In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.P. (Minor Child) and R.P. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Aug 01 2019, 7:56 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kristin Szczerbik Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrence County Public Attorney General of Indiana
Defender Agency Robert J. Henke
Bedford, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination August 1, 2019
of the Parent–Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: J.P. (Minor Child) 19A-JT-421
and Appeal from the Lawrence
Circuit Court
R.P. (Father),
The Hon. Andrea K. McCord,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
The Hon. Nathan G. Nikirk,
v. Juvenile Referee
Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of Child
47C01-1810-JT-367
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] J.P. (“Child”) was born on May 13, 2011, to R.P. (“Father”) and A.C.
(“Mother”1) (collectively, “Parents”). In May of 2015, Child was living with
Mother and was removed from her home following a violent altercation
between Mother and another woman over drugs and money. The Indiana
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Child adjudicated a
child in need of services (“CHINS”), and the juvenile court did so. Despite
some initial compliance with ordered services, Father relapsed on
methamphetamine in September of 2016, which ultimately resulted in the
revocation of the probation he was serving at the time and incarceration.
Following Father’s incarceration, he did not engage with DCS again or
complete any services. Following an arrest in February of 2017, Father also
stopped participating in visitation.
[2] In October of 2018, DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights
to Child (“TPR Petition”). A hearing was held in January of 2019, at which
Father testified that he had failed to engage with DCS due to incarceration,
homelessness, and/or indigency. The DCS family case manager (“FCM”) and
Child’s court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) both testified that
termination was in Child’s best interests and that DCS’s permanency plan was
for adoption of Child by his current foster parents. On January 24, 2019, the
1
Mother does not participate in this appeal.
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juvenile court ordered termination of Father’s parental rights to Child. Father
contends that the juvenile court’s judgment is clearly erroneous and that DCS
denied him due process by failing to provide him with adequate access to
services. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Child was born on May 13, 2011, to Parents. On June 1, 2015, Child was
removed from Parents’ care following an altercation between Mother and
another woman over drugs and money. Child was placed with relatives of
Mother’s, where he remains. On June 3, 2015, DCS petitioned to have Child
adjudicated a CHINS. On June 26, 2015, the State charged Father with Level 6
felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony criminal confinement in cause
number 47D01-1506-F6-727 (“Cause No. 727”). On September 2, 2015, the
juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered that Parents complete
several services. The same day, Father pled guilty as charged in Cause No. 727
and was sentenced to two and one-half years of incarceration with one and one-
half suspended to probation.
[4] On December 8, 2015, the juvenile court issued an order indicating, inter alia,
that Parents had not enhanced their abilities to parent Child, complied with
services, or visited Child. The juvenile court noted that Father had neither
remained in contact with DCS nor completed a substance-abuse evaluation.
The juvenile court issued another periodic case review on March 9, 2016, in
which it noted that Parents were now compliant with Child’s case plan and
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cooperating with DCS. On September 2, 2016, the juvenile court’s periodic
case review indicated that Mother was no longer compliant with Child’s case
plan, although Father still was. The permanency plan for Child was still
reunification, with a projected date of December 1, 2016.
[5] On September 29, 2016, Father tested positive for methamphetamine,
marijuana, and tramadol and was arrested. On October 3, 2016, Father
admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation in Cause No. 727 and
was released four days later, and, on November 16, the trial court re-imposed
Father’s suspended sentence of 451 days. Also on November 16, 2016, the
juvenile court found that Father was no longer compliant with Child’s case plan
due to his arrest and incarceration.
[6] On March 8, 2017, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. By this time,
Child had been removed from Father’s care for approximately twenty-three
months. The juvenile court found that Father was not in compliance with the
case plan because he had been incarcerated for violation of the terms of his
probation in Cause No. 727 from September 29 to October 7, 2016. The court
changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan of reunification and
adoption. On March 15, 2017, Father admitted that he had again violated the
terms of his probation in Cause No. 727, and the trial court ordered that he
execute his previously-suspended sentence. Father was released from
incarceration in July of 2017.
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[7] On August 23, 2017, the juvenile court held another permanency hearing.
Child had been in the same relative placement for over two years and was
progressing well. The juvenile court also found that Father had completed a
portion of the Crossover drug-rehabilitation program while incarcerated.
