Alan E. Dewitt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

FILED
MEMORANDUM DECISION Apr 28 2016, 7:16 am
CLERK
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
this Memorandum Decision shall not be and Tax Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Leeman Gregory F. Zoeller
Logansport, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Alan E. Dewitt, April 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
09A04-1508-CR-1179
v. Appeal from the Cass Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Leo Burns, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
09C01-1504-F5-28
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Alan E. Dewitt appeals his convictions for Dealing in Methamphetamine, a
Level 5 felony; Possession of Chemical Reagents or Precursors with Intent to
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Manufacture a Controlled Substance, a Level 6 felony; Maintaining a Common
Nuisance, a Level 6 felony; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class A
misdemeanor. Dewitt was sentenced to an aggregate term of six years
incarceration. On appeal, Dewitt presents three issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting certain
testimony into evidence?
2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to establish
constructive possession?
3. Do Dewitt’s convictions violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On March 31, 2015, Officer Flaude Dillon of the Logansport Police
Department, who also serves on the department’s meth suppression unit,
received a tip concerning Dewitt and Jesse Dewitt (Jesse) from a fellow
narcotics officer. The information prompted Officer Dillon to review records
from the national pseudoephedrine database.1 Because Officer Dillon
considered the quantity of pseudoephedrine purchased by both Dewitt and
1
Each time an individual seeks to make a retail purchase of a product containing pseudoephedrine, the
individual must present his or her driver’s license. Information regarding the purchase, including the
individual’s name, address, driver’s license number, what product containing pseudoephedrine was
purchased, and the time, date, and location of the purchase, is collected and stored in the database.
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Jesse to be excessive, he reviewed BMV records for identification purposes.
The BMV records for Jesse indicated that there was an active warrant for her
arrest from Cass County. Given this information, Officer Dillon contacted
Cass County Sheriff’s Deputies Josh O’Connor and Branson Eber and informed
them that he suspected Dewitt and Jesse were manufacturing
methamphetamine and he was aware of Jesse’s outstanding warrant.
[4] Officer Dillon, along with Officer Tyler Preston, began surveillance around 8:30
p.m. at Dewitt and Jesse’s residence located at 2209 East Wabash Road,
Logansport. Over the course of the next two hours, no one was seen leaving or
entering the residence. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Officers Dillon and
Preston were joined by Deputies O’Connor and Eber, and the four approached
the residence.
[5] The officers knocked and announced themselves as law enforcement. Deputies
O’Connor and Eber were on the front porch, Officer Dillon was on the east side
of the residence near a sliding glass door, and Officer Preston was positioned at
the back door. All of the windows to the home were covered with curtains,
blankets, or wood. As they approached, Deputy Eber, who had investigated
ten to fifteen methamphetamine labs, testified that he detected what he
described as the distinct smell of “sweet ammonia” he associated only with the
manufacture of methamphetamine. Transcript Vol. 1 at 85. After the officers
knocked on the door, they observed Jesse pull back a window covering and
then quickly move toward the back of the residence.
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[6] After waiting a few seconds for someone to respond, the officers forced entry by
kicking in the front door. Dewitt came into the front room and took control of
a dog as directed by the officers. They then conducted a sweep through the
house and found Jesse in a back bedroom. Jesse was arrested on the
outstanding warrant and removed from the residence. In plain view, the
officers observed a white powdery substance, lithium batteries, and a partially
exposed syringe near a bed. Dewitt was detained while the officers obtained a
search warrant. While waiting for the warrant, Cass County Sheriff’s Deputy
Patrick Zeider, who is a certified clandestine lab technician, arrived at the
residence. Deputy Zeider testified that he could smell a chemical odor he
associated with methamphetamine manufacturing outside of the residence.
[7] After the search warrant was obtained, officers searched Dewitt’s house. They
found numerous items scattered throughout the house that are either a
necessary ingredient or precursor for manufacturing methamphetamine.
