Aryan Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 01 2019, 8:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jason S. Gray Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Certified Legal Intern Attorney General of Indiana
Joel M. Schumm Caryn N. Szyper
Appellate Clinic Deputy Attorney General
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney Indianapolis, Indiana
School of Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Aryan Taylor, May 1, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2604
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Christina
Appellee-Plaintiff. Klineman, Judge
The Honorable Marshelle Dawkins
Broadwell, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1807-F6-23021
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] On July 15, 2018, officers responded to an altercation between Aryan Taylor
and his on-again, off-again girlfriend B.H. Upon arriving, the officers observed
Taylor dragging B.H. down a driveway first by her dress and then by her hair.
As a result of Taylor’s actions, B.H. suffered injuries to her knee and hand. The
next day, the State charged Taylor with three counts. The first two counts were
dismissed during trial pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). Taylor was found guilty of
the third count, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. On
appeal, Taylor contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction and that the trial court erred in referring to the first two counts as
“dismissed” on its sentencing order. We affirm and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 15, 2018, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers Randall Koehn
and Nathan Quinn responded to a reported altercation. When they arrived,
they observed Taylor dragging B.H. down a driveway by her dress. After losing
his grip on her dress, Taylor continued to drag B.H. down the driveway by her
hair. Taylor released B.H. after being instructed to stop by Officers Koehn and
Quinn. Officers Koehn and Quinn observed fresh injuries to B.H.’s knee,
which was bleeding, and hand.
[3] On July 16, 2018, the State charged Taylor with Level 6 felony kidnaping
(“Count I”), Class A misdemeanor domestic battery (“Count II”), and Class A
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misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury (“Count III”). The trial court
conducted a bench trial on September 27, 2018. Following the conclusion of
the State’s presentation of evidence, Taylor moved for an involuntary dismissal
of the charges pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). The trial court granted Taylor’s
motion with regard to Counts I and II and denied the motion with regard to
Count III. The trial court subsequently found Taylor guilty of Class A
misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury and sentenced him to a sixty-day
term of incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Taylor raises two contentions on appeal. First, he contends that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting
in bodily injury. Second, he contends that the trial court erred by referring to
Counts I and II on its sentencing order as “dismissed.”
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[5] Taylor contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.
We do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of
witnesses when reviewing a conviction for the sufficiency of the
evidence. We view all evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the conviction, and will
affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value
supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation and quotation
omitted).
[6] A person commits Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury when
he knowingly or intentionally “touches another person in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner” and the touching “results in bodily injury to any other person.”
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c), (d). In challenging his conviction, Taylor argues that
the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. Alternatively, he argues that
the State failed to prove that his actions resulted in bodily injury to B.H.
1. Rebuttal of Self-Defense Claim
[7] A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal
justification for an otherwise criminal act. In order to prevail on
such a claim, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place
where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or
participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear
of death or great bodily harm. When a claim of self-defense is
raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden
of negating at least one of the necessary elements. If a defendant
is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will
reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense
was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In any
event, a mutual combatant, whether or not the initial aggressor,
must declare an armistice before he or she may claim self-
defense.
Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800–01 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same standard for any
sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Id. at 801.
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[8] While Taylor argues that B.H. was the initial aggressor, the evidence most
favorable to the verdict indicates that Taylor was the only aggressor observed by
Officers Koehn and Quinn. Officers Koehn and Quinn observed Taylor
dragging B.H. down a driveway by first her dress and then by her hair. In
addition, regardless of who was the initial aggressor, by the time Officers
Koehn and Quinn arrived, Taylor was, at the very least, a mutual combatant in
the altercation. Thus, before Taylor could successfully claim self-defense, he
must have declared an armistice. Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) (“[A]
person is not justified in using force if … the person has entered into combat
with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from
the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the
other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”).
Taylor did not do so. The State’s evidence, therefore, successfully rebuts
Taylor’s self-defense claim. Taylor’s argument to the contrary effectively
amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See
Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726.