Father, however, had failed to set up the post-incarceration portion of the
program, missed an appointment with Centerstone, and had no contact with
DCS upon his release from incarceration. While Father had made one
unsuccessful attempt to contact DCS, he could not provide reliable contact
information and had made no further attempts. Following the hearing, the
juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.
[8] On January 10, 2018, the juvenile court held a review hearing. The juvenile
court found that Father had not complied with Child’s case plan, had not
participated in any services or maintained contact with DCS, had not enhanced
his ability to fulfill his parental obligations, had not visited Child, and had not
cooperated with DCS. On June 28, 2018, the State charged Father with Level 6
felony domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor intimidation in cause
number 36COl-1806-F6-269 (“Cause No. 269”).
[9] On September 19, 2018, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. The
juvenile court found that Child had been in the same relative placement for
approximately twenty-seven months and was progressing well in his placement.
The juvenile court also found that Father had not complied with Child’s case
plan. The juvenile court found that it was “most appropriate and consistent”
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with Child’s best interests “to have a proceeding to terminate the parent–child
relationship and be placed for adoption.” Ex. Vol. p. 58.
[10] On September 27, 2018, the State charged Father with Level 6 felony marijuana
possession, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Class C
misdemeanor paraphernalia possession in cause number 40C01-1809-F6-359
(“Cause No. 359”). Father was arrested in Cause No. 359 on October 24, 2018.
Meanwhile, on October 16, 2018, Father had pled guilty in Cause No. 269 to
intimidation, and the trial court sentenced him to 365 days of incarceration
with 235 days suspended. On October 30, 2018, DCS filed its TPR Petition.
On November 26, 2018, the State charged Father with Class B misdemeanor
marijuana possession in cause number 40D01-1811-CM-597 (“Cause No.
597”). Eventually, a bench trial was set for February 28, 2019.
[11] On January 18, 2019, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the TPR Petition. At the hearing, Father testified that had been incarcerated in
Jennings County in Cause No. 359 for approximately four months and that he
had stopped engaging with DCS after relapsing with methamphetamine in
2016. Father had, in fact, been incarcerated for approximately fourteen out of
the previous twenty-four months, including incarceration in Jackson County for
intimidation in Cause No. 269. Father testified that he had been living in his
car prior to his Jackson County incarceration, that he had not visited with Child
in more than eighteen months, and that he had not engaged in services when he
was not incarcerated because he was homeless.
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[12] According to Child’s foster mother, when he was placed with her in June of
2015, he was terrified, severely behind regarding things he should have known
for a child his age, and he had a severe speech delay. As of the day of the
termination hearing, his foster mother described Child as smart, very social,
and funny. Child’s foster mother testified that she believed it was in Child’s
best interests to stay with her and her husband and agreed that it would be
detrimental to Child “if this process is drug on longer.” Tr. Vol. II p. 95. Child
has never asked about Father.
[13] FCM Melissa Sears testified that Child has been in the same relative placement
for approximately three and one-half years and has never been returned to
either Parent’s care. After Father’s arrest for using methamphetamine and
marijuana and subsequent release in the fall of 2016, he stopped engaging in
random drug screens and quit his individual therapy. While Father continued
visits until he was arrested again in February of 2017, he has not visited Child
since. FCM Sears never received any communication from Father but
eventually found him incarcerated in September of 2018 after searching for
several months. FCM Sears went to the jail to serve Father a summons but was
not permitted to see him. FCM Sears left her card for Father but never heard
back. FCM Sears testified that Father did not maintain contact with DCS,
inform DCS of any changes of address, inform DCS of his arrests or criminal
charges, maintain appropriate housing, complete a substance abuse assessment,
or obey the law.
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[14] As for Child’s progress, FCM Sears testified that he was doing well in current
placement and was engaging in therapy to address some issues with acting out.
Child had developed a good routine in his foster placement and called his foster
parents “mom” and “buddy.” Tr. p. 71. DCS’s plan was for Child to be
adopted by his foster family. FCM Sears testified that it is in Child’s best
interests to terminate Parents’ parental rights and for him to be adopted because
he needs stability, is receiving the care he needs in his foster placement, and has
been in the same stable and loving home for the past three and one-half years.
