Eddy L. Buchanan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

FILED
MEMORANDUM DECISION Jul 27 2016, 6:11 am
CLERK
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
this Memorandum Decision shall not be and Tax Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE1 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Eddy L. Buchanan Gregory F. Zoeller
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eddy L. Buchanan, July 27, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A05-1510-CR-1600
v. Appeal from the
Delaware Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. John M. Feick, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C04-1201-FA-2
1
Attorney Megan B. Quirk filed Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Brief, and Appendix, but she was thereafter
granted leave to withdraw, and defendant Eddy L. Buchanan now proceeds pro se.
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Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Following a bench trial, Eddy L. Buchanan (“Buchanan”) was found guilty but
mentally ill of having committed attempted murder,2 a Class A felony, and
criminal confinement as a Class B felony,3 and he was adjudged to be a habitual
offender.4 Buchanan appeals, raising the following two restated issues:
I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s rejection of Buchanan’s insanity defense; and
II. Whether the trial court properly sentenced Buchanan.
[2] We affirm.5
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In January 2012, Buchanan, his wife Ashley6 Chalfant (“Chalfant”), and
Chalfant’s three young children resided in a home in Muncie, Indiana. The
oldest, D.F., was seven years old at that time. On the morning of January 4,
2
See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1, 35-42-1-1(1). We note that the statutes under which Buchanan was convicted
were amended effective July 1, 2014; however, we apply the statutes that were in effect at the time he
committed his offenses in January 2012.
3
See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-3-3(a)(1) and 35-42-3-3(b)(2)(A).
4
See Ind. Code §35-50-2-8.
5
We note that Buchanan was also charged with and found guilty but mentally ill of having committed Class
D felony domestic battery, but the trial court did not enter judgment of conviction on that conviction due to
double jeopardy concerns.
6
We note that the record contains two spellings, Ashley and Ashely. We will use the spelling found in the
charging information, subpoena issued by the trial court, and transcript.
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2012, Buchanan awoke Chalfant and instructed her not to send the kids to
school that day. Chalfant was recuperating from having had back surgery in
December 2011, and she went back to sleep for a while longer. After she got
up, she and Buchanan argued, and he accused Chalfant of cheating on him with
the landlord and told her to take a shower. She managed to shower, although
had difficulty because of the recent back surgery, and then she made her way to
the living room and sat on the couch with two of the children, including D.F.
Buchanan and Chalfant continued to argue, and, at some point, Buchanan
threw a weight at her. He then retrieved a butcher knife from the kitchen and
stabbed Chalfant in the left arm. The children ran into a bedroom, and their
mother screamed for help. Buchanan stabbed Chalfant at least five more times,
while making statements to her such as “till death do us part” and telling
Chalfant that she “shouldn’t have cheated on him.” Tr. at 64, 67-68. He also
said that “he had two cousins that had killed their wives. And [she] was no
different.” Id. at 69. As Chalfant screamed to D.F. to get help, Buchanan
yelled to D.F., “[I]f you come out here, you’ll be laying on the ground like your
mom.” Id. at 93-94. At some point, D.F. needed to use the bathroom, so
Buchanan covered D.F.’s head and walked him out of the bedroom and to the
bathroom and back, while holding a knife to D.F.’s back.
[4] Buchanan moved a couch in front of the front door, to block entry or exit, and
then he ingested a bottle of Valium and passed out on that couch. Chalfant was
on another couch, bleeding profusely. Sometime after Buchanan was asleep or
unconscious, D.F. came out of the bedroom and ran around the house trying to
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find a phone. Eventually, D.F. kicked out a small playroom window – the only
window in the house without bars on it – and climbed out. He waved down a
vehicle, and the driver, later determined to be Mitchell Parks (“Parks”), stopped
and spoke to D.F., who was scared and crying. Parks called 911 and waited
until emergency vehicles arrived.
