Vincent Morford v. TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy Expediting (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Nov 15 2016, 7:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ronald E. Weldy A. Richard M. Blaiklock
Barker Hancock & Cohron LLC Edward D. Thomas
Noblesville, Indiana Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Vincent Morford, November 15, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1603-PL-642
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy The Hon. John Hanley, Judge
Expediting, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Defendant. 49D11-1406-PL-18563
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff Vincent Morford (“Morford”) brought suit against his
former employer Appellee-Defendant TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy
Expediting (“Indy Expediting”) asserting various causes of action, including a
wage claim, intentional interference with an economic relationship, and
blacklisting. The trial court granted summary judgment for Indy Expediting on
the intentional interference with an economic relationship and blacklisting
claims, and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
[2] On appeal, Morford raises the following restated issues: whether the trial court
erred in granting Indy Expediting’s motion for summary judgment on
Morford’s intentional interference with an economic relationship and
blacklisting claims. Because Indy Expediting was justified in its disclosures to
Morford’s subsequent employer and the truthfulness of the content of such
disclosures was supported by the record, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Morford began working for Indy Expediting on or about March 7, 2013. Emily
Reeves served as Morford’s co-driver while he worked for Indy Expediting
delivering cargo. On March 22, 2013, Morford was terminated from his
employment with Indy Expediting as a result of failing his pre-employment
drug test.
[4] On or about May 24, 2013, Morford filed a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Indy Expediting. On June 21,
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2013, Morford wrote Indy Expediting a handwritten letter. In the letter,
Morford admitted that after he was terminated from Indy Expediting for testing
positive for cocaine, he was mad and “wanted to get even” so he “convinced
Emily to file charges” against Indy Expediting.1 App. Vol. 2, p. 42. Morford
went on to say that he “just became a Christian” and that he did not “want to
be a part of any deception anymore.” App. Vol. 2, p. 42.
[5] On or about August 5, 2013, Indy Expediting responded to a Performance
History Records Request from Morford’s subsequent employer Towne Air
Freight. In responding to this request, Indy Expediting disclosed that Morford
had failed a drug test, “filed false filings on company,” and “lied to dispatcher.”
App. Vol. 2, p. 44. Indy Expediting went on to state that it “never would rehire
him” and warned Towne Air Freight to “[p]lease be careful – we are having
him prosecuted for false allegations.” App. Vol. 2, p. 44.
[6] On or about August 20, 2013, Morford filed a second EEOC charge against
Indy Expediting. On February 11, 2014, Indy Expediting filed a Notice of
Claim against Morford in the Perry Township Small Claims Court. The claim
was based upon damages incurred as a result of the time Indy Expediting spent
investigating and disputing Morford’s allegedly false EEOC claims. On
February 19, 2014, Morford filed a counter-claim against Indy Expediting
alleging lost wages and harassment. On June 4, 2014, the Perry Township
1
Based upon the record, it is unclear what became of the charges that Emily Reeves allegedly filed against
Indy Expediting.
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Small Claims Court ordered the agreed dismissal of the parties’ pending claims.
Morford filed the present action later that day after the agreed dismissal.
[7] On June 4, 2014, Morford filed a complaint alleging that Indy Expediting had
violated the Wage Claims Statute, Indiana Code chapter 22-2-9; intentionally
interfered with his economic relationship with his subsequent employer Towne
Air Freight; and violated the Blacklisting Statute under Indiana Code chapter
22-5-3. On August 3, 2015, Indy Expediting filed a motion for summary
judgment. Morford filed his opposition on October 8, 2015. On December 21,
2015, the trial court granted in part, and denied in part, the motion for
summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment on Morford’s
intentional interference with an economic relationship and blacklisting claims,
but denied judgment on his wage claim.
[8] On January 20, 2016, Morford filed a motion to correct error and motion to
certify the trial court’s interlocutory order for appeal pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 15(B). Indy Expediting filed its opposition to the motion to
correct error and motion to certify on February 9, 2016. Morford filed his reply
in support of motion to correct error on February 15, 2016. The trial court
denied Morford’s motion to correct error on February 16, 2016. On March 18,
2016, Morford filed his motion to accept jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal
with this Court. This Court granted the motion on April 22, 2016.
Discussion and Decision
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Standard of Review
[9] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). At the trial court, the
summary judgment movant has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the
burden shifts to the non-movant to present contrary evidence showing an issue
for the trier of fact. Id. “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the
outcome of the case and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material
facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
[10] If the trial court grants summary judgment to the moving party, the non-moving
party has the burden on appeal to demonstrate to us that the grant of summary
judgment was in error. Id. During our review, “we carefully assess the trial
court’s decision to ensure that the [non-moving party] was not improperly
denied his day in court.” Id. Furthermore, we will only consider the
evidentiary matter that the parties have designated to the trial court and will
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.[11] Summary judgment is not intended to be a summary trial. Id. at 1003-04.