Specifically, in the living room visibly lying among papers, Deputy Zeider
found clear plastic tubing as well as tubing that had been burned or had
corroded in a manner consistent with prior use in a methamphetamine lab. He
also found in the living area a container of salt and an open tool box that had a
small glass container containing ammonium nitrate as well as additional clear
plastic tubing.2 A Coleman fuel can (organic solvent) was readily visible lying
2
Deputy Zeider testified that ammonium nitrate is commonly found inside a cold compress and explained
how such is used in the process for manufacturing methamphetamine.
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on the bottom of an open shelf that was located in the living area. Deputy
Zeider performed a test on the fuel can that indicated the presence of ammonia
gas therein. Additional tests conducted by Deputy Zeider informed him that,
more specifically, the ammonia was anhydrous ammonia.
[8] In the bedroom, Deputy Zeider found three used syringes in an eyeglasses case.
He also found three spoons (one of which had a white residue) lying in various
places in the bedroom and four lithium batteries. In addition, Deputy Zeider
found lying in the open a pen with a straw attached that contained a white
residue later determined to be methamphetamine. Deputy Zeider also found
inside a purse a receipt from Walgreens showing that Jesse had been blocked
from purchasing a product containing pseudoephedrine on March 31.3
[9] Deputy Zeider testified as to the significance of each item he found in Dewitt’s
home with respect to how it is used in the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine or as a means to introduce methamphetamine into the body.
Deputy Zeider was permitted to testify, over Dewitt’s objection, that the
presence of ammonia gas in the fuel can indicated that methamphetamine had
been manufactured.4 He explained that “there is no other reason for it, for
3
In instances where an individual has already purchased the maximum allowed by law within a given time
period, the individual will be prohibited from making additional purchases of pseudoephedrine until the set
period elapses. When this occurs, the individual is blocked, i.e., prevented from completing the purchase.
4
The trial court sustained Dewitt’s objection to the State’s attempt to elicit testimony from Deputy Zeider as
to his opinion regarding Dewitt’s intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
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ammonia gas of [sic] being in organic solvent, none, whatsoever.” Transcript
Vol. 1 at 193.
[10] Prior to the search of the residence, Deputy Zeider, like Officer Dillon, had
reviewed the national pseudoephedrine database. He learned that Dewitt had
made at least fourteen purchases within the preceding twelve-month period and
that his most recent purchase was on March 26, 2015. As for Jesse, the
database showed that over the course of the prior twelve months, she had made
twenty-one purchases and had been blocked from purchasing on two occasions,
the most recent block occurring on March 31. Jesse was blocked from buying
pseudoephedrine because she had exceeded the maximum amount allowed to
be purchased by an individual, which is 3.6 grams in a day or 7.2 grams in 30
days’ time.5
[11] Believing the amount of pseudoephedrine purchased by Dewitt and Jesse was
significant, Deputy Zeider reviewed surveillance video recordings taken from
the security system at the Walgreens6 in Logansport. Deputy Zeider confined
his investigation to the times documented in the pseudoephedrine database as
the times Dewitt and/or Jesse purchased or attempted to purchase
pseudoephedrine from the beginning of 2015 up to March 31. In each of ten
instances reviewed by Deputy Zeider, Dewitt and/or Jesse can be seen entering
5
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-14.7(e).
6
Walgreens was not the only location identified in the database where Dewitt and Jesse had purchased
pseudoephedrine.
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the store and making or attempting to make a purchase at the pharmacy
counter.
[12] On April 1, 2015, the State charged Dewitt with Count I, dealing in
methamphetamine (by manufacturing), a Level 5 felony; Count II, possession
of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled
substance, a Level 6 felony; Count III, maintaining a common nuisance, a
Level 6 felony; and Count IV, possession of paraphernalia, a Class A
misdemeanor. A two-day jury trial was held on June 22 and 23, 2015. The
jury ultimately found Dewitt guilty as charged. At a July 16, 2015 sentencing
hearing, the trial court sentenced Dewitt to concurrent terms of six years on
Count I, two years each on Counts II and III, and one year on Count IV, for an
aggregate sentence of six years. Additional facts will be provided where
necessary.