[5] Lieutenant Rick Eber (“Lieutenant Eber”) of the Muncie Police Department
arrived, along with other emergency personnel. From outside of the home, he
heard Chalfant faintly say, “I’m stabbed all over, I’m dying.” Tr. at 45. After
talking to D.F. and learning Chalfant and Buchanan were both still inside,
Lieutenant Eber kicked open the front door, because all doors were locked and
the windows barred, except the one small one. The door was blocked by the
couch, but police pushed it open and saw Buchanan lying on the couch, with
Chalfant injured and bleeding on another couch. Lieutenant Eber heard
Chalfant say, “Eddy stabbed me.” Id. at 49.
[6] Chalfant was transported to the hospital, where physicians determined she had
been stabbed at least six times, including wounds to the torso, upper left arm,
and the right side of her back. Chalfant lost approximately half of her blood
volume. She also sustained a fractured rib, laceration to the liver, puncture
wound to her left lung, and puncture wound to the pericardium.
[7] The State charged Buchanan with Class A felony attempted murder, Class B
felony criminal confinement, Class D felony domestic battery, and a habitual
offender sentence enhancement. Prior to trial, Buchanan filed a Notice of
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Defense of Mental Disease or Defect pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-3-
6. The trial court appointed board-certified psychiatrist Dr. Rebecca Mueller
(“Dr. Mueller”) and licensed clinical psychologist Dr. Frank Krause (“Dr.
Krause”) to evaluate Buchanan and file a report with the trial court. In March
2012, Dr. Mueller filed her report, in which she rendered an opinion that
Buchanan was not sane at the time of the offenses. Thereafter, in June 2012,
Dr. Krause filed his report, rendering an opinion that Buchanan was sane. The
three-day bench trial occurred in January 2015.
[8] At trial, both experts testified. In preparing her report, Dr. Mueller interviewed
Buchanan at the jail and reviewed his psychiatric records from Ball
Memorial/IU Health for the period of 2003-2011, which involved two
hospitalizations. State’s Ex. 38. She also reviewed Buchanan’s incarceration
records, which included information from the nursing staff, and she reviewed
the current charging information and probable cause affidavit. Id. During her
interview with Buchanan, he reported that he heard things in his cell that others
did not hear and that he saw things that others told him did not actually occur.
Her report emphasized such post-arrest psychosis, although Buchanan denied
having any prior history of delusions and hallucinations. Buchanan reported to
Dr. Mueller that his mother suffered from schizophrenia and that his maternal
uncles did, too. Dr. Mueller’s ultimate diagnosis of Buchanan was
“Schizoaffective, Depressed type,” noting “Of importance is the positive
correlation of his first degree family member having thought disorders across
the spectrum.” Id. Dr. Mueller concluded that Buchanan suffered from a
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mental disease or defect such that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct when he committed the crimes. Id.; Tr. at 175.
[9] Dr. Krause’s evaluation included a review of documents and videos, as well as
an interview, a medical history, psychological testing, and a substance abuse
screening. State’s Ex. 40. During the interview portion of the evaluation,
Buchanan told Dr. Krause that he had been off his medication and was suicidal.
He reported that he and his wife had been arguing on the morning in question
and that he stabbed her, and he also reporting putting the couch in front of the
door. He denied experiencing any hallucinations or delusions. Dr. Krause
administered the Personality Assessment Inventory (“PAI”) to Buchanan, and
Dr. Krause’s report stated that “[Buchanan’s] responses suggest that he is an
individual who is easily angered, has difficulty controlling the expression of his
anger, and is perceived by others as having a hostile, angry temperament.” Id.
Dr. Krause also found in his report that Buchanan tended to portray himself in
a negative or pathological manner, and “Some deliberate distortion of the
clinical picture may be present.” Id. Based on the PAI results, along with other
matters assessed during the evaluation, including prior history of antisocial
personality disorder, Dr. Krause diagnosed Buchanan as “malingering,” which
Dr. Krause described as when a person feigns a mental illness or reports
exaggerated symptoms and conditions. Id. Dr. Krause’s ultimate diagnosis
was: Bipolar II Disorder; Intermittent Explosive Disorder; Malingering; and
Borderline Personality Disorder. Id. Dr. Krause concluded that, although
Buchanan has these mental illnesses, Buchanan did not suffer from a mental
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condition that grossly and demonstrably impaired his perception and that
Buchanan was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of this actions on January 4,
2012. Id.; Tr. at 281-82.
[10] The State presented other witnesses, including police officers and Chalfant.
