Robert A. Hutchens v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Sep 24 2015, 8:55 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robert A. Hutchens Miranda D. Bray
Carmel, Indiana Manley Deas Kochalski, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert A. Hutchens, September 24, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1503-MF-190
v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior
Court.
The Honorable Daniel J. Pfleging,
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 29D02-0904-MF-1651
Darden, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[1] Robert A. Hutchens appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to set
aside and vacate sheriff’s sale. We affirm.
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Issues
[2] Hutchens presents four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate
as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Hutchens’
motion to set aside and vacate the sheriff’s sale.
II. Whether BAC lacks the capacity to maintain an action
against Hutchens.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] This case began with the filing of a complaint to foreclose mortgage on April
14, 2009. BAC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, and,
following a hearing, the trial court granted BAC’s motion. Hutchens appealed
the grant of summary judgment, and, this Court, in a memorandum decision,
affirmed the trial court. Hutchens v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 29A02-
1010-MF-1085 (Ind. Ct. App. June 24, 2011). Hutchens sought transfer of this
decision, but the Supreme Court denied his petition.
[4] Later, on February 6, 2013, BAC obtained an order for sheriff’s sale from the
trial court, and a sheriff’s sale of the real estate was set for March 28, 2013.
Hutchens was served with notice of the sheriff’s sale on March 6, 2013. On
March 21, 2013, Hutchens filed a motion requesting the trial court to cancel the
March 28, 2013 sheriff’s sale stating that he received inadequate notice of the
sale. Hutchens argued that, pursuant to statute, he was entitled to receive
notice thirty days prior to the sale and stated that he received notice only
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twenty-two days prior. The trial court granted Hutchens’ motion to cancel the
March 28, 2013 sale.
[5] Subsequently, BAC obtained a second order for sheriff’s sale from the trial
court on March 25, 2014, and a sheriff’s sale was set for May 22, 2014.
Hutchens was served with notice of the sheriff’s sale on April 29, 2014. On
May 15, 2014, Hutchens filed a motion requesting the trial court to cancel the
May 22, 2014 sheriff’s sale based upon the same argument as presented in his
previous motion filed in March 2013. This time Hutchens alleged he received
notice only twenty-three days prior to the sale. The trial court denied
Hutchens’ motion. The sale proceeded on May 22, 2014, and BAC submitted a
bid and bought the real estate. On May 28, 2014, Hutchens filed with the trial
court a motion to set aside and vacate the sheriff’s sale. The trial court denied
Hutchens’ motion on March 16, 2015, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Denial of Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Sheriff’s Sale
[6] Hutchens contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside
and vacate the May 22, 2014 sheriff’s sale due to untimely notice. The vacation
of a sheriff’s sale is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Indi Invs., LLC
v. Credit Union 1, 884 N.E.2d 896, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “The law allows a
trial court to take a commonsense approach in deciding whether or not to
vacate a sheriff’s sale.” Id. In doing so, the court takes into consideration all
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circumstances, such as the inadequacy of the price, the effect of procedural
irregularities, the existence of inequitable conduct, the evidence of mistake or
misapprehension, and problems with title. Id. The trial court’s decision in this
regard is entitled to significant deference. Centex Home Equity Corp. v. Robinson,
776 N.E.2d 935, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[7] The crux of his argument is that an alleged procedural irregularity denied him
due process. Hutchens asserts that the trial court should have vacated the sale
because he did not receive sufficient advance notice. Particularly, he claims
that the sheriff’s sale statute mandates thirty days’ prior notice to the owner of
the real estate. Indiana Code section 32-29-7-3 governs notice of a sheriff’s sale.
The version of the statute that was in place at the time the complaint for
foreclosure was filed in this case provided, in pertinent part:
(d) Before selling mortgaged property, the sheriff must advertise
the sale by publication once each week for three (3) successive
weeks in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation. The
sheriff shall publish the advertisement in at least one (1)
newspaper published and circulated in each county where the
real estate is situated. The first publication shall be made at least
thirty (30) days before the date of sale. At the time of placing the
first advertisement by publication, the sheriff shall also serve a
copy of the written or printed notice of sale upon each owner of
the real estate. Service of the written notice shall be made as
provided in the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure governing
service of process upon a person.
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1
Ind. Code §32-29-7-3 (2008).
[8] The words of a statute are to be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning
unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself, and the language
employed is deemed to have been used intentionally. Schafer v. Sellersburg Town
Council, 714 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The plain language of
Indiana Code section 32-29-7-3(d) indicates that the notice of a sheriff’s sale is
to be served upon the owner of the real estate approximately thirty days before
the sale. However, the statute does not, as Hutchens asserts, mandate that
exactly thirty days’ notice is to be given to the owner of the real estate. With
this in mind, we look to the effect of the alleged procedural irregularity within
the given circumstances.