Discussion & Decision
1. Admission of Evidence
[13] Dewitt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Officer
Zeider to give his opinion that the presence of ammonia gas7 in the Coleman
fuel container established that the substance therein had been used to
manufacture methamphetamine. We review the admission of evidence for an
7
Deputy Zeider relied upon the results of the Draeger test he conducted at the scene, which indicated the
presence of ammonia in the Coleman fuel can recovered from Dewitt’s residence.
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abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An
abuse of discretion occurs “where the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances.” Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.
2001).
[14] Indiana Evidence Rule 702 governs the admissibility of testimony by expert
witnesses. It provides that:
(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand or
to determine a fact in issue.
(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is
satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific
principles.
Evid. R. 702. The trial court acts as a gatekeeper when determining the
admissibility of opinion evidence under Rule 702. Estate of Borgwald v. Old Nat’l
Bank, 12 N.E.3d 252, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “The proponent of expert
testimony bears the burden of establishing the foundation and reliability of the
scientific principles.” Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
“In determining whether scientific evidence is reliable, the trial court must
determine whether the evidence appears sufficiently valid, or, in other words,
trustworthy, to assist the trier of fact.” Id. at 788 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n. 9 (1993)).
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[15] Dewitt does not challenge Deputy Zeider’s qualifications as an expert. Deputy
Zeider testified that he is a certified clandestine lab technician who received
training at Quantico, Virginia at the FBI Academy and who has years of
experience. Dewitt also does not challenge the reliability of the results of the
Draeger test Deputy Zeider performed, which test indicated that ammonia was
present in the Coleman fuel can. Dewitt’s argument is that the State presented
no scientific basis to support Deputy Zeider’s opinion that the presence of
ammonia indicated that contents in the fuel can had been used to manufacture
methamphetamine. More specifically, Dewitt argues that the presence of
ammonia gas inside the Coleman fuel container “does not reliably prove that
the liquid inside the can has been used to manufacture methamphetamine.”
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
[16] The trial court overruled Dewitt’s objection, finding that the State had
presented a sufficient foundation regarding Deputy Zeider’s qualification as an
expert and as such, he was permitted to testify and give his opinion. We agree
with the trial court’s assessment. As properly determined by the trial court,
Deputy Zeider’s training and experience qualified him as an expert witness.
Deputy Zeider testified about various tests, including the Draeger test, he
performed on the contents of the fuel can and the results thereof. It was
therefore permissible for Deputy Zeider to give his opinion, that based on his
training and experience, the presence of ammonia gas in the fuel can indicated
that the contents of the fuel can had been used to manufacture
methamphetamine. As noted above, Deputy Zeider explained that “there is no
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other reason for it, for ammonia gas of [sic] being in organic solvent, none,
whatsoever.” Transcript Vol. 1 at 193.
[17] The trial court correctly determined that Deputy Zeider’s opinion testimony
was subject to cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and/or
argument of counsel. Ultimately, the reliability of Deputy Zeider’s opinion was
an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. See Estate of Borgwald, 12 N.E.3d at
257 (quoting Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 2001))
(noting that “[o]nce the admissibility of the expert’s opinion is established
under Rule 702, ‘then the accuracy, consistency, and credibility of the expert’s
opinions may properly be left to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, argument of counsel, and resolution by the trier of fact’”).
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting Deputy Zeider to testify that based on the results of the Draeger test,
it was his opinion that the substance in the fuel can recovered from Dewitt’s
residence had been used to manufacture methamphetamine.
2. Constructive Possession
[18] Dewitt argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had
control over the contraband found inside his home. Our standard of reviewing
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is
well settled.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. The evidence—
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even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences drawn from it
are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. “[W]e
affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.
2004).
Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).
[19] Each crime for which Dewitt was convicted includes an element of possession
or control. Possession may be either actual or constructive. Actual possession
is proven by direct physical control. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835
(Ind. 1999). In the absence of actual possession, constructive possession may
support a conviction. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999).
Constructive possession requires proof that “the defendant has both (1) the
intent to maintain dominion and control and (2) the capability to maintain
dominion and control over the contraband.” Id. “Control in this sense
concerns the defendant’s relation to the place where the substance is found:
whether the defendant has the power, by way of legal authority or in a practical
sense, to control the place where, or the item in which, the substance is found.
See Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Allen v. State,
798 N.E.2d 490, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), trans. denied.
[20] Here, it is undisputed that Dewitt did not exercise exclusive control over the
house at 2209 East Wabash Road. Nevertheless, even where possession is not
exclusive, the law infers that a party in possession of the premises is capable of
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exercising dominion and control over all items on the premises. See Gee v. State,
810 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ind. 2004). In addition to evidence that Dewitt
emerged from the back of the residence in his gym shorts in order to restrain the
dog police encountered, the State also presented evidence through the national
pseudoephedrine database that each time Dewitt purchased pseudoephedrine,
the identification he provided to complete the transaction indicated that his
address was 2209 East Wabash Road. This evidence is sufficient to establish
that Dewitt had possession of the residence located at 2209 East Wabash Road
and therefore, had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the
premises and the contraband found therein.
[21] We next consider the intent aspect. To prove the intent element of constructive
possession, the State must demonstrate a defendant’s knowledge of the presence
of the contraband. See Armour v. State, 762 N.E.2d 208, 216 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), trans. denied. Where control over the premises is non-exclusive, as here,
knowledge may be inferred from evidence of additional circumstances pointing
to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. Such
additional circumstances include, but are not limited to, the following: (1)
incriminating statements by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive
gestures; (3) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest
manufacturing; (4) proximity of the contraband to the defendant; (5) location of
the contraband within the defendant’s plain view; and (6) the mingling of the
contraband with other items owned by the defendant. Macklin v. State, 701
N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “[A] substance can be possessed
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jointly by the defendant and another without any showing that the defendant
had actual physical control thereof.” Armour, 762 N.E.2d at 216 (citing Godar v.
State, 643 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied).
[22] Many of the items, including the plastic tubing, salt, lithium batteries,
ammonium nitrate, fuel container, and spoons with residue were visibly lying in
the main living area or the back bedroom. Although the nature of each item
may seem innocuous standing alone, taken together they suggest a
manufacturing setting consistent with the one-pot method for manufacturing
methamphetamine described by Deputy Zeider. Indeed, Deputy Zeider
explained that the plastic tubing was corroded in a manner consistent with
having been previously used in a methamphetamine lab and residue found on
the pen/straw device tested positive for methamphetamine. Two officers
testified that inside the residence they noticed the distinct smell of ammonia
that they associated only with the manufacture of methamphetamine. In
addition, used syringes and a straw/pen device with methamphetamine residue
were found in plain view in the residence.
[23] An additional circumstance suggesting Dewitt had knowledge of the presence
of items found within his residence is the significant amount of
pseudoephedrine-containing products he had purchased. Deputy Zeider
testified that in his opinion, the amount of pseudoephedrine products gave rise
to a suspicion of methamphetamine manufacturing. The State’s evidence
permits an inference that Dewitt knew of the presence of the contraband and
intended to exercise control over it. See Floyd v. State, 791 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind.
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Ct. App. 2003) (finding that evidence of furtive gestures, incriminating
statements, personal property in close proximity to contraband, drug
manufacturing setting supported inference that defendant had constructive
possession of the contraband), trans. denied.
3. Double Jeopardy
[24] Dewitt argues that his convictions violate the double jeopardy clause of the
Indiana Constitution. Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution
prohibits double jeopardy, providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense.” As our Supreme Court has explained:
In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999)[,] this Court
concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in
violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the
statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence
used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one
challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another
challenged offense. Under the actual evidence test, we examine
the actual evidence presented at trial in order to determine
whether each challenged offense was established by separate and
distinct facts. Id. at 53. To find a double jeopardy violation
under this test, we must conclude that there is “a reasonable
possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to
establish the essential elements of one offense may also have
been used to establish the essential elements of a second
challenged offense.” Id. The actual evidence test is applied to all
the elements of both offenses. “In other words . . . the Indiana
Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary
facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also
establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential
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elements of a second offense.” Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831,
833 (Ind. 2002).
Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013) (last alteration original).
Whether multiple convictions violate double jeopardy principles is a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 458 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005 (citing Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1166 (Ind. 2000)).
[25] Here, Dewitt was charged with and convicted of dealing in methamphetamine
by manufacturing under Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), which defines the crime
as “knowingly or intentionally manufactur[ing] methamphetamine.” I.C. § 35-
48-1-18 defines “manufacture” as:
the production, preparation, propagation, compounding,
conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural
origin, independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a
combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes
any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or
relabeling of its container.
[26] Dewitt was also charged and convicted of possession of chemical reagents or
precursors. In addition to proving that Dewitt “possess[ed] two or more
chemical reagents or precursors”, the State was required to prove, as with the
dealing charge, that he did so “with the intent to manufacture a controlled
substance.” See I.C. § 35-48-4-14.5.
[27] During the State’s closing argument, the State directed the jury that “the same
evidence [that] indicates intent to manufacture supports [the possession of
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precursors] charge as well.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 18. Dewitt argues the State’s
invitation that the jury consider the “same evidence” for both the dealing
charge and the possession charge created a reasonable possibility that the jury
used the same facts to reach both convictions. Dewitt thus argues that his
convictions for both dealing methamphetamine and possession of precursors
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
[28] Our precedents “instruct that a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the
jury used the same facts to reach two convictions requires
substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. State, 892
N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008) (citing cases). The reasonable
possibility standard “fairly implements the protections of the
Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and also permits convictions for
multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode
when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that
multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary
facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46. The existence of a
“‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of
whether the [fact finder] may have latched on to exactly the same
facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236. We
evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective and may
consider the charging information, jury instructions, and
arguments of counsel. Id. at 1234.
Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d at 719-20.
[29] During closing arguments, the State’s summary of the evidence as it related to
the dealing charge focused, in part, on the fact that the “finished product”, i.e.,
methamphetamine, had been found in Dewitt’s residence. Transcript Vol. 2 at
15. To prove that manufacturing had occurred, the State directed the jury to
consider Deputy Zeider’s testimony regarding a chemical synthesis—
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specifically, that anhydrous ammonia had been introduced into the organic
solvent. As evidence of Dewitt’s intent to manufacture, the State pointed out
that he had purchased a substantial amount of pseudoephedrine and asked the
jury to consider such evidence in light of Deputy Zeider’s testimony that the
amount Dewitt purchased was consistent with someone who was
manufacturing methamphetamine.
[30] With regard to the possession charge, the preliminary and final instructions
informed the jury that Dewitt had to have possessed organic solvent and
lithium metal.8 In closing arguments, the State noted the testimony and
evidence that organic solvent and lithium metal, which would have been
extracted from batteries, were found in Dewitt’s house. With regard to the
intent to manufacture element of the possession of precursors charge, we
acknowledge that the State invited the jury to consider the “same evidence.”
Transcript Vol. 2 at 18.
[31] Reading the State’s comment in context, leads us to conclude that the State
sufficiently parsed the evidence such that the intent element of both offenses
was the only element that was proved by the “same evidence.” Id. In
summarizing the evidence as it related to the possession of precursors charge,
the State noted the two specified precursors were found in Dewitt’s home. The
State then argued that Dewitt’s “intent to manufacture,” was established by “the
8
The charging information alleged that Dewitt possessed “organic solvent and ammonium nitrate.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 16.
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same evidence [that] indicates intent to manufacture supports [the possession of
precursors] charge as well.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 18 (emphasis supplied).
[32] Aside from the same evidence to establish the intent element of both offenses,
separate and distinct facts were required and relied upon by the State to prove
that manufacturing had occurred for purposes of proving the dealing charge.
Moreover, the State’s reference to the organic solvent in summarizing the
evidence in support of the dealing conviction was to show that a chemical
synthesis had occurred by virtue of the introduction of anhydrous ammonia
into it. The actual possession of the organic solvent was used to prove the
possession of precursors charge. In addition, for the possession charge, the final
instructions and the State’s closing argument directed the jury to find that
Dewitt also possessed lithium. Possession of lithium was not even suggested as
evidence supporting the dealing charge and was not necessary to support that
conviction in light of other evidence. We thus conclude that there was no
reasonable possibility that the jury considered the same evidence to establish all
of the elements of both offenses. There is no double jeopardy violation.