Thereafter, Buchanan testified in his defense. He testified to suffering from
bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress syndrome (“PTSD”) and to having
attempted suicide in December 2011. Following that attempt, he was in Ball
Memorial Hospital’s “psych ward” for a couple of weeks, until being released
on December 24, 2011. Tr. at 147. When asked about the stabbing incident on
January 4, 2012, Buchanan testified, “I don’t remember any of it at all.” Id. In
fact, he had no recollection of any of the day’s events, including waking up or
being in the hospital after the incident.
[11] Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon
to the trial court, and, on July 20, 2015, the trial court issued its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Conviction (“Order”), finding
Buchanan guilty but mentally ill on all counts, and it adjudicated him to be a
habitual offender.7 In reaching its guilty-but-mentally-ill decision, the trial court
recognized that it was presented with conflicting expert opinions, and it
accepted Dr. Krause’s expert opinion, while finding Dr. Mueller’s to be not
credible. The trial court explained in detail certain aspects of Dr. Mueller’s
7
We note that the trial court’s thoroughness in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of
Conviction, which was thirty-three pages in length, aided our appellate review.
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evaluation, report, and testimony that caused it to find her opinion and
conclusion not credible. Those included the following matters: First, Dr.
Mueller’s report emphasized Buchanan’s self-report of post-arrest hallucinations
in his jail cell. However, after she filed her report, she viewed Buchanan’s
videotaped interrogation with Detective Jami Brown, which occurred four days
after the incident. After viewing it, she noted in the margin of her report that
Buchanan’s psychosis “now N/A given investigator interview[,]” where
Buchanan did not mention any hallucinations to the investigator having
occurred, either at the time of the offense or after arrest. State Ex. 38. The trial
court found that Dr. Mueller’s note “calls into question and casts doubt upon
[Buchanan’s] self-report of post arrest hallucinations.” Appellant’s App. at 254.
[12] Second, the trial court observed that Dr. Mueller’s report and opinion rested
“entirely on the self-report of [Buchanan.]” Id. at 255. That is, her diagnosis of
“Schizoaffective, Depressed Type” was based, in part, on Buchanan’s report of
a family history, specifically he told her that his mother and maternal uncles
suffered from schizophrenia. State’s Ex. 38. The trial court observed that Dr.
Mueller “took no steps to corroborate this information.” Appellant’s App. at
255. Further, the trial court recognized that Buchanan’s reported family history
was inconsistent with that which he told Dr. Krause, as Buchanan initially
denied any family history to Dr. Krause and later told Dr. Krause that his
mother and aunts suffered from schizophrenia. Therefore, the trial court found,
Buchanan gave “three completely different and contradictory reports on family
history: none, mother and aunts, and mother and uncles.” Id. The trial court
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was troubled that, while Dr. Mueller had indicated that the family history was
“[o]f importance” in reaching her ultimate opinion, she did not take steps to
corroborate what Buchanan had told her. Id.; State’s Ex. 38.
[13] Third, the trial court noted that while “mental disease or defect” is defined by
law, Dr. Mueller on cross-examination was not able to accurately state the
appropriate definition of the phrase as it relates to the defense of insanity and
her opinion of that. The trial court found that Dr. Mueller’s definition of
mental disease or defect, which relied on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(“DSM”) “is not only incorrect, it is much broader than the statutory
definition” because it includes many mental diseases, such as personality
disorders, depression, anorexia, and others “that do not fall within the very
narrow definition of ‘mental disease or defect’ as it relates to the insanity
statu[t]e.” Appellant’s App. at 257-58. Because of her “unfamiliarity with this
fundamental and crucial definition,” the trial found that her opinion that
Buchanan, because of mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of his offense was “called into
question.” Id. at 258.