[9] Even assuming irregularity of the sheriff’s sale notice, the fact remains that
Hutchens had at least twenty-three days’ advance notice of the sale. Within
that period of time, Hutchens mailed to counsel for BAC on May 1, 2014, a
letter demanding that the May 22, 2014 sale be canceled. See Appellant’s
Appendix pp. 48-49. Further, on May 15, he filed with the trial court his
1
Previously in this case, the trial court granted Hutchens’ motion to cancel and vacate the sheriff’s sale of
March 28, 2013, when he argued that he had insufficient notice because he had less than thirty days’ notice of
the sale. According to Hutchens, the trial court erred when it subsequently denied his motion to set aside and
vacate the sheriff’s sale of May 22, 2014 for the same reason because, in doing so, it acted contrary to the law
of the case. He is incorrect. “The law of the case doctrine provides that an appellate court’s determination of
a legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate court in any subsequent appeal involving the same
case and substantially the same facts.” Think Tank Software Dev. Corp. v. Chester, Inc., 30 N.E.3d 738, 744
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Thus, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable here.
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motion to cancel and vacate the May 22, 2014 sale with supporting
memorandum of law and affidavit.
[10] Moreover, this case has been pending since April 2009, with summary
judgment having been granted to BAC and entered of record in September 2010
and affirmed on appeal in June 2011. In addition, the property was advertised
for sheriff’s sale in March 2013, and, through Hutchens’ filings with the trial
court and argument that he had only received twenty-two days’ notice, the
March 2013 sale was canceled. However, the CCS shows that following the
cancellation of the first scheduled sheriff’s sale, the trial court conducted a
status conference on April 4, 2013, at which Hutchens appeared in person and
participated. At the status conference, the trial court inquired as to whether
BAC intended to schedule another sheriff’s sale. BAC responded that it
planned to set another sheriff’s sale, and possible dates for the sale were
discussed in Hutchens’ presence. Thus, Hutchens was fully aware that BAC
intended to sell the property at a subsequent sheriff’s sale. Further, in spite of
all of Hutchens’ procedural maneuvering, we have not been made aware of any
evidence to demonstrate that he has been harmed by less than thirty days’
notice of the sheriff’s sale or that he has the ability to redeem the property even
if the sheriff’s sale was set aside. Given the totality of the circumstances of this
case and the principles of common sense, we find that Hutchens had adequate
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notice of the sale, and any irregularity in the notice is harmless and is not
2
grounds for setting aside the May 22 sheriff’s sale.
II. BAC’s Capacity to Maintain Action
[11] Hutchens additionally argues that BAC does not have the legal capacity to
maintain this action against him. Indiana Trial Rule 9(A) provides that “[t]he
burden of proving lack of such capacity [to sue], authority, or legal existence
shall be upon the person asserting lack of it, and shall be pleaded as an
affirmative defense.” Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) states that responsive pleadings
shall set forth affirmatively all affirmative defenses. Failure to do so results in
waiver. Molargik v. W. Enters., Inc., 605 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993).
[12] The burden of pleading and proving this affirmative defense lies with Hutchens.
However, he neither asserts nor provides any evidence that he raised lack of
capacity as an affirmative defense in his responsive pleading in the trial court as
required by the trial rules. Instead, in an effort to avoid waiver, Hutchens
points to his filing of a motion to dismiss the original complaint in 2009. In his
reply brief, he refers to his 2009 motion to dismiss as a responsive pleading and
claims that in it he raised the issue of BAC’s capacity to maintain this action.
2
Hutchens asserts that his rights under both the federal and Indiana Constitutions as well as the Civil Rights
Act were violated. His argument is based solely upon his contention that the sheriff’s sale statute mandates,
at a minimum, thirty days’ notice to the owner. Because we recognize that the statute does not mandate a
specific time period and that Hutchens’ twenty-three days’ advance notice is not grounds for setting aside the
sheriff’s sale in this case, we need not address the constitutional claims he raises.
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We have not been provided with these documents on appeal; however, we are
able to glean some pertinent information from the CCS which shows that on
November 19, 2009, Hutchens filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
original complaint for failure to name and prosecute in the name of the real
party in interest. Appellant’s App. pp. 5-6. At that time, the named plaintiff
was Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. On February 22, 2010,
however, Countrywide filed its response to Hutchens’ motion to dismiss as well
as a motion to amend its name to BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. The trial
court granted Countrywide’s motion to amend four days later on February 26,
2010. Id. at 9.
[13] Subsequently, Hutchens raised the issue of whether BAC was a real party in
interest when he appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of BAC on its foreclosure claim. A panel of this Court discussed Countrywide’s
motion to amend and the amendment naming BAC as the plaintiff and
concluded that BAC was authorized to pursue the foreclosure claim against
Hutchens. See Hutchens, No. 29A02-1010-MF-1085, slip op. p. 4 n.2 and pp. 6-
8. Allowing Hutchens’ claim to continue in the instant appeal would allow him
the possibility of endless litigation over BAC’s capacity to maintain this action.
This issue went to judgment and was affirmed on appeal and cannot now be
resurrected and relitigated; to do so would be to contravene the doctrine of res
judicata.
[14] Therefore, Hutchens has waived this issue by failing to plead it as an affirmative
defense in his responsive pleading in the instant matter. Waiver
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notwithstanding, the issue has been finally determined and may not be
relitigated.
Conclusion
[15] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hutchens’ motion to set aside and vacate the sheriff’s sale.
Further, the issue of whether BAC has the capacity to maintain an action
against Hutchens has been waived and, waiver aside, has already been litigated
to a final determination.
[16] Affirmed.
[17] Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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