Consequently, Indiana has a relatively high bar for summary judgment and
“consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the
merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-PL-642 | November 15, 2016 Page 5 of 9
I. Intentional Interference with an Economic
Relationship
[12] In Count II of his complaint, Morford alleged that Indy Expediting had caused
“intentional interference with [an] economic relationship” between Towne Air
Freight and him. The elements of tortious interference with a business or
economic relationship are: “(1) the existence of a valid relationship; (2) the
defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s
intentional interference with that relationship; (4) the absence of justification;
and (5) damages resulting from defendant’s wrongful interference with the
relationship.” Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing Bradley v. Hall, 720 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Illegal
conduct by the alleged wrongdoer is an essential element of tortious
interference with a business relationship. Id. Further, the lack of justification is
established “only if the interferer acted intentionally, without a legitimate
business purpose, and the breach is malicious and exclusively directed to the
injury and damage of another. Bilimoria Computer Sys., LLC v. Am. Online, Inc.,
829 N.E.2d 150, 156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). However, “[t]he existence of a
legitimate reason for the defendant’s actions provides the necessary justification
to avoid liability.” Id. at 157.
[13] Morford alleges that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on a
claim not brought by him. Specifically, Morford argues that his claim is
contractual in nature because “[h]e began working for Towne Air Freight in
April 2013” and therefore, the existence of a contractual relationship should
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have been inferred by the trial court. App. Vol. 2, p. 70; Appellant’s Br. p. 9.
Nevertheless, Morford did not claim intentional interference with a contractual
relationship in his complaint. Moreover, the mere existence of a prospective or
actual employment relationship does not alter the claim that Morford himself
chose to bring in his complaint. The trial court did not err when it did not infer
a contractual relationship at summary judgment. Indeed, the trial court did
nothing more or less than rule on the claim that Morford himself brought in his
complaint.
[14] As discussed below in the blacklisting claim, there is evidence to support a
finding that Indy Expediting was justified in its disclosures to Towne Air
Freight. Indy Expediting did not initiate contact with Morford’s subsequent
employer. There is also no evidence that that Indy Expediting responded to the
Performance Request with the intent to be malicious or to injure Morford. The
pertinent information disclosed by Indy Expediting in the Performance Request
had been admitted to by Morford. Consequently, Indy Expediting was justified
in its disclosures which Morford claims to have caused interference with his
economic relationship with Towne Air Freight. Because the trial court granted
summary judgment on a claim that Morford himself made and uncontradicted
designated evidence indicates that Indy Expediting was justified in its actions,
we affirm the trial court’s ruling in this regard.
II. Blacklisting
[15] Under Indiana Code section 22-5-3-1(b),
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An employer that discloses information about a current or former
employee is immune from civil liability for the disclosure and the
consequences proximately caused by the disclosure, unless it is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
disclosed was known to be false at the time the disclosure was
made.
Additionally, the statute “does not prohibit a person from informing, in writing,
any other person to whom the discharged employee has applied for
employment a truthful statement of the reason for the discharge.” Ind. Code. §
22-5-3-1(a). Moreover, when interpreting this statute in the past, we have
recognized that “[e]mployers and their agents are immune from civil liability
for the disclosure of truthful information to subsequent and potential
employers.” Steele v. McDonald’s Corp., 686 N.E.2d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997).
[16] In the present case, Morford had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence on his blacklisting claim. Consequently, Morford had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed by Indy
Expediting to Towne Air Freight was known to be false at the time the
disclosure was made.
[17] The disclosures at issue were made on or about August 5, 2013, in response to a
Safety Performance History Records Request. App. Vol. 2, p. 44. Specifically,
among other things, Indy Expediting disclosed Morford’s failed drug test. Indy
Expediting was required to make such disclosure under 49 C.F.R. Section
40.25(h) because his failed drug test was the reason for his termination.
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Moreover, Morford himself admitted to failing the drug test in the letter he sent
to Indy Expediting on June 21, 2013. App. Vol. 2, p. 42. In that same letter,
Morford indicated that he “wanted to get even” and therefore “convinced
Emily [Reeves] to file charges” against Indy Expediting. App. Vol. 2, p. 42.
However, Morford went on to explain that he “just became a Christian” and
that he “[did not] want to be a part of any deception anymore.” App. Vol. 2, p.
42. Based on the evidence, Indy Expediting did not violate the Blacklisting
Statute when it disclosed a truthful statement involving Morford’s discharge,
nor was it a violation to disclose statements that Morford himself admitted to.
Such statements were not “known to be false” by Indy Expediting. Morford
did not meet his burden at the summary judgment phase and the trial court did
not err when it granted Indy Expediting’s request for summary judgment on the
Blacklisting claim, Count III of Morford’s complaint.
[18] We affirm.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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