of the neck and tried to
push [Chaves] out of the door, but [Chaves] knelt down because she didn’t
want” to leave. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). Upon seeing Ramey’s actions, Parcher
“panicked and she tried to get [Ramey] off of [Chaves,]” but Ramey turned
around, swung his arm, and hit Parcher on her shoulder. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 53).
Although he left Parcher’s house, Ramey was later arrested.
[5] On August 30, 2016, the State filed an Information, charging Ramey with
Counts I and II, domestic battery, Class A misdemeanors. On November 2,
2017, a bench trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court
found Ramey guilty as charged. The same day, the trial court sentenced Ramey
to serve concurrent terms of 365 days on each Count in the Marion County Jail.
However, the trial court suspended 351 days to probation on both Counts.
[6] Ramey now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[7] Ramey contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to support his convictions for domestic battery. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate
courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007). It
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is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility
and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted
with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial
court’s ruling. Id. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable
fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an
inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the judgment. See id.Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002).
[8] Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a person
who knowingly or intentionally: (1) touches a family or household member in
a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or (2) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner
places any bodily fluid or waste on a family or household member . . . commits
domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.”
[9] In Count I, the State alleged that “Ramey did knowingly touch Bricia Chavez,
a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by grabbing
her and/or pushing her and/or pulling her.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 16).
Here, Ramey claims that while “there is a high probability” that he touched
Chaves, “the touching does not rise to the level of rude, insolent or angry as
necessary for the conviction.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11).
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[10] On the day in question, Chaves and Ramey were arguing. When Chaves used
Parcher’s cell phone to call her sister who would arrange for an Uber to take her
home, Ramey became furious. Ramey, who was “already livid . . . snatched
the phone” from Chaves, and he began hurling threats and insults at Chaves’
sister. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). Because Parcher “didn’t want [Ramey] to break” her
phone, she took it back. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). At that point, Ramey was “yelling
and screaming,” and Parcher ordered Ramey to leave and threatened to call the
police. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 50). Ramey refused, and he angrily threw his own phone
against the wall. Based on his appalling behavior, Parcher again ordered
Ramey to leave her house. Ramey informed Parcher, “If I’m leaving, then
[Chaves is] leaving with me.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 52). At that moment, Ramey
“yanked [Chaves] by the back of her neck and [he] tried to push her out of the
door, but [Chaves] knelt down because she didn’t want to go.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.
52). Ramey’s arguments that Chaves offered an alternate explanation—that
Ramey did not hold her neck in rude, insolent or angry manner—amount to an
invitation to reweigh conflicting evidence, which we cannot do. See Stewart,
768 N.E.2d at 435.
[11] As for Count II, the State alleged that “Ramey did knowingly touch Shalika
Parcher, a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by
striking her with his hand.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 16). Ramey’s only
claim is that he did not knowingly hit Parcher. “A person engages in conduct
‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high
probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).
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[12] Parcher alleged that after Ramey “yanked” Chaves by “the back of her neck,”
she “panicked” and she “tried to get [Ramey] off of [Chaves]” because she
“didn’t know what [Ramey] was going to do next to [Chaves].” (Tr. Vol. II, p.
53). At that moment, Ramey turned around, swung his arm severally and “hit”
Parcher on her “shoulder.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 54). Here, the factfinder could have
reasonably inferred that Ramey was aware of a high probability that he would
hit Parcher at the time he swung his arm.
[13] In sum, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to convict Ramey of two Counts of domestic battery, Class A
misdemeanors.
CONCLUSION
[14] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Ramey’s two Counts of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.
[15] Affirmed.
[16] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur
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