[15] Child’s CASA Paul Smoot tried to contact Father during the CHINS case but
was not successful. Father’s own legal counsel did not have Father’s contact
information. CASA Smoot had had contact with Child at least fifteen times in
the nineteen months since his appointment in his foster home, at his school
when Child was playing basketball, and at a birthday party outside the foster
home. CASA Smoot observed that Father had not adhered to the court-ordered
services, and, after Father was released from one of his incarcerations, he
“disappeared for over a year where nobody could find him until DCS located
him in the Jackson County Jail, once again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. CASA Smoot
testified that it was in Child’s best interests for the juvenile court to terminate
Parents’ parental rights to Child. In CASA Smoot’s opinion, adoption by
Child’s current foster family is in his best interests, because they have provided
him with a loving, stable home in which he has continued contact with other
members of his extended family.
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[16] On January 24, 2019, the court ordered termination of Parents’ parental rights
to Child. The juvenile court’s termination order provides, in part, as follows:
1. On June 1, 2015, [Child] was removed from Mother and
Father on an emergency basis due to allegations of abuse and/or
neglect.
2. Father has been incarcerated 14 of the last 24 months and
Father had issues of homelessness prior to his incarceration.
3. Father has not kept in contact with DCS and has not
visited with the child since February, 2017.
[…]
6. The child was placed on June 1, 2015 with the foster
family with whom he [] still resides. The foster family is pre-
adoptive and desires to move forward with said adoption.
7. The parents have failed to participate with DCS services
and have failed to comply with the dispositional decree.
8. Mother and Father have had substantial issues with
homelessness and drug abuse.
9. [Child] is extremely bonded with his foster placement, his
siblings in the foster home, and his environment.
10. The CASA is Mr. Paul Smoot.
11. The CASA testified that [Child] is well cared for by his
foster family and that [Child] is doing very well.
12. The CASA has been involved in this case since June,
2017. During that time period the CASA made approximately
15 visits to see the child in Greenwood, Indiana and the CASA
attended all Court hearings.
13. The CASA has also talked extensively with [Child]’s
school teachers, school counselors and his therapist.
l4. The CASA testified that he attempted to set up a time to
talk with [Father] in July, 2017. Further, the CASA testified that
he attended the review hearings during the pendency of this case
and that [Father]’s whereabout[s] were unknown and could not
be ascertained from [Father]’s counsel during the pendency of the
case.
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15. Lastly, the CASA testified it is in [Child]’s best interest[s]
to remain in the foster home and be adopted by his foster
placement as the foster parents have provided a loving home and
care deeply about the minor child. The CASA testified that
[Child] is extremely bonded with his foster parents and that
[Child] is tired of being a foster child and wants to be adopted by
his foster parents.
[….]
The Child has been removed from the home and custody
of Mother and Father and has been under the supervision of
DCS for at least fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, and has been removed from his Mother and Father for
more than six (6) months pursuant to the terms of the
dispositional decree.
There is a reasonable probability that:
The conditions which resulted in Child’s removal and
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by
Mother and Father;
That continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to Child’s well[-]being.
Termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests.
There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the Child, that being adoption.
Order pp. 3–4, 6.
Discussion and Decision
[17] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further,
we acknowledge that the parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued
relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are of a
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constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights
when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.
In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,
parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s
interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate
the parent–child relationship. Id.
[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental
Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider
the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes
findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to
assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment
terminating a parent–child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn
therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal
conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact
or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[19] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) governs what DCS must allege and establish
to support a termination of parental rights:
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(A) that […] the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
[….]
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
[…]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
[20] Father contends that DCS failed to establish that termination is in the best
interests of Child or that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
Child. Father also claims that DCS’s failure to provide him with adequate
services deprived him of substantive due process.
I. Child’s Best Interests
[21] Father contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination is in Child’s best interests. We are mindful that in
determining what is in the best interests of Child, the juvenile court is required
to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the
evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185,
203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the
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interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. Moreover, we
have previously determined that the testimony of a child’s CASA and FCM
regarding the child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is
in the child’s best interests. See id. (“The testimony of [FCM] Fields and
[CASA] Dr. Heumann alone is sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that
termination is in the children’s best interests.”).
[22] FCM Sears testified that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Parents’
parental rights and for him to be adopted because Child needs stability, is
receiving the care he needs in his foster placement, and has been in the same
stable and loving home for the past three and one-half years. CASA Smoot
agreed that it was in Child’s best interests for the juvenile court to terminate
Parents’ parental rights to Child. CASA Smoot testified that adoption with his
current foster family would provide Child a loving, stable home in which he has
continued contact with other extended family members. While this testimony
is likely sufficient by itself to support a conclusion that termination is in Child’s
best interests, there is more.
