Robert J. Fiedler and Dianne C. Fiedler v. LaGrange County Regional Utility District (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 25 2016, 9:11 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John J. Schwarz, II John R. Gastineau
Schwarz Law Office, PC Larry L. Barnard
Hudson, Indiana Carson Boxberger LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert J. Fiedler and May 25, 2016
Dianne C. Fiedler, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Respondents, 44A03-1512-MI-2316
Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable Randy Coffey,
LaGrange County Regional Special Judge
Utility District, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Petitioner 44C01-1308-MI-56
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Robert and Dianne Fiedler appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) on the complaint filed
against them by the LaGrange County Regional Utility District (Utility
District). Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In February 2008, the Utility District entered into an agreement to provide
sewer services to the residences located around Shipshewana Lake. Some or all
of the funding for the sewer project was provided by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The Code of Federal Regulations requires
that the Utility District, having accepted USDA funding, was obligated to
comply with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Act (URA). 49 CFR 24.101(c)(1).
[3] For the Utility District to provide sewer services to the affected residences, a
grinder pump and other equipment had to be installed on each lot. The Utility
District notified the affected homeowners that it would install all necessary
equipment, at no cost to the homeowners, if the homeowners granted a
voluntary easement to the Utility District for the installation and maintenance
of the equipment. The Fiedlers owned a lot on Shipshewana Lake and declined
to grant a voluntary easement to the Utility District. Rather than proceed with
condemnation proceedings, as allegedly required by the URA, the Utility
District merely stated that it would not install the equipment, that the Fiedlers
would have to do so at their own cost, and that the Fiedlers were required to
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disconnect their private septic tank system by a certain date. At Utility District
meetings held on July 11 and August 8, 2012, an attorney for the Utility District
and a Board member told Robert Fiedler that the Utility District was not
required to comply with the URA. Appellants’ App. p. 70-72. The Fiedlers did
not comply with the directives issued by the Utility District.
[4] On August 22, 2013, the Utility District filed a complaint against the Fiedlers,
seeking an order to force the Fiedlers to connect to the District’s sewer line, to
discontinue use of their own private septic system, and to pay the costs and
attorney fees stemming from the litigation.1 The Utility District filed a motion
for summary judgment on March 6, 2014, and the Fiedlers, pro se, filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2014.
[5] The trial court held a hearing on the cross-summary judgment motions on
October 15, 2014. On October 24, 2014, the Fiedlers—newly represented by
counsel—filed a motion to amend their answer and to file counterclaims,
alleging for the first time that the Utility District was required—and failed—to
comply with the URA and acted fraudulently throughout its dealings with the
Fiedlers. On November 19, 2014, the trial court entered partial summary
judgment in favor of the Utility District, finding that the Fiedlers were required
to connect to the sewer system and reserving the calculation of damages, to
include attorney fees and hook-up fees, for a later proceeding. The Fiedlers
1
There were other named defendants in the Utility District’s complaint, but they are not participating in this
appeal.
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sought an interlocutory appeal of this order, but their appeal was eventually
dismissed.
[6] As the appellate proceedings were ongoing, counsel for the Fiedlers sought
documentation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Eventually, he
received the documents he had been seeking, which confirmed that the Utility
District was aware from the inception of the agreement with the USDA that it
would be bound by the URA.
[7] On October 22, 2015, the Fiedlers filed a motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), alleging that the fraudulent behavior of
the Utility District and/or newly discovered evidence warranted a ruling in
their favor. On November 25, 2015, the trial court summarily denied the
motions. The Fiedlers now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[8] The Fiedlers contend that the trial court erroneously denied their motion for
relief from judgment. In this case, the Fiedlers argue that they are entitled to
relief pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
On motion and upon such terms are just the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a judgment, . . . for the
following reasons:
***
(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including
without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by
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due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a motion to correct errors under Rule 59;
(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party . . . .
We review a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60 for an abuse
of discretion. Elliott v. Dyck O’Neal, Inc., 46 N.E.3d 448, 456 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015), trans. denied. We will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it as well as the
reasonable and probable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] The Fiedlers contend that, until they received documentation pursuant to their
Freedom of Information Act request, they were unaware and/or unable to
prove that the Utility District was required to comply with the URA. 2 We
disagree. The USDA’s website contains a wealth of readily accessible
information. Among other things, there is a “Water and Waste Processing
Checklist” setting forth the documentation that an applicant must provide to
receive USDA funding. Water and Waste Processing Checklist, RUS Bulletin
1780-6, http://www.rd.usda.gov/files/UWP-rb-06.pdf. That Checklist
references, in relevant part, the requirement that the applicant provide evidence
of “Right-of-Way and Easement,” “Evidence of Title to Assets,” and “Opinion
2
There is no dispute that at all times, the Fiedlers have known that the sewer project was fully or partially
funded by the USDA. Indeed, at a Utility District meeting, Robert Fiedler made abundantly clear that he
understood the role of the federal financing when he sharply questioned the Utility District attorney about
compliance with the URA.
