Daniel L. Riddle v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 28 2016, 8:35 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Gregory F. Zoeller
Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Daniel L. Riddle, July 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A02-1511-CR-1980
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D01-1312-FC-100
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1511-CR-1980 | July 28, 2016 Page 1 of 7
[1] Daniel L. Riddle appeals the revocation of his direct placement in home
detention. Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s decision, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Riddle pled guilty to Class C felony operating a vehicle after a lifetime
suspension. 1 On August 11, 2014, the court sentenced Riddle to six years, with
two years suspended to supervised probation. The court ordered Riddle to
serve his executed time on home detention. Riddle entered home detention on
August 18, 2014, at which time he signed the rules thereof. Those rules
required him to abstain from alcohol and to not commit crimes.
[3] On April 18, 2015, Riddle argued with his girlfriend J.T. She wanted to leave
their house, but he insisted she stay to talk. He grabbed her arms with such
force that he left bruises on the underside of both her arms, and he pushed her
against a wall. J.T.’s nine-year-old son went outside the house, flagged down a
passerby, and asked for help because a man was beating up his mother. The
passerby called police, who responded to the scene. Police spoke to J.T., but
she did not report the battery or that Riddle had prevented her from leaving the
house.
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 (2013).
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[4] On April 21, 2015, Riddle again argued with J.T. After an hour of
disagreement, J.T. decided to leave. Riddle refused to let her leave, blocked the
door, and took her car keys. J.T. asked a friend, Susan, to call the police.
Susan told the police that Riddle was keeping J.T. in the house and had
physically assaulted J.T. on earlier occasions. Before the police could arrive at
their house, J.T. managed to leave the house with her son and walk to Susan’s
house. Police arrived and found Riddle home alone. Riddle provided a phone
number, and police contacted J.T. to determine her location. One officer
remained with Riddle while another went to meet J.T.
[5] J.T. met Officer Mench in the parking lot of a convenience store. Initially, J.T.
did not want to talk about what had happened. Officer Mench read the
statutory definition of criminal confinement to J.T., and then J.T. began to cry
and showed Officer Mench the bruises on the undersides of her arms that
Riddle inflicted on April 18. Officer Mench took pictures of the bruises. J.T.
explained how Riddle had kept her in the house on April 18 and April 21, and
had taken her car keys from her on April 21. While in Officer Mench’s car, J.T.
filled out a battery affidavit and a voluntary witness statement regarding the
events of April 18 and April 21, and Officer Mench witnessed them.
[6] Officer Mench radioed Officer Wells, who was still at J.T.’s house with Riddle,
and asked that he retrieve J.T.’s car keys from Riddle. Officer Wells confirmed
the car was registered only to J.T. He asked Riddle about the keys, and Riddle
produced them from his pants pocket. Police arrested Riddle.
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[7] On April 22, 2015, Riddle went to Community Corrections to see his Home
Detention Case Manager, Mary Addison. Riddle reported he spent the night in
jail after being arrested. He claimed “he didn’t confine [J.T.]. He blocked the
door so that she would not leave and she did anyway.” (Tr. at 29.) He also
“maintained that marks on her arm were left during a verbal confrontation.”
(Id.) Addison told Riddle he could return home if he was still allowed to stay
there, which he was. The next day, April 23, Addison summoned Riddle to
Community Corrections for a drug and alcohol test. Riddle admitted he had
consumed seven beers on April 22, and his urine sample tested positive for
alcohol.
[8] The State filed a petition to revoke Riddle’s placement in home detention. The
court held a hearing at which Officer Mench, Officer Wells, and Addison
testified to the facts as stated herein. J.T.’s voluntary witness statement and
battery affidavit were admitted into evidence. The court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Riddle violated home detention by
committing criminal confinement and by consuming alcohol, and it revoked
Riddle’s placement.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Trial courts have the authority to place convicted persons in home detention
rather than in the Department of Correction. State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d
775, 776-77 (Ind. 2015) (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-1-21(b) (2012)). “Home
detention may be imposed as either a condition of probation or as an alternative
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placement that is part of an offender’s community corrections program.” Id. at
777. Either way, the placement is a conditional liberty given at the discretion of
the trial court, and we review the trial court’s revocation thereof under the same
standard. Id.
A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove
an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the
evidence. When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, we
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—
without regard to the weight or credibility—and will affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial
court’s conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition
of probation.
Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
[10] The petition to revoke alleged Riddle violated his placement by consuming
alcohol and committing criminal confinement. 2 Riddle admits he consumed
alcohol, but argues the court would not have found that violation alone
“sufficient justification to revoke” his placement. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) We
need not address whether the court would have revoked Riddle’s placement if
2
Riddle notes “the original petition for revocation included the criminal confinement and domestic battery
cases only,” (Appellant’s Br. at 13), and the amended petition that included consumption of alcohol as a
violation was “filed on the day of the hearing.” (Id.) He does not, however, assert on appeal any error in the
amendment thereof; nor did he object to the filing of the amended petition at the hearing. Instead, he waived
the initial hearing on the amended petition and admitted consuming alcohol. (See Tr. at 3.)
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his only violation had been consumption of alcohol, as the record supports the
finding he violated his placement by committing criminal confinement.
[11] Riddle argues the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding
regarding confinement because neither he nor J.T. testified about the events
that occurred on April 21, 2015. 3 However, other evidence supported the
court’s finding.
[12] Criminal confinement occurs when a person knowingly or intentionally
confines another person without the other person’s consent. Ind. Code § 35-42-
3-3. “‘[C]onfine’ means to substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.”
Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1. During the revocation hearing, the State introduced into
evidence J.T.’s April 21, 2015 voluntary witness statement and battery affidavit.
The affidavit affirmed under the penalties of perjury that Riddle “grabbed my
arms” and that “touching resulted in bodily injury” to her. (State’s Ex. 2.) The
statement alleged:
Saturday 4/18/15 Daniel refused to let me leave, blocking the
door and grabbing ahold of me, Pushing me back against the wall
by my arms, (upper) Tuesday 4/21/15 Daniel and I were
arguing, I was tired of arguing and wanted to leave, he refused to
let me leave. Blocking the door.
3
In the midst of his sufficiency argument, in a one-sentence paragraph, Riddle states: “Moreover, the
criminal confinement and domestic battery cases were both dismissed on September 3, 2015. Tr. p. 53.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Riddle does not explain how that dismissal of criminal charges might be relevant to
our analysis of whether the evidence was sufficient to support finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that he confined J.T., and thus we need not address that issue.
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(State’s Ex. 3.) The State also introduced into evidence photographs of bruises
on J.T.’s arms. (State’s Ex. 5 & 6.) When combined with the testimony of
Officer Mench, Officer Wells, and Addison, the State presented sufficient
evidence to permit the trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Riddle interfered with J.T.’s liberty without her permission. 4 See Ransom v.
State, 850 N.E.2d 491, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (evidence of confinement
sufficient where accomplice holding a gun backed victim against a closed door,
victim believed the door was locked, and victim “did not feel free to leave”).
Conclusion
[13] The evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of Riddle’s placement in
home detention. Accordingly, we affirm.
Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.
4
Riddle notes most Rules of Evidence do not apply in revocation proceedings but “there still needs to be
some indication of the reliability of the source.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) Riddle does not cite authority to
support that quote; he does not set out a standard by which we determine if there is some indication of
reliability; nor does he seem to challenge on this basis any evidence besides the recording of the 9-1-1 call, to
which he did not object at the hearing. For all these reasons, any argument he intended to raise was waived.
See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (argument must be cogent and supported with citation to authority).
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