Erika Washington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 24 2018, 5:43 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Megan Shipley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Erika Washington, October 24, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-385
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1706-F5-20558
May, Judge.
[1] Erika Washington appeals following her convictions of Level 3 felony
aggravated battery inflicting injury that causes a protracted loss or impairment
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of the function of a bodily member or organ 1 and Class B misdemeanor
criminal mischief. 2 Washington argues her fourteen-year sentence is
inappropriate. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Washington dated Darion Slaughter, and their relationship produced a child.
After Washington and Slaughter separated, they shared custody of their child.
Subsequently, Slaughter began dating Shartasia Hughes.
[3] On May 30, 2017, Shartasia and her sister, Shaydriona, took Slaughter to work
in Shartasia’s car. After dropping off Slaughter, Shartasia and Shaydriona
noticed Washington following them closely in her SUV. Washington began to
ram Shartasia’s car from behind with her SUV. Washington hit Shartasia’s car
four or five times before Shartasia lost control and crashed into a ditch.
Washington fled the scene. Shartasia called Slaughter and Abigail Ackerman,
who drove them to buy a new tire. When they returned to Shartasia’s car,
Shartasia and Slaughter stayed with the car, and Shaydriona left with
Ackerman.
[4] Three or four hours after the crash, Shartasia and Slaughter were standing
behind Shartasia’s car, and Washington drove directly at them. Slaughter
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5(2) (2014).
2
Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a) (2016).
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managed to jump out of the way. However, Washington struck Shartasia,
pinning her between the back of the car and the front of Washington’s SUV.
When Washington backed up, Shartasia fell to the ground. Washington then
drove over Shartasia. Shartasia “felt all four tires” go over her body. (Tr. at
49.) Shartasia suffered significant bodily injuries, including a broken pelvis and
hip socket, a mangled ankle, and a knee that needed a rod surgically implanted
into the bone. Shartasia spent a month recovering in the hospital and then five
months in a wheelchair while she relearned how to walk.
[5] The State charged Washington with Level 5 felony battery by means of a
deadly weapon, 3 Level 6 felony criminal recklessness committed with a deadly
weapon, 4 Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, and Level 3 felony
aggravated battery inflicting injury that causes a protracted loss or impairment
of the function of a bodily member or organ. At trial, the State proceeded only
with the charges of aggravated battery and criminal mischief. A jury found
Washington guilty of both counts. The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences of 180 days for criminal mischief and fourteen years for aggravated
battery.
Discussion and Decision
3
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) & (g)(2) (2016).
4
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-5(b)(1)(A) (2014).
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[6] Washington argues her sentence is inappropriate in light of her character and
the nature of her offense.
We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
“Although appellate review of sentences must give due
consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of the special
expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions,
Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when
certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Shouse v. State, 849
N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (citations and
quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as
appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the
culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a
given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
In addition to the “due consideration” we are required to give to
the trial court’s sentencing decision, “we understand and
recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its
sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Couch v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans.
denied. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating her sentence is
inappropriate. Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011),
trans. denied.
[7] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
point for determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The
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sentencing guideline for a Level 3 felony is a fixed term between three and
sixteen years, with the advisory sentence being nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
5(b) (2014). The sentencing guideline for a Class B misdemeanor is a fixed term
of no more than 180 days. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3 (1977). The trial court
sentenced Washington to fourteen years; thus, she received a sentence above
the advisory but below the maximum.
[8] Regarding the nature of the offense, the trial court noted the significant injuries
Shartasia sustained. Shartasia suffered a broken pelvis and needed a rod
surgically implanted in her knee, which left her unable to walk for five months.
See Mann v. State, 895 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (victim
experiencing muffled hearing two months after incident showed protracted loss
of bodily member or organ).
[9] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the
defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). Washington does not have a valid driver’s license and has been
convicted multiple times for driving without a license. Washington’s repeated
violation of the law reflects negatively on Washington’s character.
[10] Washington argues her remorse and her difficult childhood should be
considered, however we note the trial court found Washington may respond
well to imprisonment based on her background and upbringing. “The trial court
is not required to give the same weight to any mitigator as would the
defendant.” Davies v. State, 758 N.E.2d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The trial
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court did not have to consider Washington’s background. See Bethea v. State,
983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013) ( “evidence of a difficult childhood is
entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight”).
[11] Given the nature of the offense, i.e., the severity of Shartasia’s injuries, and the
character of the offender, i.e., Washington’s repeated violation the law, we
cannot say Washington’s sentence is inappropriate. See Clark v. State, 26
N.E.3d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (defendant’s extensive criminal history
showed bad character and allowed for aggravated sentence), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[12] In light of Washington’s character and the nature of her offense, her fourteen-
year sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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