Christopher Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 11 2019, 9:59 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Lisa M. Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Megan M. Smith
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Brown, December 11, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1890
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Clayton A.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Graham, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G07-1904-CM-16609
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 1 of 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Christopher Brown (Brown), appeals his convictions for
disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2); and
resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Brown presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his
conviction for disorderly conduct.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISOTRY
[4] On April 14, 2019, Indianapolis Police Officer William Bueckers (Officer
Bueckers), working with the Special Event Team in downtown Indianapolis,
was stationed outside Club Blu at the corner of South Meridian Street and
Jackson Street. Around 2:30 a.m., prior to the bars closing, Officer Bueckers
heard Brown make comments to several women outside Club Blu and noticed
the women “were not happy.” (Transcript p. 47). Brown was loud “enough to
draw [the officer’s] attention.” (Tr. p. 58). The officer was able to hear both of
them because not many people were on Meridian Street “because of the rain.”
(Tr. p. 58). As the officer approached, he heard Brown make sexually explicit
remarks towards the women, use profanity, and state that he “wanted to fuck
every one of them[.]” (Tr. p. 47). Attempting to defuse the situation, Officer
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 2 of 6
Bueckers informed Brown that it was time for him to leave and walked him a
little north of Meridian Street.
[5] Approximately thirty minutes later, Officer Bueckers observed another
disturbance in front of Club Blu and noticed that Brown had returned. Again,
Brown was making sexually explicit statements towards the women and they
“were really, really agitated this time.” (Tr. p. 48). Brown was “very loud,
boisterous, yelling, screaming, ranting and raving.”(Tr. p. 77). Officer Bueckers
escorted Brown down Meridian Street and onto Jackson Street. As the officer
walked Brown away, Brown continued to make comments to the women.
Upon entering Jackson Street, Officer Bueckers informed Brown that he was
under arrest for disorderly conduct. Brown shook free from the officer’s grip
and took off running. Ignoring the officer’s order to stop, Brown ran between
two vehicles and took “a fighting pose by lifting his hands up.” (Tr. p. 50).
Officer Bueckers gave Brown the taser warning, but because the taser “was not
active,” Brown was able to continue fleeing. (Tr. p. 54).
[6] After Brown continued running down Jackson Street, he jumped over a gated
area outside another bar where he tripped over some tables and chairs. After
Brown had fallen down, other officers attempted to subdue him. Brown
continued to kick at the officers and refused to comply with commands to stop
resisting and present his hands. Officer Bueckers successfully deployed his taser
and the officers were able to place Brown in handcuffs.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 3 of 6
[7] On April 30, 2019, the State filed an Information, charging Brown with
disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor, and two Counts of resisting law
enforcement, Class A misdemeanors. On July 11, 2019, the trial court
conducted a jury trial. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Brown guilty
of disorderly conduct and one Count of resisting law enforcement. Because the
jury was deadlocked on the second Count of resisting law enforcement, the
State moved to dismiss the Count, which was granted by the trial court. On
July 12, 2019, the trial court sentenced Brown to 365 days, with 357 days
suspended, on the disorderly conduct charge and to 180 days, with 172 days
suspended, on the resisting law enforcement charge, with sentences to run
concurrent.
[8] Brown now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[9] Brown contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to support his conviction for disorderly conduct. Our
standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d
92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to
the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the
evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value
to support the judgment. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to
support a conviction. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 4 of 6
Circumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. See Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95. Reversal is appropriate only when
reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material
element of the offense. Id.
[10] To convict Brown of disorderly conduct as a Class B misdemeanor, the State
was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown, “recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally [made] unreasonable noise and continue[d] to do so
after being asked to stop[.]” See I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). “[T]o support a
conviction for disorderly conduct, the State must prove that the defendant
produced decibels of sound that were too loud for the circumstances.” Johnson
v. State, 719 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis omitted). Brown’s
sole argument focuses on the “unreasonable noise” prong of the charge.
Specifically, he claims that there is no evidence Brown was being any louder
than anyone else in the area. We find his argument unavailing as it essentially
requests us to reweigh the evidence of the case, which we are not allowed to do.
See Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95.
[11] Notwithstanding Brown’s argument, we find that the State carried its burden.
The State presented evidence that Officer Beuckers was stationed near Club Blu
on Meridian Street when Brown drew the officer’s attention by making loud
comments to several women. At the time, it was raining and not many people
were on the street. Upon approaching, Officer Beuckers noticed the women
getting agitated and the officer told Brown to leave. When Brown returned
approximately thirty minutes later, Brown again drew Officer Beuckers’
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 5 of 6
attention by being “very loud, boisterous, yelling, screaming, ranting and
raving.” (Tr. p. 77). He was making sexually explicit statements towards
women and they “were really, really agitated this time.” (Tr. p. 48). See Hooks
v. State, 660 N.E.2d 1076, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“To sustain a conviction,
the State must show that the complained-of speech infringed upon the right to
peace and tranquility enjoyed by others.”), trans. denied. Based on the facts
before us, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain
Brown’s conviction as he was making unreasonable noise and disturbing the
peace of several women on Meridian Street.
CONCLUSION
[12] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to support Brown’s conviction for disorderly
conduct.
[13] Affirmed.
[14] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1890 | December 11, 2019 Page 6 of 6