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of Counsel Relative to Rights-of-Way.” Id. at p. 8. Each of these documents,
in turn, references a citation to the Code of Federal Regulations. 7 CFR
1780.44. A relevant section of the Code of Federal Regulations reads as
follows:
(g) Acquisition of land, easements, water rights, and existing
facilities. Applicants are responsible for acquisition of all
property rights necessary for the project and will determine
that prices paid are reasonable and fair. RUS may require
an appraisal by an independent appraiser or Agency
employee.
(1) Rights-of-way and easements. Applicants will
obtain valid, continuous and adequate rights-of-way
and easements needed for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of the facility.
(i) The applicant must provide a legal opinion
relative to the title to rights-of-way and
easements. Form RD 442-22, “Opinion of
Counsel Relative to Rights-of-Way,” may be
used. When a site is for major structures
such as a reservoir or pumping station and
the applicant is able to obtain only a right-of-
way or easement on such a site rather than a
fee simple title, the applicant will furnish a
title report thereon by the applicant’s attorney
showing ownership of the land and all
mortgages or other lien defects, restrictions,
or encumbrances, if any.
(ii) For user connections funded by RUS,
applicants will obtain adequate rights to
construct and maintain the connection line or
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other facilities located on the user’s property.
This right may be obtained through formal
easement or user agreements.
[10] 7 CFR 1780.44(g). In addition to these specific rules by which the applicant
must abide, the URA itself is explicitly applicable to projects receiving federal
financial assistance that require the acquisition of permanent and/or temporary
easements. 49 CFR 24.101(c)(1).3 As to what the URA itself does and does not
require, that analysis can be made based upon the text of the law and
regulations.
[11] We now turn to the specific claims raised by the Fiedlers. First, under Rule
60(B)(2), the Fiedlers argue that they are entitled to relief because of the newly-
discovered evidence they received as a result of their Freedom of Information
Act request. We acknowledge that they did not receive the documentation until
after the conclusion of the litigation. But they could have requested this
documentation long before they actually did.4 Moreover, the “evidence” to
which they direct our attention is not evidence at all. At the heart of their claim
is the applicability of the URA to the Utility District; this is an issue of law that
could have been answered without the documents on which they rely. We do
not find that they are entitled to relief on this basis.
3
The URA is adopted by the Rural Development branch of the USDA at 7 CFR Part 21.
4
We note that much or all of this documentation could have been procured during the discovery process,
had the Fiedlers requested it.
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[12] Second, under Rule 60(B)(3), they contend that they are entitled to relief
because of the Utility District’s alleged fraud or misrepresentation. Specifically,
they direct our attention to statements made by the Utility District’s attorney at
public meetings—the attorney stated that the Utility District was not required to
comply with the URA. They also point to statements made by the attorney
during a hearing before the trial court. To establish fraud under this rule, a
party must show (1) a material misrepresentation of past or existing fact; (2)
that was untrue; (3) that was made with knowledge of or in reckless ignorance
of its falsity; (4) that was made with the intent to deceive; (5) that was rightly
relied upon by the complaining party; and (6) that proximately caused the
injury or damage complained of. Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft, 825 N.E.2d 23, 30
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In this case, any alleged misrepresentation was one of
law, not of fact. And as stated above, the text of the relevant laws and
regulations are, and always have been, publicly available. Therefore, the
Fiedlers cannot be said to have reasonably relied on these statements.5 We find
no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion for relief from judgment
pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B).
[13] Finally, the Fiedlers argue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
have a hearing on their motion for relief from judgment. Trial Rule 60(D)
5
We acknowledge that through much of these proceedings, the Fiedlers were not represented by counsel.
We sympathize with their statement that they relied on an interpretation of law made by an attorney. But it
is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as practicing attorneys. Akiwumi v.
Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Therefore, this argument is unavailing.
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states that “the court shall hear any pertinent evidence[.]” It is well established
that “where there is no ‘pertinent evidence,’ a hearing is unnecessary.”
Benjamin v. Benjamin, 798 N.E.2d 881, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In this case, as
noted above, the primary issue is one of law. There was no “pertinent
evidence” that would have assisted the trial court in ruling on an issue of law.
Therefore, we find no error in this regard.
[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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