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[33] Dewitt vaguely challenges his convictions for maintaining a common nuisance 9
and possession of paraphernalia10 as being in violation of double jeopardy
principles. For the former, the State argued that there was evidence to prove
that manufacturing had occurred at Dewitt’s residence and further focused its
attention on the distinct odor in and outside the residence, which two law
enforcement officers described as associating only with the manufacture of
methamphetamine. With regard to the latter, the State pointed to the discovery
of used syringes in the bedroom as well as a straw device containing a white
residue that tested positive for methamphetamine. Given the separate and
distinct elements of each of these crimes and the State’s reliance upon separate
9
The crime of maintaining a common nuisance is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally maintains a building, structure, vehicle, or other
place that is used one (1) or more times:
***
(2) for unlawfully:
(A) manufacturing;
(B) keeping;
(C) offering for sale;
(D) selling;
(E) delivering; or
(F) financing the delivery of;
controlled substances, or items of drug paraphernalia as described in IC 35-48-4-8.5;
commits maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony.
I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(2).
10
To convict Dewitt of possession of paraphernalia, the State was required to prove that Dewitt possessed a
raw material, an instrument, a device, or other object that he intended to use for introducing a controlled
substance into his body. See I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3.
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and distinct facts to prove them, we conclude that Dewitt has failed to establish
a double jeopardy violation.
[34] Dewitt also argues that his convictions violate I.C. § 35-38-1-6, which
“reinforces” the prohibition of Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause that prohibits
a trial court “from sentencing a defendant for an offense and a lesser included
offense charged in separate counts.” Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind.
2001). Specifically, I.C. § 35-38-1-6 provides that if a defendant is charged with
an offense and an included offense in separate counts and is found guilty of
both counts, “judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant
for the included offense.” An “included offense” is defined as an offense that:
(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
than all the material elements required to establish the
commission of the offense charged;
(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
offense otherwise included therein; or
(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
establish its commission.
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168. A lesser-included offense is necessarily included
within the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense
without first having committed the lesser offense. Zachary v. State, 469 N.E.2d
744, 749 (Ind. 1984). If the evidence indicates that one crime is independent of
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another crime, it is not an included offense. Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006,
1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In other words, I.C. § 35-38-1-6 does not preclude
conviction and sentence for two offenses so long as each offense is established
by proof of an element not contained in the other. Ingram v. State, 718 N.E.2d
379, 381 (Ind. 1999).
[35] Dewitt’s argument is based on his claim that “[a]ll four counts alleged that
Dewitt was guilty because he used things to make and consume
methamphetamine on or about March 31, 2015.” Appellant’s Brief at 19.
Dewitt, however, overlooks the fact that different elements comprise each
offense. The elements of this dealing conviction include that a person
knowingly or intentionally manufacture methamphetamine. A conviction for
possession of precursors requires that one knowingly or intentionally possess
two or more delineated precursors. Manufacturing and possession are distinct
elements that are proved by distinct evidence. Thus, contrary to Dewitt’s claim,
his possession of precursors conviction is not a lesser included offense of his
dealing conviction.
[36] The offense of maintaining a private nuisance includes the distinct element of
maintaining a building, structure, vehicle, or other place, in addition to
unlawfully manufacturing, delivering, selling, etc. The offense of possession of
paraphernalia is established by possessing an instrument, device, or similar item
that is intended to be used to introduce a controlled substance into a person’s
body. Clearly each offense is established by different elements. Further, as
noted above in our double jeopardy analysis, there is no reasonable possibility
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that the jury would have relied upon the same evidentiary facts to establish the
elements of each of these offenses. Dewitt has not established that his
convictions violate I.C. § 35-38-1-6.
[37] Judgment affirmed.
[38] Robb, J. and Barnes, J., concur.
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