Keenan J.P. Mardis v. State of Indiana

FILED
Mar 16 2017, 9:45 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Keenan J. P. Mardis, March 16, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A05-1610-CR-2327
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Terry C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Shewmaker, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1502-MR-1
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Keenan J.P. Mardis appeals his conviction for murder, a felony, following a
jury trial. Mardis raises the following two issues for our review:
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1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
his conviction.
2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error
when it instructed the jury.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 19, 2014, Mardis and others confronted Lenell Williams and
Ontario Brown on Wagner Avenue in Elkhart, near the Washington Gardens
apartments. One of Mardis’ companions, Zirei Jackson, began to fight with
Brown. During the fight, Mardis told Jackson to “take his belt when you knock
him out.” Tr. Vol. I at 139-40. Brown was wearing a designer belt worth about
$300.
[4] The fight between Jackson and Brown ended and the two groups began to walk
away from each other. But then Mardis “came out of nowhere,” “pulled a
revolver,” and “told [Brown] to give him his belt.” Id. at 145. Brown refused.
Mardis then shot Brown in the head and killed him.
[5] The State charged Mardis with murder, a felony. At his ensuing jury trial, the
court instructed the jury as follows, without objection from Mardis’ counsel:
Under the law of this state, a person charged with a crime is
presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of
innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each
element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove
his innocence or to prove or explain anything.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 60. The jury found Mardis guilty of murder and the
court sentenced him to fifty-eight years in the Department of Correction. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[6] On appeal, Mardis first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
to support his conviction. In reviewing such claims, “we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither
reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.” Griffith v. State, 59
N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). “We affirm the judgment unless no reasonable
factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Id. Mardis’ only argument on this
issue is that the State failed to show that he was the person who shot and killed
Brown.
[7] We cannot agree. At trial, Williams testified that Mardis was the person who
fatally shot Brown. Williams further testified that Mardis had told Jackson,
during Jackson’s scuffle with Brown, to get Brown’s belt, which Mardis had
then also demanded himself, at gunpoint, after the fight.
[8] According to Mardis, Williams was not a reliable witness because “he gave a
prior contradictory statement to police” in which he had initially stated that he
did not know who had shot Brown. Appellant’s Br. at 12. It is true that
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Williams acknowledged that he had initially told police that he “didn’t see
anything” the night of the murder. Tr. Vol. I at 151-52. But Williams also
clarified that he had not told the police the truth “the first day . . . [b]ecause [he]
was scared” of Mardis. Id. at 150. However, after later talking to Brown’s
mother, Williams informed the police of what he had actually seen. Id. And
Williams made clear in his testimony to the jury that “from just a few minutes
after [he] saw [the murder] until [the trial he has] always said . . . Keenan” was
the shooter. Id. at 151. Mardis’ challenge to Williams’ testimony on appeal
simply seeks to have this court reweigh Williams’ testimony and reassess his
credibility, which we will not do.
Issue Two: Jury Instruction
[9] Mardis also asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error when it
instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence. As our supreme court has
explained:
Appellate courts may, on rare occasions, resort to the
fundamental error exception to address on direct appeal an
otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. However, fundamental
error is extremely narrow and available only when the record
reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary
principles, when the harm or potential for harm cannot be
denied, and when the violation is so prejudicial to the rights of
the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.
Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 640 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted). With respect
to jury instructions, we usually consider: “(1) whether the tendered instruction
correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to
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support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction
was covered by other instructions that were given.” McCowan v. State, 27
N.E.3d 760, 763-64 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). We consider the
instructions as a whole and do not reverse unless the whole of the instructions
misled the jury as to the law in the case. Id. at 764.
[10] In McCowan, our supreme court declared:
A defendant in a criminal case is per se entitled to a jury
instruction that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defendant is
entitled to request the following jury instruction, and the trial court
must give this instruction if requested: “The presumption of
innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout the
trial. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the
defendant is innocent if you can reasonably do so.” If the
defendant adds to or varies this language in his request, inclusion
of that variation remains within the discretion of the trial court,
under the traditional three-prong analysis established by our
jurisprudence.
Id. at 766 (emphases added; citations omitted).
[11] Here, again, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Under the law of this state, a person charged with a crime is
presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of
innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each
element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove
his innocence or to prove or explain anything.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 60. On appeal, Mardis does not challenge whether
that language fails to instruct the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, he asserts, relying on
McCowan, that that instruction was fundamental error because it did not also
inform the jury that it was “required to maintain that presumption throughout
the course of the trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 12.
[12] Mardis misunderstands McCowan. The court in McCowan was unambiguous:
the defendant is entitled “to request” an instruction that the presumption of
innocence continues in his favor throughout the trial, and the trial court must
give that instruction “if requested.” 27 N.E.3d at 766. But Mardis made no
such request. Accordingly, the trial court had no burden to instruct the jury as
Mardis alleges. See id. Indeed, Mardis’ argument on this issue would remove
the burden of requesting additional information on the presumption of
innocence in the jury instructions from the defendant and place that burden on
the trial court. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 212 (Ind. 2016) (stating
that, to meet his burden to show fundamental error, the appellant must show
that the trial court erred in not sua sponte raising the issue). Mardis’ argument is
contrary to McCowan. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court
committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury, and we affirm
Mardis’ conviction for murder.
[13] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J, concur.
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