P & P Home Services, LLC v. Review Board of the Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development and Cynthia Hutcherson

FILED
Apr 29 2016, 8:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jay Meisenhelder Gregory F. Zoeller
Jay Meisenhelder Employment & Civil Attorney General of Indiana
Rights Legal Services, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana Andrea E. Rahman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
P & P Home Services, LLC, April 29, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
93A02-1511-EX-1818
v. Appeal from the Review Board of
the Department of Workforce
Review Board of the Indiana Development
Department of Workforce Cause No.
Development and Cynthia 15-RB-1599
Hutcherson,
Appellee-Respondent
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] P & P Home Services, LLC (“P & P”) appeals a decision of the Review Board
of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”)
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finding P & P’s former employee, C.H., to be eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits. P & P presents the sole issue of whether the Board’s
decision is contrary to law. We reverse and remand to the Review Board for
further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] P & P is a provider of in-home personal care or health services for individual
clients P & P refers to as “consumers.” (Ex. Pg 13.) On November 25, 2013,
C.H. began her full-time employment with P & P. She was assigned to work
with one particular consumer (“Consumer”). The last day that she provided
services for Consumer was December 31, 2014.
[3] On January 8, 2015, P & P notified C.H. that Consumer had terminated the
business relationship between Consumer and P & P. On January 21, 2015,
C.H. sent an e-mail message to the CEO of P & P, Ranaye Miles (“Miles”),
inquiring about the availability of “second shifts” and their locations. (Ex. Pg
31.) Miles responded, in general terms, that second shift consumers were
available “all over Indy.” (Ex. Pg 32.) At the same time, Miles advised C.H.
that she needed medication administration training.1 On the same date, a letter
was sent by P & P to C.H., requesting that C.H. submit her annual T.B. test
1
P & P offered payment for the course, but did not pay wages for the time in attendance.
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result (“expired 11/25/14”) and her vehicle registration (“due before
expiration”). (Ex. Pg. 36.)
[4] The requested materials were not submitted. No new consumer was assigned
to C.H. Communications regarding potential assignments ceased, and P & P
marked C.H.’s employment file with a date of separation from employment of
February 15, 2015.
[5] C.H. sought unemployment benefits and, on July 8, 2015, a claims deputy
found that C.H. was eligible for benefits because there was a lack of evidence to
support a determination that C.H. had voluntarily quit her employment. On
July 10, 2015, P & P appealed. An Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”)
conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 24, 2015. 2 At the conclusion of
the hearing, the ALJ reversed the decision of the claims deputy, finding that
C.H. had voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. C.H. appealed
to the Review Board.
[6] On October 7, 2015, the Review Board issued an order reversing the ALJ
decision. The Review Board concluded that the relationship between P & P
and C.H. was essentially that of a temporary services agency and temporary
employee; C.H.’s employment relationship with P & P had ended on January 8,
2015; and C.H. did not leave her employment voluntarily. This appeal ensued.
2
The hearing was conducted telephonically, despite the absence of a telephone number for C.H., who did
not participate.
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Discussion and Decision
[7] Decisions made by the Review Board are subject to review for legal error, but
questions of fact determined by the Review Board are, absent limited
exceptions, conclusive and binding. K.S. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 33 N.E.3d 1195, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The Review Board’s
conclusions of law may be challenged as to “the sufficiency of the facts found to
sustain the decision and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of
facts.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(f). The Review Board’s findings are classified in
three ways: (1) as basic, underlying facts; (2) as “ultimate facts” derived as
inferences or conclusions from basic, underlying facts; and (3) as conclusions of
law. Chrysler Group, LLC. v. Review Bd., 960 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 2012). We
review the findings of basic facts under a “substantial evidence” standard and
review ultimate facts to ensure that the Board has drawn a reasonable inference
in light of its findings on the basic, underlying facts. Id.[8] A claimant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits is determined based upon
the information that is available without regard to a burden of proof. I.C. § 22-
4-1-2(c). The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to provide
unemployment benefits to individuals who are “out of work through no fault of
their own.” Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 927 N.E.2d
906, 909 (Ind. 2010). Therefore, an individual who voluntarily leaves his or her
employment without good cause in connection with the work is disqualified
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. K.S., citing I.C. § 22-4-
15-1(a). Whether an employee has voluntarily left employment without good
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cause in connection with the work presents a question of fact for the Review
Board. Davis v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 900 N.E.2d 488, 492
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[9] Here, the Review Board found that C.H.’s employment with P & P ended
involuntarily when P & P notified C.H., on January 8, 2015, that Consumer
was no longer using the services of P & P. Without question, C.H. did not
initiate an end to her employment with P & P on that date. However, the
Review Board’s premise that the employment relationship necessarily ended on
that date is based upon treating P & P as if it were a temporary services agency.
[10] The Review Board cited Cintemp, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Review Board,
717 N.E.2d 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that “once a temporary
assignment ends, there is no relationship between the temporary employee and
the temporary service agency except for consideration for future assignments.”
(App. at 56.) Cintemp involved a consolidated appeal by CTI, a temporary
services company, of fifteen orders from the Review Board finding that a
claimant was eligible for unemployment compensation after he or she had been
temporarily placed in factory employment for sixty to ninety days, accepted an
offer of full-time permanent employment there, but was subsequently laid off.
Id. at 989-90. In affirming the orders, a panel of this Court observed:
A thorough review of the record reveals that substantial evidence
of probative value exists which supports the ALJs’ findings of
fact and conclusions as set forth above. The evidence shows that
once an offer of permanent employment was extended to the
Claimants by either Cambridge Industries or Libbey-Owens-
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Ford, each of the fifteen claimants were faced with the decision
of either accepting the offer of permanent employment, or cease
working for both the company and CTI. . . . Blackburn further
testified that once an assignment with one of CTI’s corporate
clients had ended, either for lack of work or some other reason,
they were ‘no longer a CTI employee’ and that there was no
continuing relationship between CTI and the Claimant, other
than consideration for future assignments.
Id. at 992-93.
[11] The nature of the employment relationship between C.H. and P & P does not
mirror the employment relationship in Cintemp. There, employees were placed
“with certain corporate clients on a temporary basis.” Id. at 990. Given the
expectation of temporary employment only during the sixty to ninety-day
window before permanent employment could be offered, this particular
employment relationship between CTI and an employee would inevitably
terminate.
[12] These are not the circumstances under which C.H. accepted employment with
P & P. C.H. did not come to the pre-determined end of a temporary
probationary placement with a potential future employer. She was a permanent
employee of P & P, although she had no assurance that she would always be
assigned to provide services to Consumer. The employment arrangement
contemplated successive assignments at different locations and of varying
durations while the caregiver remained the employee of P & P. The employee
handbook advised that “additional” training was required, tailored to each
consumer’s needs (for example, “seizure management”). (Ex. Pg. 13.)
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[13] The Review Board reached its decision based upon the premise that the
employment relationship at issue was one of a temporary employer and
temporary employee. Finding the relationship severed as a matter of law, the
Review Board did not consider whether a permanent employment relationship
was voluntarily severed by the employee. Accordingly, we remand for a factual
determination of whether, in light of the communications between the parties
and the surrounding circumstances, C.H. voluntarily left her employment
without good cause.
[14] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., Altice, J., concur.
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