[23] The record contains ample and undisputed evidence that Father has significant
issues with substance abuse, incarceration, and homelessness, much of which
evidence was provided by Father himself. There is also no dispute that Father
has not successfully completed even one service ordered by the juvenile court,
has not kept in contact with DCS, and has not visited Child since February of
2017. In addition, the record indicates that Child is thriving since his removal
from Father’s care. When Child was placed with his foster family in June of
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2015, he was terrified and developmentally delayed. As of the termination
hearing, Child was doing well in current placement and was engaging in
therapy to address some issues with acting out. Child has developed a good
routine in his foster placement and calls his foster parents “mom” and “buddy.”
Tr. p. 71. FCM Sears described Child’s placement as a “stable and loving
home[,]” while CASA Smoot described it as “a loving, stable home where
[Child] also has contact with extended family.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 71, 108.
[24] Father argues, essentially, that he should be given more time to prove that he
can be a good parent to Child, relying on the decisions in In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d
1257 (Ind. 2009); Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family & Children, 841
N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; and In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191
(Ind. 2009). None of these cases help Father, as they are all easily
distinguished.
[25] In G.Y., the mother committed a crime before her child’s conception. 904
N.E.2d at 1258. Several years later, the mother was arrested and sentenced for
her part in the crime after her child had been born. Id. at 1258–59. Upon
mother’s arrest, she arranged for childcare, but that care later failed, and DCS
took custody of G.Y. Id. at 1259. On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court
concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish that termination was in
G.Y.’s best interests. In doing so, the Court noted that the mother had taken
what steps she could while incarcerated to better herself, including completing
college classes that would help her provide permanency for the child upon her
release, making arrangements for housing and employment upon her release,
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completing a drug-rehabilitation program, and completing a parenting class. Id.
at 1262. The mother had also maintained a consistent, positive relationship
with G.Y., and, additionally, there was no evidence the mother had a pattern of
criminal activity likely to continue upon her release from prison. Id. at 1262–
63. The Court also noted that Mother was likely to be released soon. Id.
[26] The facts of this case contrast sharply with those in G.Y. Father’s criminal
conduct arose shortly after the underlying CHINS case began and continued
throughout the case, and he was again incarcerated and awaiting trial on two
pending criminal cases by the time of the hearing on the TPR Petition. Father
did not complete a single service ordered by the court, has not visited Child
since February of 2017, has never been in consistent contact with DCS (even
when not incarcerated), and has taken no perceptible steps to improve himself
by furthering his education or otherwise improving his employment prospects.
Father’s one tangible attempt at self-improvement, participation in the
Crossover program while incarcerated, did not take: Father did not implement
the post-incarceration phase of the program and has been charged with four
drug-related crimes since. The facts of this case are clearly a far cry from those
in G.Y.
[27] Father also seems to argue that his case is analogous to Rowlett. In Rowlett, an
incarcerated parent who was set to be released from prison just six weeks after
the scheduled termination filed for a continuance, which request was denied.
Id. at 618–19. The parent in Rowlett had not had a prior opportunity to engage
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in reunification services. Id. at 617–18. Moreover, while incarcerated, the
parent in Rowlett
took steps and made a good-faith effort to better himself as a
person and as a parent. […] Father had participated in nearly
1,100 hours of individual and group services, including services
in encounters, anger management and impulse control, parenting
skills, domestic violence, self-esteem, self-help, and substance
abuse. Father had also earned twelve hours of college credit
through Ball State University, maintaining a 2.33 grade point
average, and at the time of the termination hearing was enrolled
in an additional eighteen hours.
Id. at 622. We concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying the parent’s request to continue the hearing because under the
circumstances he was entitled to “a sufficient period following his release to
demonstrate his willingness and ability to assume parental duties.” Id. at 619.
As with G.Y., Rowlett is clearly distinguishable from this case, as Father wasted
his opportunities to avail himself of services and took no perceptible steps to
improve himself or his situation.