[14] Fourth, the trial court observed that, even if it were to accept Dr. Mueller’s
opinion that Buchanan suffered from Schizoaffective Disorder on the date in
question, she “did not offer any explanation as to how that disorder is in any
way connected to [Buchanan’s] ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
actions” or how that disorder impaired Buchanan’s perception of reality on the
day of the stabbing, noting that there was no evidence presented that Buchanan
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suffered from hallucinations or delusions on the day of the stabbing or any time
prior thereto. Id. at 259.
[15] In addition to explaining its reasons for discounting Dr. Mueller’s opinion and
conclusions, the trial court cited to other non-expert “demeanor-type evidence”
that supported Dr. Krause’s conclusion that Buchanan did appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct on the day in question. Id. at 264. For instance,
evidence was presented that Buchanan was angry on the day in question,
accusing Chalfant of having had sex with another man and ordering her to take
a shower. Chalfant complained about the water being cold, and she could not
adjust it herself due to the recent back surgery, and Buchanan became angrier.
They argued in the living room, where Chalfant accused him of taking money
from her purse, and Buchanan got a weight from another room and threw it at
her. He thereafter began stabbing her. He made statements during the stabbing
such as “till death do us part,” reminding Chalfant of her wedding vows. He
told her that he had cousins “who killed their wives, and they got away with it,”
demonstrating that he knew killing someone was wrong. Id. at 265; Tr. at 69.
He also covered D.F.’s head when he walked D.F. to the restroom and back to
the bedroom, thereby shielding him from seeing what Buchanan had done to
D.F’s mother, which the trial court viewed as an indication that Buchanan
recognized the wrongfulness of his actions.
[16] In addition, the trial court’s Order also found that Buchanan’s testimony was
“not credible.” Appellant’s App. at 262. Although Buchanan testified at trial to
having no recollection whatsoever of the events of January 4, 2012, when he
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met with Dr. Mueller on March 12, 2012, he recalled and related details of the
January 4 morning, including that he made a steak-and-eggs breakfast for
Chalfant, there was a steak knife on her plate, and they may have had a “knife
fight.” State Ex. 38. Similarly, Buchanan, when he met with Dr. Krause on
May 25, 2012, related details of the January 4 morning, including that he was
off his medication on January 4, he and Chalfant argued, he stabbed her, and
he put a couch in front of the door. Also, during the January 8, 2012 interview
with police, Buchanan stated that he and Chalfant argued about her having an
extramarital affair, he swung a knife at her, he took pills because he wanted to
die with Chalfant. The trial court found that Buchanan was “feigning memory
loss because he believes it is in his best interest to do so[,]” and the “feigned
memory loss is simply more evidence of malingering.” Id.
[17] The trial court ultimately concluded that Buchanan failed to prove that he was
legally insane at the time of the offense. However, the trial court concluded
that Buchanan was guilty but mentally ill of the charged offenses, and it
thereafter adjudicated him a habitual offender. At the subsequent sentencing
hearing, the trial court identified aggravating factors, which included: (1)
Buchanan had a history of criminal activity; (2) he violated the conditions of
parole when he committed the instant crimes; (3) Buchanan exercised a degree
of care and planning in the commission of the crimes as evidenced by having
the children stay home from school and, after he stabbed Chalfant, barricading
the door so that no one could help her; (4) the harm, injury, loss, or damage
suffered by Chalfant was significant and greater than the elements necessary to
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prove the commission of the offenses; (5) there were three prior attempts at
rehabilitation through supervised probation, parole, and incarceration that were
unsuccessful; (6) the facts of the instant case “are particularly disturbing”; and
(7) there appears to be a distinct pattern or similarity indicated by the violent
nature of Buchanan’s past criminal history. Tr. 315-16. The trial court also
identified mitigating circumstances that included: (1) Buchanan had “some
family backing and support”; (2) his “apparent repentant attitude”; (3) there
may have been mental vagaries in Buchanan’s reasoning, which he thought
tended to justify his actions, though they failed to rise to the level of a defense;
and (4) he acknowledged financial responsibility and a willingness to make
restitution to Chalfant. Id. at 316-17.
[18] After finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating ones, the
trial court imposed a sentence of forty years executed for attempted murder and
twenty years executed for criminal confinement, to be served concurrently.
