Joseph Miller v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Oct 10 2018, 10:18 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph Miller Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joseph Miller, October 10, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-232
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1502-F5-6841
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-232 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] Joseph Miller raised a collateral challenge to his sentence by filing an Indiana
Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. He appeals from the denial
of this motion. Because the Supreme Court has established that a criminal
defendant may not collaterally challenge his sentence through a Trial Rule
60(B) motion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 16, 2015, Miller pled guilty under cause number 49G03-1502-F5-6841
(“Cause No. F5-6841”) to Level 5 felony robbery and was sentenced to three
years, with one year executed in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and
two years in community corrections. The State subsequently alleged that Miller
had violated the terms of his community-corrections placement by committing
a new crime. Following a March 23, 2016 hearing, the trial court took the
violation under advisement pending disposition of the new charge.
[3] Miller was sentenced on April 18, 2016, under Cause Number 49G24-1602-F6-
6681 (“Cause No. F6-6681”), to approximately two years in the DOC after
pleading guilty to Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention. On May
4, 2016, under Cause No. F5-6841, the trial court revoked Miller’s community-
corrections placement and ordered him to serve the remaining 518 days of his
sentence in the DOC. The trial court further ordered that Miller’s sentence
should run consecutively to his sentence in Cause No. F6-6681. On December
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-232 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 4
21, 2017, Miller filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from the trial court’s
judgment. Later that day, the trial court denied Miller’s motion.
Discussion and Decision
[4] In filing his Trial Rule 60(B) motion, Miller challenged the order in which the
DOC credited him as serving his consecutive sentences in Cause Nos. F5-6841
and F6-6681. The trial court denied Miller’s motion. Miller contends on
appeal that the trial court erred by doing so. We disagree.
[5] In Van Meter v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1138, 1138 (Ind. 1995), the Indiana Supreme
Court held that a defendant may not collaterally attack his criminal convictions
or sentence through a Trial Rule 60(B) motion, rather than employing the
established procedures for post-conviction relief. The Court explained that
“[g]enerally, our Trial Rules govern procedure and practice in civil cases only.”
Id. (internal citation omitted). “We established the special procedures set out in
the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules to facilitate review of criminal convictions
and sentences.” Id. “Criminal defendants may not circumvent these
procedures by seeking remedies under the civil law.” Id. (internal citations
omitted); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(b) (providing that the post-
conviction rules provide the exclusive method to raise a collateral challenge to a
criminal conviction or sentence). The trial court, therefore, did not err by
denying Miller’s motion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-232 | October 10, 2018 Page 3 of 4
[6] Miller also contends that he was denied a fair hearing because the trial court
was biased against him. “A defendant asserting judicial bias must show that
the trial judge’s actions and demeanor showed partiality and prejudiced his
case.” Brown v. State, 746 N.E.2d 63, 71 (Ind. 2001). Miller alleges that the trial
court “abandoned her position of neutrality, by advocating for the State, when
the State filed no answer or opposition to [his] motion, and [he] was entitled to
relief, pursuant to prevailing law.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 15–16. His claim is
essentially that the trial court demonstrated bias by ruling against him.
Prejudice, however, “is not derived from judicial rulings.” Garland v. State, 788
N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003). The record does not contain any indication of
judicial bias, and, considering that the trial court could not grant Miller the
requested relief, the denial of his motion does not represent an abandonment of
neutrality or bias against Miller.
[7] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J, and Mathias, J., concur.
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