[28] Finally, Father’s reliance on J.M. is misplaced. In J.M., the juvenile court
denied DCS’s TPR petition based, in part, upon evidence that the parents were
being released early from prison and had completed programs during their
incarcerations, meaning that the child’s permanency was not prejudiced by
waiting upon parents’ release and waiting to further judge their fitness. J.M.,
908 N.E.2d at 194–96. After a panel of this court reversed the juvenile court’s
denial of the TPR petition, the parents sought transfer, arguing that the court of
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appeals had not found the juvenile court’s findings to be clearly erroneous and
had not relied upon the evidence most favorable to the juvenile court’s
judgment. Id.
[29] The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and agreed with parents that the
record supported the juvenile court’s decision that the parents’ “ability to
establish a stable and appropriate life upon release can be observed and
determined within a relatively quick period of time. Thus, the child’s need of
permanency is not severely prejudiced.” Id. at 196. The Indiana Supreme
Court concluded that the juvenile court’s order was not clearly erroneous and
affirmed the juvenile court. Id. J.M. largely addresses the standard of review in
these cases, which is highly deferential, and by which “[a]n appellate court may
not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court if any evidence or
legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment.” Best v. Best, 941
N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). Because J.M. stands for the proposition that the
juvenile court’s findings should not be disturbed if supported by the evidence,
J.M. is not really applicable here, where the juvenile court made findings
sufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights, and those findings are
unchallenged. Father has failed to establish error in this regard.
II. Plan for Care and Treatment of Child
[30] Father briefly seems to argue that DCS failed to establish that it has a
satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. DCS’s plan for the Child
if the juvenile court granted termination is adoption by his current foster
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parents. “For a plan to be ‘satisfactory,’ for purposes of the statute, it ‘need not
be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the
child will be going after the parent–child relationship is terminated.’” Lang v.
Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting In re Termination of Parent–Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,
268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. DCS’s plan for adoption
by Child’s current foster family easily satisfies this test, as even “(a)ttempting to
find suitable parents to adopt [the Children] is clearly a satisfactory plan.” Id. at
375 (citing Matter of A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). In any
event, DCS’s plan is more than just a general sense of direction, as FCM Sears
and CASA Smoot both testified that the permanency plan for Child was for his
current foster parents to adopt him. Father has failed to establish error in this
regard.
III. Due Process
[31] Father also argues that DCS failed to provide services to him during the CHINS
case. As an initial matter, there is no indication that Father raised this issue in
the juvenile court. To preserve a claim for review, “counsel must object to the
trial court’s ruling and state the reasons for the objection.” Durden v. State, 99
N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018). Father has waived this issue for appellate review.
Id. We choose to address this claim on its merits despite Father’s waiver.
[32] First, it is worth noting that proof of services offered parents is not an element
of termination proceedings. See In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct.
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Ohio App. 2009) (“failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to
directly attack a termination order as contrary to law”). That said, even if DCS
had been required to establish proof of services, it did so. The record is clear
that Father was provided services, and during 2016 he was cooperating with
those services to the point where it appeared he would be engaging in a trial
home visit with Child. Father, however, admitted that he stopped engaging
with DCS after he relapsed on methamphetamine in 2016 because he was either
homeless and/or in and out of jail. Father also admitted that while
incarcerated he did not reach out to DCS, claiming that he was indigent and did
not even have enough money to send a letter. There is no indication that DCS
failed to provide Father services.
[33] Finally, Father has not demonstrated that he requested additional services from
DCS. See Prince v. Allen Cty. DCS, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(“[T]he responsibility to make positive changes will stay where it must, on the
parent. If the parent feels the services ordered by the court are inadequate to
facilitate the changes required for reunification, then the onus is on the parent
to request additional assistance from the court or DCS.”). The record indicates
that after Father was released from incarceration, he “disappeared for over a
year where nobody could find him until DCS located him in the Jackson
County Jail, once again” in early fall of 2018. Tr. Vol. II p. 107. Father failed
to stay in contact with DCS or the CASA in order to be offered services and
therefore has no basis to complain now. See Jackson v. Madison Cty. Dep’t of
Family & Children, 690 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“A parent may
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-421 | August 1, 2019 Page 19 of 20
not sit idly by for such an extended period without asserting a need and desire
for services and then successfully argue that [he] was denied services to assist
[him] with [his] parenting.”), trans. denied. Father has failed to establish that he
was denied due process.
[34] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-421 | August 1, 2019 Page 20 of 20