Todd A. Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

FILED
MEMORANDUM DECISION Jun 29 2016, 9:09 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paula M. Sauer Gregory F. Zoeller
Danville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Todd A. Brown, June 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
32A05-1510-CR-1748
v. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior
Court.
The Honorable Mark A. Smith,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Cause No. 32D04-1211-FC-146
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Appellant Todd Brown missed a pre-trial conference on the charge of driving
while privileges are forfeited for life. He contends, and the record validates,
that the prosecutor, the court, and his lawyer had reason to believe (including a
letter Brown sent the court) that his failure to appear was due to being
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incarcerated in the county next door. More than a year passed without any
action on the case.
[2] Brown contends his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move
for discharge under Criminal Rule 4.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The State charged Brown on November 13, 2012, and at Brown’s initial hearing
the same day, the trial court set a pre-trial conference for January 2, 2013. At
the pre-trial conference in January, Brown requested a continuance, which the
court granted. It rescheduled the pre-trial for March 6, 2013. At the March
conference, Brown again requested a continuance, and the court rescheduled
the pre-trial conference for April 10, 2013. On April 8, 2013, Brown filed a
motion to continue, requesting that the pre-trial conference be re-set in sixty
days. The court granted Brown’s motion and re-set the pre-trial conference for
June 5, 2013.
[4] Brown’s counsel appeared on June 5, but Brown did not. The court issued a
warrant for Brown’s arrest. Following the June 2013 pre-trial conference entry
and two inconsequential entries regarding the issuance of the warrant, there are
no entries in the CCS for over a year. The warrant was served on Brown on
June 13, 2014. On June 16, 2014, Brown appeared in court via video link from
the county jail. At that time, the trial court set a pre-trial for August 5, 2014.
From that date forward there were several pre-trial hearings and continuances
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ultimately concluding in a jury trial on August 25, 2015, at which Brown was
found guilty as charged.
Issue
[5] Brown raises two issues, one of which is dispositive: whether his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to request his discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal
Rule 4(C).
Discussion and Decision
[6] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish both
(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Johnson v. State, 948 N.E.2d 331 (Ind.
2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984)). To satisfy the first element, the defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that counsel’s errors were so serious that the defendant was denied the counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind.
2013). To satisfy the second element, the defendant must show prejudice; that
is, a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. There is a strong presumption that
counsel rendered effective assistance, and the defendant has the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Harris v. State, 762 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), trans. denied.
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[7] Specifically, Brown bases his claim on counsel’s failure to move for discharge
under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Criminal Rule 4(C) sets forth a one-year
time limit for bringing a defendant to trial that begins to run on the date the
defendant is arrested or charged with a crime, whichever is later. The rule
places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one
year. Gibson v. State, 910 N.E.2d 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The defendant is
under no obligation to remind the State of its duty or to remind the trial court of
the State’s duty. Id.
[8] Here, the State filed charges against Brown on November 13, 2012. Pursuant
to Criminal Rule 4(C), the State needed to bring Brown to trial by November
13, 2013. Between the date charges were filed and the June 5, 2013 pre-trial
conference where Brown failed to appear, three continuances caused delays
attributable to Brown. See id. (defendant extends one-year period by seeking or
acquiescing in delay resulting in later trial date). In this case, Brown’s
continuances extended the one-year trial period by 154 days, thereby making a
trial necessary, pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C), by April 16, 2014.
[9] At the June 5, 2013 pre-trial conference, Brown failed to appear, and the CCS
reflects no settings by the trial court from June 5, 2013 to June 16, 2014 when
Brown next appeared in court over a year later. By June 16, 2014, the one-year
period in which to bring Brown to trial had passed. At the June 2014 hearing,
the trial court set a pre-trial conference for August 5, 2014, and it is at this point
that Brown alleges his counsel should have moved for discharge.
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[10] A defendant waives the right to be brought to trial within one year by failing to
raise a timely objection if the trial court, acting during the one-year period,
schedules the trial beyond the time limit. Id. By contrast, a defendant has no
duty to object to the scheduling of a belated trial date if the scheduling occurs
after the year has expired. Id. Rather, in that situation, the defendant need
merely move for discharge. Pearson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993); see also Young v. State, 765 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Thus,
Brown is correct that his trial counsel should have moved for his discharge at
1
the June 2014 hearing or soon thereafter.
[11] Of course, a defendant cannot be allowed simply to abscond for a year and then
seek to benefit from his absence by invoking Rule 4. See, e.g., Feuston v. State,
953 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that when defendant
absconds, ensuing delay is caused by his act and Criminal Rule 4(C) clock is
tolled until court and State have actual knowledge of his whereabouts), declined
to follow on other grounds by Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013); see also
Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (defendant, whose case is
midstream in one county and who is subsequently arrested on unrelated charges
in another county, must provide formal written notice of his incarceration to
court and State to avoid tolling of one-year time limit), trans. denied.
1
Although the CCS shows that Brown appeared without counsel at the June 16, 2014 hearing, it also
documents notice of the August pre-trial conference setting to Brown’s counsel two days later on June 18,
2014.
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[12] We thus have examined what the State and the trial court knew concerning
Brown’s whereabouts. Brown’s unchallenged contention is that the State and
the trial court had knowledge of his whereabouts when he failed to appear for
the June 2013 pre-trial. At the conference on June 5, 2013, Brown’s counsel
explained to the court he had “a strange feeling that possibly Mr. Brown . . .
could be in the Marion County Jail.” Tr. p. 19. At the hearing on June 16,
2014, the State confirmed to the court what defense counsel suspected in June
2013: “It looks like, uh, prior to the failure to appear that he did send a letter to
the court advising that he was incarcerated.” Id. at 27.
Conclusion
[13] We conclude that Brown’s counsel performed deficiently in failing to move for
discharge. Accordingly, we reverse Brown’s conviction and order that he be
discharged.
[14] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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