2. Bodily Injury
[9] “‘Bodily injury’ means any impairment of physical condition, including pain.”
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29. There is “no requirement that the pain be of any
particular severity, nor does [the statute] require that the pain endure for any
particular length of time.” Toney v. State, 961 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012). “It must simply be physical pain.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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[10] Taylor asserts that “the State’s burden of proving pain beyond a reasonable
doubt was not met because [B.H.] did not testify to having any pain.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 13. As we have previously noted, “[t]he State need not
present direct evidence to support each element of a crime, and it has long been
held that circumstantial evidence will support a conviction.” Semenick v. State,
977 N.E.2d 7, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439
(Ind. 2000) (emphasis in original). The circumstantial evidence in this case is
sufficient to support the reasonable inference that Taylor’s actions caused B.H.
to suffer pain.
[11] Contrary to B.H.’s testimony that “[n]one of [the alleged acts] happened,” tr. p.
8, Officers Koehn and Quinn testified about the portion of the altercation
between Taylor and B.H. that they observed. Upon arriving at the scene of the
disturbance, Officer Koehn heard B.H. screaming and observed Taylor
“dragging [B.H.] by her dress down the driveway,” tr. p. 14, “dragging her to
where her feet and her legs were dragging on the ground as he was walking with
her.” Tr. p. 19. When Taylor “lost his grip” on B.H., B.H. fell “to the
driveway on her hands and knees.” Tr. p. 19. Taylor then “grabbed [B.H.] by
the hair and continued to pull her down the driveway.” Tr. p. 19. As a result
of being dragged down the driveway, B.H. suffered an injury to her knee that
“was actively bleeding” and an injury to her hand. Tr. p. 22.
[12] In making inferential decisions, the fact-finder applies its “experiences in life”
and “common sense” as it “takes into account all of the facts and
circumstances.” McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 163 (Ind. 2017) (internal
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quotations and brackets omitted). Common sense would dictate that one who
suffers an injury significant enough to cause “active bleeding” also suffers pain.
Common sense would also dictate that one would also suffer pain as a result of
being dragged by the hair and that screaming is a frequent indicator of pain.
Thus, the circumstantial evidence supports the reasonable inference that
Taylor’s actions caused B.H. to suffer pain and, as a result, the evidence is
sufficient to prove that Taylor’s rude, insolent, or angry touching of B.H.
resulted in bodily injury to B.H. Taylor’s claim to the contrary again amounts
to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
See Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 726.
II. Sentencing Order
[13] Taylor also contends that the trial court erred by indicating on its sentencing
order that Counts I and II were “dismissed.” Following the conclusion of the
State’s presentation of evidence, Taylor moved for an involuntary dismissal
pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). The trial court granted Taylor’s motion as to
Counts I and II and the trial continued on Count III. Taylor argues that
because relief under Trial Rule 41(B) operates as an adjudication upon the
merits, the trial court’s sentencing order should reflect a “not guilty” verdict on
Counts I and II. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. For its part, the State argues that the
trial court did not err given that the plain language of Trial Rule 41(B) refers to
relief granted thereunder as a “dismissal.” Appellee’s Br. p. 18.
[14] Trial Rule 41(B) provides as follows:
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After the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof upon an
issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing
party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the weight of the evidence and the law there has been
shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff or
party with the burden of proof, the court, when requested at the
time of the motion by either party shall make findings if, and as
required by Rule 52(A). Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision or
subdivision (E) of this rule and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
(Emphasis added). We agree with the State and conclude that because the
plain language of Trial Rule 41(B) refers to relief granted thereunder as a
dismissal, the trial court did not err in indicating on the sentencing order that
Counts I and II were “dismissed.” However, the plain language of Trial Rule
41(B) further indicates that unlike general dismissals which allow for the refiling
of the dismissed charges, dismissals pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B) act as an
adjudication on the merits, precluding the refiling of charges. We therefore,
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions for the court to amend the
sentencing order to indicate that Counts I and II were dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B).
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[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the matter remanded with
instructions.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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