Appellant’s App. at 274. The trial court enhanced Buchanan’s forty-year
sentence by thirty years for being a habitual offender, for a total sentence of
seventy years, to be served at a “correctional facility that offers some sort of
treatment or counseling to address his mental issues.” Tr. at 317. Buchanan
now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Insanity Defense
[19] Even when the State proves every element of a charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, a defendant can avoid criminal responsibility for that offense
by raising and proving an insanity defense. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699,
708 (Ind. 2010); Lawson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1273, 1278-79 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied. Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6 states:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited
conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the
offense.
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” means a
severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and
demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term does
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful
or antisocial conduct.
Mental illness alone is not sufficient to relieve a defendant from criminal
responsibility. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 708. Rather, a defendant must establish
both that he suffers from a mental illness and that this mental illness rendered
him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the
offense. Id. A defendant bears the burden of proving the insanity defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. A defendant who is mentally ill, but fails to
establish that he or she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct, may be found guilty but mentally ill. Id. As this court has observed,
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“[W]hile, all too often, horrific acts are irrational, this does not mean that the
perpetrator of those acts must be legally insane.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d
1080, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
[20] Buchanan asserts that the trial court erred when it rejected his insanity defense
and, instead, found him guilty but mentally ill. Because Buchanan bore the
burden of establishing his insanity defense, he is now appealing from a negative
judgment. When reviewing a negative judgment, this court will not reweigh
evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by
the trier of fact, even if more reasonable inferences arguably could have been
made. Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1279. A defendant appealing a rejection of his or
her insanity defense must demonstrate that the evidence is without conflict and
leads only to the conclusion that he or she was insane when the crime was
committed. Id.
[21] The question of whether a defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his
conduct at the time of the offense is a question of fact for the fact-finder to
determine. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709. Although Indiana Code Section 35-
36-2-2 provides for the use of expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in
determining the defendant’s insanity, the trier of fact has extremely wide
latitude and such expert testimony is merely advisory. Id. Our courts have
recognized, “When mental health experts who have examined a defendant offer
conflicting opinions on whether a defendant was insane at the time of the
offense, i.e. where one or more experts testify that the defendant was insane
while others testify that he or she was sane, such conflicting testimony generally
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‘is sufficiently probative of sanity.’” Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1273 (citing
Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710).
[22] Here, the trial court was presented with conflicting expert opinions as to
whether Buchanan appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct on January 4,
2012. Buchanan essentially argues that the trial court should have accepted Dr.
Mueller’s opinion of insanity over Dr. Krause’s opinion of sanity. However,
we cannot reweigh the testimony of the experts or reassess credibility. Lawson,
966 N.E.2d at 1280-81. Thus, here, the trial court as the fact-finder was free to
credit Dr. Krause’s opinion over Dr. Mueller’s. See Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1281
(jury was free to credit one doctor’s opinion that defendant was sane over other
doctor’s opinion that defendant was insane when he committed crimes).
[23] We observe that, even if the experts had agreed that Buchanan was insane, our
Supreme Court has held that “even unanimous expert testimony is not
conclusive on the issue of sanity.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709; Fernbach, 954
N.E.2d at 1086 (finding it was reasonable for jury to disregard insanity opinions
of expert witnesses), trans. denied. That is, a fact-finder may still reject an
insanity defense if there is “other evidence of probative value from which a
conflicting inference of sanity can be drawn.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 712.
Such evidence may include “demeanor evidence that, when considered in light
of the other evidence, permits a reasonable inference of sanity to be drawn.” Id.
In this case, the trial court explained that it considered not only the experts’
reports and testimony, but also demeanor evidence, which it found
corroborated a finding of sanity. In its Order, the trial court reviewed the
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events of the morning of January 4, which included Buchanan’s concern and
accusation that Chalfant had engaged an extramarital affair, his ordering her to
shower because “he thought [she’d] been with somebody that night,” their
ensuing argument, his first throwing a weight at her, then stabbing her. Tr. at
59. The trial court also noted that Buchanan made statements to Chalfant that
indicated he appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions, such as telling her his
two cousins “got away” with killing their wives, and Buchanan covered D.F.’s
head so he would not see what Buchanan had done to her. Id. at 69. From the
events of the morning, the trial court inferred that Buchanan “attacked []
Chalfant out of anger and revenge.” Appellant’s Br. at 266.
[24] Here, Dr. Krause’s report and testimony was probative evidence that Buchanan
was sane when he committed his crimes, which alone “is sufficiently probative
of sanity,” despite its conflict with Dr. Mueller’s opinion that he was insane.
See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710. Additionally, lay witness testimony was
presented, including Chalfant’s and D.F.’s, that corroborated the opinion that
Buchanan was sane. Accordingly, Buchanan has failed to establish that the
evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that he was insane
when the crime was committed.
II. Sentencing
[25] Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a written sentencing
order (“Sentencing Order”), and in it the trial court identified aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Finding that the aggravators outweighed the
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mitigators, the trial court sentenced Buchanan to forty years on the attempted
murder conviction, which the trial court enhanced by thirty years for the
habitual offender adjudication, for a total of seventy years on the attempted
murder conviction. As to the Class B felony criminal confinement conviction,
the trial court imposed twenty years, to be served concurrently with the
attempted murder conviction.
[26] As long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only
for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
aff’d on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Id. Examples of ways in which a trial court may abuse its discretion
include: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement; (2) entering a sentencing
statement that explains reasons for imposing the sentence but the record does
not support the reasons; (3) the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) the
reasons given in the sentencing statement are improper as a matter of law.
Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012). However,
[b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when
imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have
abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh such factors.
This is so because once the trial court has entered a sentencing
statement, which may or may not include the existence of
aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then impose any
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sentence that is authorized by statute and permitted under the
Indiana Constitution.
Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations
omitted).
[27] Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in
determining a sentence, Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that the appellate court
may revise a sentence authorized by statute if the appellate court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender. Id. “It is on this basis alone that a criminal defendant may now
challenge his sentence where the trial court has entered a sentencing statement
that includes a reasonably detailed recitation of its reasons for imposing the
particular sentence that is supported by the record, and the reasons are not
improper as a matter of law.” Id.
[28] On appeal, Buchanan argues that the sentence imposed was “inappropriate,”
asserting that the trial court did not consider Buchanan’s “inability to control
his behavior due to his disorder/impairment” or “any limitation of his
functioning,” as well as “the duration of his mental illness[.]” Appellant’s Br. at
15. Although claiming generally that the sentence is “inappropriate,”
Buchanan does not challenge his sentence with respect to his character or the
nature of his offense. He has therefore waived any argument that his sentence
is inappropriate. Ind. App. Rule 46(A)(8); Allen v. State, 875 N.E.2d 783, 788
n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
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[29] To the extent that Buchanan’s claim is that the trial court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider as a mitigator that he suffered from a mental
illness, we reject that claim. The trial court expressly identified the following as
a mitigating circumstance:
There may tend to be mental vagaries[] in [Buchanan’s]
reasoning, which he thought tended to justify his actions, though
they failed to rise to the level of a defense.
Appellant’s App. at 274; Tr. at 316. The Sentencing Order further expressly
addressed Buchanan’s mental health issues by recommending that “[Buchanan]
be placed in a correctional facility which offers some sort of treatment or
counseling to address [his] mental health issues.” Appellant’s App. at 274. Thus,
the record before us reflects that, when sentencing Buchanan, the trial court
recognized and considered that Buchanan suffered from one or more mental
illnesses.
[30] To the extent that Buchanan contends that the trial court should have afforded
his mental disease or defect more weight than it did, we reject that claim as
well. A trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, and, therefore,
a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion by failing to
properly weigh such factors. See Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009) (weight trial court gives to mitigating factors is not subject to
appellate review). Accordingly, Buchanan has failed to establish either that his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A05-1510-CR-1600 | July 27, 2016 Page 19 of 20
sentence was inappropriate or that the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him.
[31] Affirmed.
[32] Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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